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Birzeit University Address at the Opening Session of Conference to Launch the
Human Development Report 2004 ≠ Palestine (18 December 2004)
Address by Birzeit University
On behalf of Birzeit University and its Secretariat Council, administration, and institutes, I am pleased, at the opening
of this address, to welcome you to this conference on human development in Palestine, and to thank you for your
attendance and participation, which will be rich and distinguished. I would also like to emphasize that Birzeit University
has always been committed to the betterment of Palestinian academic life and to providing the best possible
educational programs.
Through its simultaneous and equal commitment to its national, community-based duties, our university programs
carry out a comprehensive roster of research and community-based initiatives that contribute to policymaking, guide
the decision-making process, and raise community awareness. During these critical times, we concentrate on
providing living examples of perseverance and persistence in work and life, despite trying conditions and the political
and daily dilemmas in which we are entangled. We at Birzeit University strive for our programs to be national and
universal, extending to all Palestinian areas, reaching marginalized locales and social groups, in a continuing
affirmation of their ability to contribute and participate. We distribute our programs across numerous social welfare
endeavors, such as eradicating illiteracy, continuing adult education, community-based health, the environment, law,
human rights, social studies, sustainable human development, and many more.
Today we open the Launching Conference of the 2004 Human Development Report in Ramallah and Gaza to reap the
fruit of our joint efforts. The report we place in your hands focuses on empowering the Palestinian people in the tasks
of national liberation and development in order to arrive at wider and more effective involvement. To promote the role
of the Palestinian people, we must acknowledge that our reality was and remains dependent on people’s resoluteness
and restored abilities to come up with creative solutions to life’s difficulties. This comes with the realization that the
institutional infrastructure (governmental and community-based) serves as a means of organizing individual and
collective action for the Palestinians, as well as a crucible for aggregating their initiatives. However, this structure has
not yet been able to invest proactively in the latent abilities of the Palestinian people to the extent that they become
pioneers in the development process and benefit from it as citizens with full rights.
This present report represents a Palestinian scientific effort, in its study of the subject of empowerment as basis for
attaining independence and effecting development in Palestine. What distinguishes this effort is that it does not offer
ready-made prescriptions for “magicò solutions to the deteriorating Palestinian circumstances. Rather, it poses
essential questions about the Palestinian situation, searching for answers through assessment of cumulative
Palestinian experience. On the other hand, the sections of the report do not merely propose what must be done to
escape from the disintegration. Rather, the report strives to offer mechanisms and tools for bringing about the
necessary practical breakthroughs.
The concept of empowerment that the report proposes encompasses numerous elements: 1) activating the role of the
people and strengthening them, with the goal of promoting the ability of various groups, especially those that are
oppressed, so that they might enjoy sovereignty over their lives; 2) the importance of joining in activities and
structures that allow participation by the people; 3) highlighting the importance of providing for basic needs and
providing the institutions necessary for generating and restoring the abilities and skills of individuals within society; 4)
expanding the areas and bounds of participation and decision-making; 5) awareness of basic rights and freedoms; 6)
development of a national economy based on the freedom of intelligent use of natural and environmental resources;
and 7) providing the infrastructure and a suitable environment for growth.
I must, on this occasion, offer my thanks and appreciation to Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia for his encouragement and
support of this conference and to the many that helped make this report a success. The university is deeply grateful to
the United Nations Development Programme for its continued support of Birzeit University and especially the
Development Studies Programme. We extend special thanks to Mr. Timothy Rothermel and Mr. Sufyan Mashasha.
We also thank the Ministry of Planning for its effective and beneficial partnership, and we would especially like to
ii
recognize the contributions of the Minister as well as Mr. Mohammad Ghadia, the ministry’s Human Development
Officer. We also thank the members of the Conference Preparatory Committee, and we extend thanks to the
members of the Advisory Committee, who guided the preparation of this report during its various stages in Gaza and
the West Bank—they are the ones who made issuing this report under these circumstances possible. We also thank
the members of the Ministerial Committee for their tremendous effort in developing and reviewing the report. The
university also wishes to take this opportunity to express its great admiration for the staff of the Development Studies
Programme, along with its director, Dr. Nader Said and all of those who work in the program.
Finally, I would like to invite all of you—in the capacity of your valued professional positions representing all sectors of
Palestinian society—to look seriously at the report results and attempt to derive practical benefit from its proposed
recommendations and suggestions for policy change in order to advance the Palestinian condition. We have begun,
and all that is before us is to remain on our path and attain the goal of national liberation associated with sustainable
human development. We only have one option and that option is to succeed. We can achieve our goals if we work
from strong scientific foundations, through wide participation, and within an institutionalized, democratic environment.
I thank you very much for your participation in our conference, and I hope we will see you on many coming occasions
in our joint effort to raise our people to new heights and to achieve the best for this nation.
Nabil Kassis
President of Birzeit University
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Address by the Ministry of Planning
Ministry of Planning Address at the Opening Session of the Conference to Launch the Human Development Report
2004 ≠ Palestine (18 December 2004)
We welcome you to the launching conference for the fourth Human Development Report, which addresses an
important theme in the life of the Palestinian people: “Empowerment of Palestinian Individuals and Society.” The
report is subtitled “Hope for the Future: Toward Empowering Palestinian Society through Investment in Social Capital
”  and was prepared by the Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University, in partnership with the Ministry of
Planning and the Ministerial Committee, which coordinated its efforts, and with the support of the United Nations
Development Programme.
The report offers a development-based, empowering vision for Palestinian individuals and society under a set of very
complex external and internal conditions—with the continuing Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and the sweeping
aggression continuing for four years against the Palestinian people and their daily existence.   These conditions have
resulted in destruction, siege, starvation, the weakening of official institutions and NGOs, and the fragmentation of the
Palestinian economic and social fabric—as well as in the reliance of development in Palestine on outside support, and
the accompanying problematic issues in terms of vulnerability and dependency. In spite of this, as the report points
out, there are hundreds of points of light shining from the initiatives of individuals, groups, governmental organizations
and NGOs. Herein we can find a host of effective mechanisms for determination, perseverance, and continuity.
I would like to highlight the program of Palestinian reform approved by the present government, extending from
1 September 2004 through 1 September 2005. Its practical application will contribute substantially to overcoming the
weaknesses and flaws in the official executive, legislative, and judicial establishment, and pave the way for a process
of greater empowerment for Palestinians.
The Ministry of Planning has worked to consolidate and shape national development plans. When the situation was
averse to crystallization of long-range plans, as a result of the extraordinary and unforeseen conditions brought about
by the Israeli aggression, the ministry created contingency plans and labored to restore economic and social stability
to prevent further deterioration. Recently, in cooperation with various development partners (the public sector, private
sector, and civil society), the ministry formulated a development vision making the people the target and the
generators of the development process and linking aid and development. Moreover, it completed a middle-range plan
for 2005-2007, also with a participatory approach, with a central theme of curtailing poverty and unemployment and
building state institutions through:
- Securing social protection
- Investing in social, human, and material capital
- Investing in good institutional governance.
- Creating a suitable climate for private sector development.
Achieving the aforementioned goals will further Palestinian empowerment and help them to remain steadfast on the path
toward attaining their national right to return, self-determination, and establishment of a democratic Palestinian state.
Ghassan Al-Khatib
Minister of Labor and Acting Minister of Planning
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Address by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP/PAPP)
It is my sincere pleasure to be with you today as we announce the theme of the next Palestinian Human Development
Report. Empowerment as the cross-cutting strategy for Palestinian development is the topic of exploration and
discussion in this initiative. We hope this strategy will generate dialogue and influence development thinking and
practice in this very challenging context.
Let me first thank Birzeit University and the Development Studies Programme for the invaluable role they played in the
preparation of the fourth Human Development Report, and in particular Dr. Nader Said, director of the Development
Studies Programme.   I also extend my thanks to the Ministry of Planning for its support and active engagement in the
process.  And finally, a note of appreciation for my colleague, Sufian Mushasha, at UNDP/PAPP,  as well as to the
many others who will be involved in the publication of this very important report.
I believe empowerment serves as one of the cornerstones of the human development approach - all people must
have a voice and work as active agents of development.  By using empowerment as an entry point to the development
process, we move the debate beyond practitioners, institutions and agencies — directly to the Palestinian people,
who are the primary drivers of the process.   The Human Development Report will attempt to broaden and deepen
internal dialogue among Palestinians on the nature of empowerment efforts to date and its approach will resonate with
national and international institutions that continue to play an integral role in the development process.
This initiative represents a process of collective thinking with regard to the application of the empowerment
approaches both at this juncturein the present and in the longer term.  Collective engagement in the empowerment
process is a pressing need for Palestinian society at the present timeright now, as well as for future generations.
I thank you once more for your attendance and active participation and extend my best wishes for the success of this
conference.
Timothy Rothermel
Special Representative for the UNDP/PAPP
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DSP              Development Studies Programme
MOEHE              Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MOF              Ministry of Finance
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MOH              Ministry of Health
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Human Development Report 2004 ≠ Palestine
Executive Summary
The Human Development Report ≠ Palestine (PHDR) covers the years 2003 and 2004. As it was being prepared, the
Palestinian situation suffered numerous political, social, and economic setbacks that reflected two contradictory
phenomena. The first was seen in systematic destruction and severe deterioration on virtually all levels, inflicted
mainly by the practices of the occupation but magnified by internal structural faults in the political and institutional
spheres. On the other hand, Palestinians have displayed hope, steadfastness, and perseverance throughout these
difficult times, qualities which found expression in many creative initiatives that bore testament to the eternal
endurance of hope for a better life characterized by liberty, equality, and peace.
The Palestinian people have been engaged for decades in dual endeavors:  the work of national liberation on the one
hand, and furthering development on the other. Within the framework of these endeavors, it is essential to activate
and strengthen the role of the Palestinian people, who are at the same time the creators of the strategies to achieve
these goals and the target of the goals.   Therefore, the present report focuses on the empowerment of Palestinians
as the basis for strengthening Palestinian society building, with all that this entails in terms of possessing moral
strength as well as quantitative abilities, as two necessary components that are indispensable for reviving the spirit of
human initiative and action.
The late President Yasser Arafat served as both symbol and leader of the Palestinian experience, with all of its
achievements and differences. In his absence, there are new challenges for uniting Palestinians in action for national
liberation and development. Perhaps the upcoming elections and the completion of the reform agenda are the most
important opportunities to prove the collective Palestinian ability to safeguard their national aspirations and to ready
them to achieve independence and freedom. This will require establishing internal Palestinian relationships based on
the principles of  institutionalization and the rule of law, complementary relations between governmental organizations
and NGOs, and the synchronization of political, cultural, educational, and development visions and methods. In the
Palestinian context, these foundations must be built upon first, as they are central to any empowerment effort.
The 2004 PHDR is an attempt to assess the various aspects of the Palestinian condition as a first step toward an
integrated approach to the development of Palestinian individuals and society and to strengthen the social fabric
needed to support our national liberation and development activities. To this end, each section of the report addresses
these aspects from two perspectives. From the first perspective, the general Palestinian condition is assessed in
order to gain an understanding of what exists, what is hoped for, and what is possible given internal and contextual
challenges. The second perspective analyzes major forces influencing independence and development, such as
occupation, external factors (especially international funding), and the role of Palestinian governmental organizations
and NGOs. These lead to general and sector-specific recommendations for how efforts can be channeled in the most
productive way possible.
The PHDR poses a set of essential questions. The answers to these questions—not only in academic terms, but also
in terms of changes in attitude and behavior on the ground—can serve to move society from a state of fragmentation
and disintegration to a state of empowerment that will preserve the Palestinian social fabric and consolidate its
abilities and potential to achieve humanitarian and national goals. The PHDR poses the following questions for both
Palestinian and international institutions:
  What is the role of institutions in empowering Palestinian society to achieve its legitimate rights as stipulated in
United Nations conventions?
  How can institutions help strengthen the fabric of Palestinian society in order to preserve unity and commitment in
the face of challenges?
  What is their role in attaining true empowerment of the individual, as well as groups that represent the individual and
serve as advocates for individual human rights?
  What structural changes have development institutions achieved to further integrate marginalized groups into
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society and to allow them to participate fully in the development process and enjoy its benefits?
One of the most significant messages of the PHDR is that in order to answer these questions, local and international
institutions will need to radically change the way in which they view their past and future roles in advancing the
Palestinian agenda. Therefore, the PHDR aims to:
  Provide an objective Palestinian perspective of empowerment as a basis for achieving development and
independence based on the cumulative experience of Palestinian society.
  Expand and deepen internal Palestinian dialogue on vital issues affecting the Palestinian present and future on a
scientific and systematic basis and within the framework of the analyses put forth by a number of Palestinian experts.
  Establish an organic, studied, and evidence-based relationship between the tasks of national liberation and
development-based institution building which fully incorporates an awareness of the Palestinian context.
  Increase active participation in policy- and decision-making at all levels of Palestinian society, starting with the
approach adopted in preparing this report, which involved many Palestinian experts, institutions, and grassroots
community members. Chances for success are increased by widening the framework of participation and the sharing
of responsibility.
  Highlight Palestinian development initiatives by presenting experiences within the 101 Points of Light project and, in
so doing, demonstrate the success of Palestinian development efforts and initiatives at the project level, affirming the
necessity of strengthening that work and of development coordination to bring about the desired development changes
on a general level.
  Offer a number of recommendations that may benefit decision-makers, such as general guidelines on future
Palestinian work as well as program-specific policies. These recommendations must encompass work on two levels:
the macro level, to include all parties concerned with the issue of Palestinian development, as well as the sector level,
involving governmental institutions, civil society organizations, and others.
Perhaps the most important conclusion of the PHDR is that empowerment as defined in the Palestinian context
means promoting the vast potential within Palestinian society so that it can maintain its presence on Palestinian land
and evolve into a viable society, capable of preserving its cultural and national identity and of developing all its
resources. This requires the activation of all of society’s dormant energies —residing in its individuals, institutions, and
system of values—and developing them in order to accomplish its historic endeavor of self-determination and building
an independent state. Therefore, the PHDR presents a number of general recommendations, which provide the basis
for additional, more detailed recommendations. These general recommendations include:
  The need, in the work of Palestinian institutions, to link the national liberation dimension and the human dimension.
The first dimension requires mobilizing resources and abilities to bolster people’s steadfastness, to enable them to
stay on their land, to coalesce in the face of the policies of fragmentation and disintegration imposed by the
occupation, and to validate and shore up the resistance while also negotiating political issues with Israel successfully
and effectively. The human dimension requires mobilizing all resources at our disposal in order to create a climate
conducive to the generation and restoration individualsß capabilities and skills, promoting a collective spirit of initiative,
and protecting the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens. This will require the involvement of all society’s
institutions, supported by a broad and organized grassroots base to keep them strong and to protect all achievements
in the areas of empowerment and resistance.
  The need for the empowerment vision to arise from recognition of the negative effects of Israeli occupation, along
with the need to seriously address internal obstacles and challenges.
  Ensuring the readiness of political will and necessary resources to convert development-empowerment visions into
clear and specific goals.
  Aligning the development agenda with the priorities of Palestinian society by involving all sectors of society,
especially the private and NGO sectors, in setting this agenda. The empowerment process is based primarily on the
2
perspectives and interests of the general population as established through free and uninhibited public discourse.
Encouragement of public debate will restore faith in the Palestinian individual’s role in the development process, not
as a powerless and visionless recipient of aid and assistance, but as a proactive part of the empowerment process
through intellectual and practical involvement.
  Viewing empowerment as cumulative and sustainable process linked to every sector of society rather than a
temporary, separate, and independent process.
The purpose of holding a public conference to launch the publication of the Human Development Report was to invite
feedback from the greatest possible number of groups, organizations and individuals, thereby increasing the numbers
of those who have contributed to its development, and enriching its contents with the views, suggestions, and
recommendations of concerned local and international experts and institutions.
The conference also served as an additional guarantee of the report’s objectivity, neutrality, and richness in its quest
to examine the Palestinian condition and striving to change it for the better. To this end, the discussions, suggestions,
and recommendations of conference participants were incorporated into the final version of the report. Participants
were drawn from local and international governmental organizations and NGOs, and the conference was held
simultaneously in Ramallah and Gaza, thereby ensuring full participation representatives from all geographic areas
within Palestine.
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Introduction to the Report and the Environment Constraining
Development and Independence
This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the general characteristics of the environment constraining
Palestinian development and independence.  It is an environment in which scenes of the systematic
destruction and deterioration of a society exist side-by-side with examples of the hope, determination, and
perseverance found within its people.   It presents a conceptual adaptation of what is meant by
empowerment in the specific Palestinian context, offering a starting point for a new role of the Palestinian
people, one in which they are full participants in carrying out the tasks of national liberation and
development. This chapter also presents the report message and methodology.
Chapter One

The Palestinian people are looking
toward the future.   They endeavor, both
individually and collectively through
their institutions, to secure better
opportunities for coming generations,
even as they are confronted by
extraordinary challenges. Perhaps
Palestinian society’s extraordinary skills
and human resources in all areas have
boosted their capacity to endure,
persist, and resist in the face of attempts
to deny the justice of their cause. The
Palestinians continue to demand
recognition and implementation of
international resolutions related to a
peaceful resolution of the ongoing
conflict.  Foremost among those
resolutions are those that affirm the right
of self-determination for the Palestinian
people that offer solutions to the issues
of borders, refugees, settlements, and
Jerusalem as the basis for arriving at
peaceful coexistence.
The Palestinian case is a particular and
unique example of the empowerment
experience. The Palestinian society
and its formal and informal institutions
have a singular capacity to deal with
crises and find creative solutions to
problems, as well as the ability to
continue to    adhere to high personal
standards     without forsaking the
quest for national liberation.
The exceptional character of the
Palestinian case is heightened when
one takes into account the magnitude
of the assault to which Palestinian
society is exposed, along with the
systematic destruction of its capacities
and the efforts to destroy its
foundations. This assault would have
led any less capable society into
greater social, economic, and political
deterioration. But the fabric of
Palestinian society and the depth of its
experience in the area of   resistance
—meaning the humanitarian and
peaceful approach to resistance
espoused by the overwhelming
majority of Palestinian cit izens,
characterized by continued
endurance, efforts to halt deterioration
and to rebuild - have together
contributed to a strengthened
determination to overcome all
hardships and attain legitimate human
rights. Given the need to place
emphasis on all positive aspects of
Palestinian action, the report offers a
“Points of Light” series, representing
shining examples of successes
achieved on the path to human
development.
Section One: Introduction and Background to the Report
Point of Light 1: The Palestinian People are a
Peace-Loving People
Excerpts from speeches of the late President Yasser Arafat before
the Palestinian Legislative Council on 29 April 2003, and before the
Special Session of the Legislative Council on 18 August 2004:
 “Ladies and gentlemen, people of the world:  The Palestinian
people are a people who love just and comprehensive peace and
struggle on its behalf. A people striving for security, stability, and
prosperity and working to attain them. A people longing to see its
country, its neighbors, and the region learn to coexist, build, and
cooperate. But, at the same time, they are a people who know how
to stand fast.  They cherish their rights and not relinquish any of
them. So help them to help you.”
 ”[There] were wrong and detestable practices within some
institutions. Some people have abused their positions and were
unfaithful in their jobs. The process of building up our  institutions
was not as carefully monitored as it should have been.  Inadequate
efforts were exerted towards the establishment of the rule of law,
the activation of the judicial system and consecration of the
principles of accountability. Therefore, I would like, officially, to call
upon you to launch together today nationwide effort for
comprehensive reforms, an effort that  incorporates all aspects of
the work of our Authority, an effort that seeks, through a concrete
program of action, to achieve all that can be achieved under
continued occupation, siege, and aggressionÆ”
The Palestinian people are
looking toward the future.
They endeavor to secure
better opportunities for
coming generations.
The PHDR offers a “Points of
Light” series, representing
shining examples of
successes achieved on the
path to human development.
7Chapter one: Introduction to the Report
The processes of empowerment
continue in spite of the continuing
deterioration on virtually every
polit ical, economic, social, and
institutional level. This is in addition to
Point of Light 2: Olive-Picking Season in the
Palestinian Territories
In the Palestinian consciousness, olive trees are more than just a source of
nourishment or profit. The olive tree is a symbol of Palestinian perseverance
and Palestiniansß holding fast to the ground in the face of efforts to uproot them.
It is also an image of their past, rooted deep in the history of human civilizations,
as well as an embodiment of their present resistance and the revival of their
hope for a free, peaceful future. So it is perhaps unsurprising that the Israeli
occupation targets olive trees—cutting them down, bulldozing them, and burn-
ing them as both symbolic and systematic destruction of all that represents the
Palestinian national identity. The occupation forces and settlers uprooted 500,000
trees (80 percent of which were olive trees) during the first Palestinian Intifada.
The Israeli practice of  targeting the agricultural sector, farmers and their lands
has continued during the second Intifada, (referred to as the “Al-Aqsa“ Intifada).
The following statistics demonstrate that the occupation endeavors to destroy
both dreams and hope:
 In the West Bank, approximately 750,000 dunams of land are planted with
olive trees, comprising about 50 percent of all cultivated agricultural land in
Palestine (and about 80 percent of the orchard lands). Further, there are an
estimated 10 million olive trees, producing on average 18,000 tons of olives
per year, comprising 12 percent of the total value of agricultural output.
 Access to approximately 19,000 dunams of Palestinian agricultural land
has been cut off by the Separation Wall, preventing their proprietors from
reaching them. During the years of the Intifada, approximately 10,000 dunams
of land were bulldozed in order to construct the Wall, or to build bypass
roads and expand Israeli settlements, or as a form of collective punishment.
 Approximately 15,000 dunams of Palestinian land planted with olive trees
are located within areas categorized as  Israeli “security zones“, meaning
they are located near settlements or along settlement roads, making it
difficult, if not impossible, for the Palestinian olive farmers to tend to their
trees. These security zones are concentrated in the suburban areas of the
cities of Nablus, Salfit, and Tulkarem.
 A staggering total of approximately 42,000 dunams (or about 6 percent of
the land dedicated to olive production in Palestine) has been damaged,
confiscated, restricted, or destroyed.
 As a result of the above violations, the lost olive yield this season is
estimated at approximately 2,100 tons of olives. The monetary value of this
loss is approximately $8.4 million, without taking into account future losses
from the trees permanently damaged or destroyed.
the ongoing illegal occupation of
Palestinian land, which seeks to
systematically destroy all efforts to
achieve sustainable development.
Quantitative data and qualitative
Continuation of illegal
occupation of the land
subjects the process of
development to systemetic
distruction.
The institutional infrastructure
of the Palestinian National
Authority has been targeted in
order to impede its work and
destroy its effectiveness.
1-1 Empowerment in the Midst of Deterioration
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analysis confirm that the current state
of deterioration threatens the future of
the fabric of Palestinian society at its
most fundamental level ≠ the level of
basic daily needs, which are crucial to
the attainment of any acceptable level
of human development. All that has
occurred during the current Intifada
clearly reflects an intent to deliberately
destroy all amenities of Palestinian life,
Point of Light 3: International Law against the Wall
On 9 July 2004, the High Court of Justice at The Hague issued its advisory opinion with regards to the Separation
Wall Israel is constructing on Palestinian territory. The most important points of this opinion are as follows:
 “The construction of such a Wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of several of its obligations under
the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.”
 “Israel is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction on the Wall being built in the
occupied Palestinian territories, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure
therein situated…”
 “The Wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime gravely infringe a number of rights of
Palestinians residing in the territories occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot
be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public orderÆ”
 “Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East JerusalemÆ”
 “All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the
Wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such constructionÆ”
 “The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what
further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the Wall and
the associated regimeÆ”
On 20 July 2004, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the advisory opinion issued by the Court at
The Hague and affirmed what was contained therein, calling on all states party to the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel for the Convention.
Moreover, on 30 June 2004 (i.e., nine days before the Court at The Hague issued its decision), the Israeli High
Court ruled that a 30-kilometer stretch of a 40-kilometer section of the Wall around the occupied city of Jerusalem
is illegal and harms the Palestinian inhabitants. However, despite its principal ruling on the illegality of that section
of the Wall, the Israeli military leadership has the authority to erect the Wall so long as it alters the current route.
External factors influence the various political, economic, and social realities as evidenced in the political    pressure
that is brought to bear via donor funding. As a result, the operations of government and nongovernmental
Palestinian institutions have come to depend almost entirely on outside funding. This situation has increased
Palestinian society‘s vulnerability to these external powers and has in turn weakened their own internal
capacities, which are crucial to sustainable development and empowerment. Palestinians are completely at the
mercy of outside powers, particularly the occupying forces, which have created a relationship based on the
logic of force and autocracy.  External forces have played a pivotal role in the Palestinian experience from the
outset of the peace process, which continues through all subsequent negotiations and agreements, including
the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority on the lands occupied as of 1967.
using the pretext of “security” and
operating under the guise of
“combating terrorism”- to carry out this
planned destruction.
The institutional infrastructure of the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has
been targeted in order to impede its work
and destroy its effectiveness.  Citizens’
9Palestine - Human Development Report 2004
Box 1-1: Resistance to the Separation Wall
The grassroots campaign against the Separation Wall started with an
initiative by the Palestinian Environmental Nongovernmental Organizations
Network (PENGON), which began working against construction of the wall in
October 2002. The campaign was launched in an attempt to halt the Wall‘s
construction and to expose the true objectives of the Israeli government. This
campaign relies on the work of grassroots committees that organized
themselves to oppose the construction of the Separation Wall.   PENGON
coordinates with them on activities and agendas.
The campaign has made great strides since its founding, becoming the central
resource for information and activities related to the subject. Pressed by need,
it began expanding its activities, extending beyond its original launch site to
include additional sites that the Wall reaches and threatens. The campaign
established emergency centers in affected villages to collect information and
document developments on the ground in addition to coordinating grassroots
committee activities. The campaign currently has operational centers in Juyous,
Qalqielya, Tulkarem, Jenin, Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Salfit.
Campaign members include affected farmers, NGOs, local council and
municipal representatives, members of the local Land Defense Committees,
and political activists from the country’s different governorates. The campaign’s
primary objective is to focus media attention on its work and to mobilize the
international community in solidarity against the Separation Wall and the
Palestinian occupation.  The campaign has succeeded in this regard.  It now
serves as the primary source of information for the media and the center for
activities on the ground ≠ working to mobilize world opinion in opposition to
the Wall. The campaign has not neglected the role of active national political
groups, but considers them an important part of resistance efforts.
The campaign is still actively rallying behind its central mission: a complete
halt to further construction of the Separation Wall, a dismantling of sections
already built, return of the land to its rightful owners and financial
compensation for losses incurred during construction of the Wall.
homes are demolished, municipal
infrastructures damaged, residential
centers are cut off from one another,
Palestinian workers prevented from
reaching jobs inside Israel, settlements
are continually expanded, and more and
more Palestinian land is seized.
And yet all of these daily measures—in
spite of their impact—seem inconse-
quential compared with the effects of the
Separation Wall being built by Israel and
the devastating long-term implications
of its continued construction.
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The past years have seen quantitative
and qualitative deterioration in the degree
of institutionalization achieved by the
Palestinians. Some infrastructure
advancements have been deferred,
without taking into consideration the
specifics of the existing Palestinian
situation, in which the tasks of national
liberation and institution-building are
intertwined. This deterioration has caused
a retreat in the process of  internal
construction and made haphazard,
scattered activity the rule rather than the
exception. This comes as an extension
of what occurred during the years
following the establishment of the PNA.
During that time its institutions were
managed with a mindset which created
detrimental consequences on two levels:
the structural level and the cultural
values level. On the structural level, it
furthered the entrenchment of
individualism and authoritarianism within
the Palestinian political system, and
slowed transformation of the political
system’s foundations. On the level of
cultural   values, it fragmented established
elements of cultural and social values,
and instead promoted individualistic,
selfish value patterns at odds and in
conflict with goal of developing
Palestinian society‘s own capacity to
undertake the tasks of liberation and
economic advancement.
The current Intifada exposed
infrastructural weaknesses in
Palestinian public institutions,
especially the institutions of the PNA
— their methods for coping with the
current conditions and the responsible
stewardship of public interests. It also
revealed the lack of vision and the
absence of a clear methodology for
confronting challenges inherent in many
Palestinian institutions.   These
deficiencies significantly contributed to
a general sense of malaise and a
gradual destabilization of Palestinian
society as a whole. Consequently, the
social structure and its newly built
foundations came disastrously close to
the point of collapse — incapable, at
least for the time being, of mounting any
serious resistance to the internal and
external challenges it faced.   Other key
social institutions:  the family, the
religious establishment, civil society
institutions, and political parties — were
each affected by the slow deterioration.
Slowly, a gulf opened and widened
between the PNA and its political
institutions and the society it purported
to serve.  A growing state of chaos,
1-1-2 The Weakness of Institutionalization is
Anti-Empowerment
Point of Light 4: Demands for Reform through
Peaceful Means Alone
Despite the Palestinian public’s doubts about the seriousness of
many leadership figures who call for reform (particularly within the
Authority   leadership), popular support for reform is high. Among
those polled, 72 percent supported the calls for reform made by
leaders within the Palestinian Authority, as compared to 21 percent
who do not think reforms are needed.
Likewise, a significant percentage of the Palestinian public finds
the Authority‘s calls for reform lacking in credibility: 38 percent of
those polled viewed the calls for reform as serious, 40 percent did
not, and 22 percent of those polled had no opinion. This distrust
might be explained by the fact that 57 percent of those polled thought
that personal motives lay behind the recent calls for reform.
In the same context, 40 percent of those polled believed President
Arafat to be serious in the promises he made before the Legislative
Council in August 2004 to implement comprehensive reforms,
whereas 27 percent considered him somewhat serious, and 28
percent of those polled believed he was not serious. Further, 52
percent of those polled regarded the PNA as not serious about
reform, whereas 37 percent had confidence in reform efforts.
As for the position of the Palestinian public with regards to the means
used to bring about social change, it was clear that the overwhelming
majority (90 percent) support peaceful means of demanding reform,
and a similarly high percentage of the public (ranging from 77 to 85
percent) reject violent forms of resistance, such as the abduction of
foreigners or figures within the Authority, or armed marches.1
The past years have seen
quantitative and qualitative
deterioration in the degree of
institutionalization achieved
by the Palestinians.
The Palestinian social structure
and its newly built foundations
came disastrously close to the
point of collapse — incapable,
at least for the time being, of
mounting any serious
resistance to the internal and
external challenges it faced.
1 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Program, Results of Public Opinion Poll No. 19, 5 October 2004.
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security lapses, and the perception that
no institutional protection existed for
Palestinian citizens led to the
fragmentation and decline of popular
resistance.
This decline led to a rise in internal
conflicts within Palestinian society.
Calls for internal reform came from all
sides and with multiple agendas, but no
coherent outlines of goals or methods
of reform were forthcoming. For
example, as the formal judiciary
system and its processes broke down,
calls for system-wide reform came from
all  quarters.  With no guiding authority
or central plan for reform, application
of the rule of law continued to
disintegrate.  Instances of civilians
“taking the law into their own hands
“ became more and more commonplace,
with the resulting deterioration of the
Palestinian social fabric and the loss of
a sense of security and order.
1-1-3 Empowerment: A Human ≠ Universal State
The Palestinian situation may be
described as one of general or collective
poverty.  The whole society is subject to
poverty, impoverishment, and loss of
individual and collective rights, and is held
hostage to the needs and interests of
another people through an occupying
government. Indeed, improvement in
individual income levels or economic
averages that seem high compared with
undeveloped or neighboring nations is not
coupled with actions to build up a
sustainable development foundation or
any internal development mechanisms.
Thus, traditional development indicators,
whether quantitative or qualitative,
cannot fully depict the Palestinian
situation, especially in the present period
which exhibits unprecedented
reversals in economic, education, and
health indicators.
At the same time, a state of collective
empowerment exists, based on human
capital and social organization, along
with a deepening of practical
experience in the area of emancipatory
development.   Emancipatory
development is a complex process that
balances the needs of a resistance
culture with the need for social and
humanitarian advancement.  It requires
that the basic resources for existence
be secured, and that institution
building and institutional reform
take place simultaneously in a
changing environment.
This duality is accompanied by
another, related duality that is equally
important: micro-empowerment and
macro-empowerment. On the one
hand, Palestinian society provides
exceptional examples in the areas of
civil society, institutional, democratic,
and human rights development—on
both the individual and institutional
levels. However, these initiatives have
not been systematically implemented,
and therefore have failed to bring
about a measurable result as a whole.
Empowerment on the macro level
requires fundamental changes in the
state of general poverty; an eradication
of the factors that create systemic
impoverishment and that prevent
society from building the stable and
wide-reaching foundations it needs for
sustainable growth.  Transformation of
individual and group initiatives into a
comprehensive plan for nation-building,
in every sense of the term, requires
changes to the surrounding
environment. Successful nation-building
institutions must possess at their core a
sincere vision, an action plan and
carefully chosen priorities. Nation-
building institutions are expected to
address a set of essential questions,
including the following:
 How will it serve to empower
Palestinian society to attain the
legitimate rights stipulated by United
Nations conventions?
The Palestinian situation may
be described as one of
general or collective poverty.
At the same time, a state of
collective empowerment
exists, based on human
capital and social
organization, along with a
deepening of practical
experience in the area of
emancipatory development.
Empowerment on the macro
level requires fundamental
changes in the state of
general poverty.
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 How will it strengthen the fabric of
Palestinian society and help it to unite
in the face of challenges?
 How will it serve to advance the genuine
empowerment of the individual and groups
that represent the individual and seek the
preservation of human rights?
 How will it increase levels of
participation from marginalized
groups-such as the unemployed, women,
persons with disabilities, and others-so as
to include them in society and allow them
to fully partake in the  development
process and its rewards?
These core questions will require
Palestinian institutions to adopt a new
perspective in how they view their past
and future contributions to society.
Box 1-2: The Internal Priorities of the Palestinian Public
In April 2004, a survey of the views of Palestinian residents toward current economic and social conditions showed
that 38 percent of Palestinian families regard obtaining food as their foremost priority.  Another  twenty-one
percent of families rank work as their first priority, and 20 percent rank financial support as their first priority.
Another 8 percent rank educational services first, and the same percentage rank health services first.2 Moreover,
the results of Poll No. 19, issued by the Development Studies Programme (2004), showed that improvement of
the economic situation and provision of internal security are among the most important  priorities:
Distribution of Palestinian Priorities by Areas of Concern and Region
In terms of occupation-related issues, ending the occupation, removal of the occupation forces from
Palestinian areas, and halting construction of the Separation Wall have come to occupy a permanent place
on the list of Palestinian priorities
The Human Development Report 2004
focuses on promoting the role of the
Palestinian people in carrying out the tasks
of national liberation and development.
The report provides an examination of the
primary structural, institutional (external
and internal), and societal obstacles that
prevent wider and more effective
participation in    social development and
hinder progress toward the goal of
creating a decent life for the Palestinian
people. The report recognizes that the
Palestinian situation has always
depended on people’s willingness and
ability to create solutions to life’s
dilemmas. Our institutional infrastructure
(government and community-based)
organizes the activities of Palestinian
individuals and groups and serves to
aggregate individual initiatives into a
Transformation of individual
and group initiatives into a
comprehensive plan for
nation-building requires
changes to the surrounding
environment.
The 2004 PHDR focuses on
promoting the role of the
Palestinian people in carrying
out the tasks of national
liberation and development.
Despite the uniqueness of the
Palestinian case, it nonetheless
exists within the general
framework of universal human
experience.
Section Two: Report Theme
1-2-1 Empowering the Palestinian People: the Individual,
the Group, and Society
2 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Survey of Palestinian Residents on Socio-Economic Conditions: April 2004, May 2004, p. 5.
Gaza Strip
37%
16%
9%
10%
6%
4%
West Bank
33%
19%
10%
6%
8%
2%
West Bank & Gaza Strip
35%
18%
10%
8%
7%
3%
Areas
Improving the economic
situation
Providing internal
security
Reducing the unemploy-
ment problem
Combating corruption
Supporting the cause of
persons with disabilities
Strengthening rule of law
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working whole. However, our institutional
infrastructure has not as yet been able to
fully mobilize the Palestinian people’s
untapped potential, enabling them to
become pioneers in the development
process and to benefit from it as citizens
with full citizenship rights.
Despite the uniqueness of the
Palestinian case, it nonetheless
exists within the general framework of
universal human experience. Any
discussion of Palestinian development
and empowerment would be
incomplete without the support from
the vast body of human development
literature and empirical experiences.
These theoretical and practical
historical perspectives offer a starting
point for what must be done in Palestine.
However, it is necessary to take into
account the cultivation of concepts of
development, with the associated
indicators and mechanisms, which
accord with the specifics of the
Palestinian context. The development
literature is in agreement that the
concept of empowerment defines a set
of processes and relationships designed
to activate the role of the people and
strengthen them. Empowerment seeks
to promote the ability of marginalized
groups, especially the oppressed, to gain
and enjoy sovereignty over their lives.
Sovereignty is gained through
involvement in matters directly
affecting the individual. Empowerment
fosters self-governance by engaging an
individual‘s abilities, not with the goal of
directing them against  others, but rather
to bring about social change through
positive interaction with others and with
an awareness of the  nature of the
community-based structure.
1-2-2 The Concept of Empowerment within the Specific
Palestinian Context
Since “a person cannot live on bread
alone,” a comprehensive understanding
of empowerment necessitates
recognition of the following intertwined
and interdependent dimensions:
1. The provision of basic needs in terms
of food, water, housing, education, and
health, along with what that requires in
establishing needed levels of social
expenditure and allocating the necessary
funding for these needs through the
relevant institutions and programs.
2. The presence of institutions to
generate and restore the abilities and skills
of members of society on two levels: The
first level is related to increasing individual
abilities or individual intellectual capital,
primarily through educational institutions
of various levels; training institutes,
technical skill development programs, and
centers for the various vocational trades;
and academic research institutes,
preserving the close relationship between
the consumption and production of
knowledge. The second level is related to
improving social capital through all types
of social groups:  political parties, unions,
cooperatives, syndicates, associations,
and clubs.
3. Expansion of the boundaries for
participation and decision-making on
various levels, beginning with the
family, moving on to the market and
civil society, and ending with the state.
Participation is regarded as a
fundamental component of citizenship,
with all of its rights and duties,
including those that strengthen
institutionalized participation that is
direct, at the level of the individual, or
indirect, through elected representatives
and proxies. These components
include: participation in election and
nomination; respect for the rights and
freedoms of others; participation in
decision-making that impacts the life
and future of society; helping to build
a society of solidarity, with all that
means in terms of participating in
volunteer activities and works; and
belonging to institutions, organizations,
The concept of empowerment
defines a set of processes
and relationships designed to
activate the role of the
people and strengthen them.
Participation is regarded as a
fundamental component of
citizenship, with all of its rights
and duties
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parties, and syndicates. At the same
time, citizenship implies various duties,
such as paying taxes, which go toward
cultivating and restoring social
capacity, developing a social security
network, and other areas.
4. Awareness of and working to
possess basic rights and freedoms,
which are the rights set forth in
international conventions and
agreements, including both the rights
of the individual and the rights of the
group. Individual rights include
citizenship rights; a person’s right to life,
education, suitable housing, work, a
clean environment, a healthy life, and
social security; the right to organize;
and the right to express opinions and
beliefs. Collective rights include the
rights of minorities (i.e.  women,
ethnic, religious, the disabled or others
with special needs or interests),
Box 1-3: Excerpts from United Nations Resolutions on the Right to
Self-Determination, Statehood, and Development
Palestinians derive the strength of support for their case from numerous sources, including the belief in the
legitimacy of international resolutions.  These resolutions serve as a credible reference for settlement of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a manner that balances Palestinian aspirations for liberation, independence, and
sovereignty and Israeli aspirations for a state that enjoys security and good relations with its neighbors, along
with both sidesß need for equality and peaceful coexistence. These resolutions include the following:
 General Assembly Resolution 194 (December 1948): “The General Assembly, having considered further the
situation in Palestine… Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid
for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property…”
 Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967): “The Security Council, expressing its continuing concern
with the grave situation in the Middle East, emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war
and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security… 1. Affirms
that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the
area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity… (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing
the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area…”
 Security Council Resolution 338 (October 1973): “The Security Council 1. Calls upon all parties to the present
fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately… 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to
start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its
parts; 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the
parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”
 Declaration on the Right to Development (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/128/41, 4 December
1986): 1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development,
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 2. The human right to development also
implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination…”
 Security Council Resolution 1397 (March 2002): “The Security Council…Affirming a vision of a region where
two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders…Demands immediate
cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction…”
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the right to exercise self-determination
and liberation from external control, and
the right to development.
5. The development of a national economy
capable of employing the labor force,
contributing to its training and the
acquisition of needed skills, and
upgrading those skills  to develop the
economy’s capacity to support and
sustain society and to generate adequate
revenue to cover basic social
expenditures; education, health, and
social services.
Box 1-4: The Relationship between Human Development and Knowledge
The attainment of knowledge is one of the basic human rights to which a person is entitled simply by being human.
The attainment of knowledge is also a means of furthering all areas of human development. At its core, human
development is a sustained desire to liberate people from unacceptable conditions within a specific context and to
create access to higher states of human existence, which lead to an increase in the acquisition of knowledge.
Thus, in the present era of human progress, it may be said that knowledge is a means of attaining our highest
social and ethical objectives: freedom, justice, and human dignity for all. In Palestinian society, and Arab society
generally, promotion of cultural and intellectual awareness as well as the need for free public discourse on
political, social and economic issues is required in order to effect social action and advancement.  However, it
is also necessary to acknowledge the existence of two interconnected problems hindering this advance: The
first is the prevailing intellectual mindset, which is based on a culture of being mired in the past. The second is
the ineffectiveness of knowledge transfer and acquisition systems in Arab societies generally.3
In the Palestinian context, the
comprehensive concept of
empowerment is expanded
to mean:
 A set of linked and continuous
processes of challenge and resistance
designed to bring about change in the
substance, trends, and relationships of
power through the ability to act, control,
and challenge undesirable conditions.
 At the personal level, empowerment
refers to acquiring knowledge,
Empowerment is a set of
linked and continuous
processes of challenge and
resistance designed to bring
about change in the
substance, trends, and
relationships of power.
awareness, and confidence and
experiencing and exercising power
within a clearly defined and agreed upon
social contract.
 At a group relations level, empowerment
means the ability to negotiate and effect
change. Therefore, empowerment
includes the establishment of relation-
ships between people as individuals and
groups, regardless of social strata, in a
fair and equal manner, in terms of both
economic capacity and political power.
 Added to this are independence and
societal sovereignty, which refer to the
ability of individuals and groups to live
in a stable society that enjoys freedom
and independence and has the
inherent ability to preserve its   fabric and
reasonably control its fate in its
interaction with the global system.
1-2-3 Investment in the Palestinian People and the
Dialectic of Development and Resistance
Any effort to rebuild Palestinian society
must begin with investment in the
Palestinian people as individuals and
groups and with correction of all
structural conditions that limit their ability
to enjoy their rights.  A society built on
these foundations will be able to further
its struggle for emancipation from
occupation, injustice, and oppression.
Investment in the Palestinian
people is the basis for any
effort to rebuild Palestinian
society.
3 United Nations Development Programme and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Arab Human Development Report for 2003, p. 37. See also: Birzeit
University ≠ Development Studies Programme, A Knowledge  Community and Possibilities for Development: Palestinian Contributions in the Arab Human Development Report
for 2003, 2004.
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Therefore, the Palestinian people must
possess a certain set of moral traits and
values if they are to regenerate their
abilities and their creativity. These traits
and values include awareness of self
and others, self-confidence, and a
commitment to human rights, along with
the ability to exercise these rights through
legitimate, appropriate opportunities,
gained through possession of and
participation in the  utilization of  society’s
natural and human resources.
Thus, empowerment has comprehensive
aspects with material, moral, cultural,
political, economic, and social
implications which work to eliminate all
relationships based on dependence,
vulnerability, and alienation.  These are
the traits which currently characterize
Palestinians ß interactions with the
outside world and with Israel as well as
the authoritarian and alienating
characteristics relationships present
within Palestinian society today.
Given that the tasks of national
liberation and society building are
linked, emancipatory development
must serve as the starting point for the
reconstruction of Palestinian society, as
articulated in Palestinian literature (and
as was pointed out in the 2002
Palestinian Human Development
Report), along with securing the
inalienable right to self-determination
and the right to    sustainable human
development. For if empowerment
means-which it does-expanding
people’s options so as to expand their
participation in the decisions that affect
their fates, then the right to
self-determination on the      collective
and individual level is the starting point
for the reconstruction of society, as well
as the basis for confronting the
challenges and obstacles on the path
toward liberation and development.
Palestinian empowerment is integrally
linked to collective resistance of basic
negative realities, primarily the
continuing occupation. Likewise, it is
linked to changes in the nature of the
Palestinian economy and its capacity to
attain relative independence and
generate job opportunities for the tens
of thousands of unemployed. Efforts in
this area are tied to rebuilding institutions
so as to arrive at true statehood as
relates to these vital issues. Despite the
importance of continuing the processes
of  reforming the agencies and
institutions of the PNA, lasting   success
will not  occur without a comprehensive
political program on the Palestinian
issue.     Expanding the  concept of
empowerment requires  incorporating a
number of components, including:
 Firmly integrating the processes of
legitimate, popular resistance and striving
toward peace for all peoples of the region.
 Managing resources so as to strike a
balance between relief and
development needs.
 Halting the decline of PNA institutions
and empowering them.
 Providing basic social services, such
as education, health care, and poverty
alleviation programs.
 Strengthening the Palestinian economy
to the greatest extent possible and
preventing its paralysis and degradation.
This adaptation of the concept of
empowerment within the specific
Palestinian context means bringing
together the aforementioned elements
to formulate three integrated strategies:
a strategy of determination and
steadfastness, a strategy of resistance,
and a strategy of negotiation. While
these strategies are distinct, they are
all necessary for realization of the full
range of human rights within the
changing circumstances dictated
by local, regional, and
international conditions.
The right to self-determination
on the collective and
individual level is the starting
point for the reconstruction
of society.
Empowerment has
comprehensive aspects with
material, moral, cultural,
political, economic, and social
implications.
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Point of Light 5: Public Opinion Polling and Participation
Public opinion studies and polls in Palestine hold a special significance since they facilitate measurement and analysis of the
views of Palestinian society toward social, political, and economic issues. The history of these studies is tied to the early 1990s
and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. With the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993, Palestinian public polling
was first undertaken by approximately ten Palestinian organizations in June 2004. The work of these organizations and
centers expanded, along with the subjects they addressed, according to political and informational developments, until they
came to include: political and social views; electoral conduct; issues of reform, accountability, and transparency; and
evaluation of the public and civil society sectors and their services.
 The fourth PHDR, covering the years
2003 and 2004, addresses the present
state of Palestinian political, economic,
social, and institutional conditions and
their impact on Palestinian national
goals — development goals and goals
of liberation alike.
The report comes at a critical
juncture in the history of the
Palestinian people, providing data,
analyses, and recommendations that
lay the foundation for community-based
discussion of the future of the
Palestinian people and the type of
society it strives to build. The report can
play a pivotal role in steering
Palestinian efforts if governmental and
nongovernmental institutions adopt and
activate the concepts, guidelines, and
recommendations that it offers as a start-
ing point for working toward the society
that Palestinians are striving to achieve.
 The current report is entitled “Hope for
the Future: Toward Empowering
Palestinian Society through Investment
in Social Capital.”  Thus, its principal
endeavor is setting down the
quantitative and qualitative indicators
concerned with strengthening the social
fabric in order to develop a fundamental
assessment (bringing the theoretical,
academic and research aspects of the
public debate together with practical
experience grounded in reality) of what
may be done — indeed, what must be
done—within the Palestinian context.
The report presents general and
specific guidelines and recommendations.
Their adoption may help push the
Palestinian debate forward in its striving
for independence, a just peace, and
development toward modernization.
Although the report offers a critical,
in-depth analysis of the previous period, it
takes an optimistic view of the future.
Palestinian society, with the resolve of its
members, can serve as a model for
human development, justice, social equity,
freedom and preservation of the
environment, as they work to  achieve full
equality through respect for the rights of
all sectors of society, including women,
young adults, children, persons with
disabilities, and the working classes.
1-3-2 Report Methodology
 The 2004 PHDR was prepared using
a participatory approach based on the
involvement of all actors in Palestinian
society, including PNA institutions,
political groups, NGOs, professional
and grassroots organizations and
unions. The report    methodology
helped to raise awareness of the
gravity of the Palestinian situation.  It
also impressed on representatives of
these groups the collective responsibility
for awakening the individual and
collective  energies of Palestinian
society to work   toward refortification
of the components of Palestinian
society to stave off imminent threats.
Section Three: The Message and Methodology of
the Report
1-3-1 The Message of the Report
The PHDR can play a pivotal
role in steering Palestinian ef-
forts if institutions adopt and
activate the concepts,
guidelines, and
recommendations that it offers.
The current report is entitled
“Hope for the Future: Toward
Empowering Palestinian So-
ciety through Investment in
Social Capital.ò
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 The report was prepared by two advisory
committees, a technical committee and a
ministerial committee (whose work was
coordinated by the Ministry of Planning),
and a research team composed of elite
Palestinian researchers. It also involved
cooperation with the staffs of many
Palestinian institutions, which helped in
writing background papers and supplying
the work team with information necessary
for the report.
 A large body of background papers and
research studies were prepared for the
report, and scores of Palestinian experts
contributed to their preparation.
 Focus groups and workshops were held
in throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip
to discuss the report’s theme and
methodology, as well as the issues it
addresses. Participants in these workshops
included women, men, young adults,
refugees, workers, children, and
representatives of governmental
organizations and NGOs.
 The present report is a scientific
Palestinian effort to study the subject of
empowerment as a basis for advancing
development in Palestine. What
distinguishes this effort is that it does not
offer ready-made prescriptions or “magic”
Point of Light 6: The Continuing Work of the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics
The PCBS was founded with the establishment of the PNA in 1994, is the official source of Palestinian social
statistics and is responsible for building a comprehensive national statistics system, relying on international
standards to produce official figures.
Since the PCBS’s founding, it has issued more than 700 statistical publications and carried out scores of field
surveys in various population, social, economic, and geographical areas. The most widely distributed
publications were issued in the period prior to the current Intifada: the Establishment Census of 1994, the first
Demographic Survey of 1995, the General Population and Housing Census of 1997, and the National
Conference on Statistics and Policies of 1999.
Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, along with the accompanying Israeli hostilities, the PCBS has faced
numerous hardships and obstacles, most importantly: the policy of closures and siege, the general security
situation, the extremely heavy workload, and the demands of that workload in terms of finding access to
adequate financial and qualified human resources. On top of this, at the end of 2001, the Israeli forces occupied
the PCBS headquarters and deliberately destroyed everything inside.
The PCBS thus redoubled its efforts to ensure continued provision of statistical data—that which is routine and
that which reflects the new situation. For this purpose, the PCBS established a specialized unit called the
Statistical Monitoring Unit. Additional measures taken to adapt to the conditions of the Intifada and ensure
continuation of its work include:
 Applying a flexible (decentralized) work system, allowing employees to work in the governorates where they live.
 Putting in place a system of compensation for work hours lost as a result of closures or curfew.
 Coordinating with national organizations and NGOs to obtain assistance for the employees.
 Holding training courses for field researchers in the governorates, and using video-conferencing systems
between Ramallah, Gaza, and Nablus.
The most important routine surveys that the PCBS prepared during the Intifada include: a series of annual
economic surveys, a monthly consumer price    index, the demographic health survey, the youth survey, and the
child labor survey. Statistical activities developed in response to the conditions of the Intifada include: a weekly
field survey of the impact of Israeli measures on the Palestinian economy, a survey of the impact of Israeli
measures on the family and Palestinian children, and four rounds of a survey of the impact of the Separation
Wall on economic and social conditions.
The 2004 PHDR was
prepared using a participatory
approach based on the
involvement of all actors in
Palestinian society.
Focus groups and workshops
were held in throughout the
West Bank and Gaza Strip to
discuss the report’s theme
and methodology.
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Box 1-5: The 101 Points of Light Project
Despite all of the efforts to strip the Palestinian people of their resolve and crush their potential and
abilities- which were limited from the outset—the Palestinian people provide living examples of individual and
collective ability and creativity, which preserve their capacity to resist and endure. Within this framework, the
101 Points of Light project was conceived as part of the participatory approach to preparing the present PHDR.
This project highlights development experiences, including individual, group, and institutional initiatives focused
on local development and empowerment. The process of collecting information on such initiatives has
strengthened the ability of the research team to examine and analyze real-life efforts of individuals and groups
within local society in order to better understand their mechanisms of coping and overcoming challenges. Also,
examining people’s real-life experiences helps policymakers and planners stay in touch with local realities and to
develop and adopt plans based on actual local experiences.
 In selecting initiatives to publish in the report, consideration was given to the diversity of projects, including: individual
and group initiatives; local, national, and international efforts; institutional and non-institutional projects; and
governmental and non-governmental activities. A range of spheres of activity are included:   politics, health, education,
agriculture, social solidarity, culture and arts, media and technology, human rights, marginalized groups, and others.
A committee from the PHDR team selected the initiatives to be included. Objective selection criteria were
devised to ensure that these initiatives represent different fields, exhibit creativity and novelty in their concepts
and goals, and demonstrate community participation and activate local resources.   The initiatives also needed
to be compatible with the goals of human development by targeting marginalized groups, with special attention
to underprivileged individuals, institutions, and groups.
Initiatives presented in the 2004 PHDR were nominated directly by Palestinian individuals and institutions that are
connected with or knew about these initiatives. These initiatives do not include all of those received by the
Development Studies Programme (DSP). Rather, a number of initiatives were selected as representative of a
multitude of fields and various levels of  action. There are certainly thousands of exemplary, beneficial initiatives
within Palestinian society, and the report could not include all of them. Those  initiatives that did not reach us or were
not included in the report are hereby applauded.
In preparing the report, data
from the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics was used.
solutions to deteriorating Palestinian
circumstances. Rather, it poses
essential questions about the
Palestinian situation, and seeks its
answers through assessment of
cumulative Palestinian experiences. But
the objective of this report is not merely
to identify areas of concern and
deterioration. The report strives instead
to offer mechanisms and tools for
bringing about necessary practical
breakthroughs.
 The analyses in the report adhere to
scientific and objective standards. They
are in no case an attempt at
self-flagellation or placing responsibility
for shortcomings and the current state of
decline on others. Rather, they buttress
the report’s credibility and trustworthiness
from a methodological standpoint only.
From a practical standpoint, this
objectivity is manifest in the attention to
accuracy in describing the situation as
well as in assigning realistic weight to the
factors involved in the current decline and
the responsibility of all parties to work to
correct these problems.
 In preparing the report, data from the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
(PCBS) was used. When this data was
unavailable or not up-to-date, data
issued by local and international
research and development institutions
was used.
 It has also incorporated forms of
qualitative research through studies of the
situation and in-depth interviews with
relevant persons (details on the
methodology are provided in the appendix).
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Box 1-6: Summary of  “The Poor Speak Out: National Report on
Participatory Poverty Assessment (Voice of the Palestinian Poor)4
Poverty is defined as the inability to meet basic needs of individuals and families. These needs include healthy
food, clothing, housing, adequate education for family members, and the capacity to fulfill social obligations.
According to those living in poverty, it is a condition  associated with different groups and is the result of various
influences, such as unemployment, the inability of earned income to cover a family‘s needs, seasonal
employment, low-wage employment, subsistence farming, widowed and divorced women supporting children,
wives of unemployed persons, and various other groups. Moreover, the poor linked poverty to various
conditions, including the absence of work opportunities, illness and physical disability, advanced age, lack of
job qualifications and education, and traditional restrictions, especially those imposed on women.
Suggestions by the poor to challenge poverty focus on three main aspects:
 Expanding and creating employment opportunities within the local economy.
 Providing an improved infrastructure of public services.
 Creating a social safety net.
The poor evaluate the institutions they deal with in the following ways:
Health services: In government clinics and hospitals, the poor complained of a shortage of services, treatment
options, and medicines; a lack of physician specialists, and a lack of necessary equipment.  In regards to the
United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) clinics, the poor residing in the camps thought that these clinics
help to alleviate their suffering, but problems arose when there was a need for advanced treatment.
Educational services: The poor (especially in remote areas) complained of the shortage of schools and
classrooms and the problems of overcrowding, which force many students to travel to schools in other localities.
Social assistance: The poor said that social assistance is limited, irregular, and excludes a large proportion of the poor.
Agricultural assistance: Farmers complained of the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Agriculture’s services.
There is a shortage of agricultural inputs (such as cuttings and fertilizers) provided by the ministry as well as
poor monitoring of the use of pesticides and agricultural chemicals and additives.
Local government institutions: The poor criticized the level of services provided to the municipalities. They
said that garbage collection is the only regular service provided and that municipalities pay inadequate
attention to infrastructure construction and rehabilitation.
NGOs that deal with the poor: Large numbers of the poor praised the regular assistance and medical services
provided by the Zakat Committees. The poor complained about credit and lending institutions, some of which
require collateral or a guarantor as a pre-condition for loans. Moreover, loan amounts are insufficient for setting up
projects that generate adequate levels of income, and interest is high and the payment periods are short.
 The value of participatory approach was strengthened through study and analysis of a number of local and
national initiatives in the various areas of development. The study and analysis of such initiatives (the “Points of
Light”) helped to deepen the applied and practical dimensions of the report.
4 Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation & UNDP. The Poor Speak Out: National Report on Participatory Poverty Assessment (Voice of the Palestinian
Poor). Ramallah, 2002.
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The Israeli vision of
settlement was limited to
concessions by neighboring
nations in return for
normalization of Israeli-Arab
relations.
1-4-2 The Impact of International and Regional Changes
1-4-1 Israeli Occupation and
Systematic Destruction of
the Potential of Palestinian
Society
Israeli military aggression continued
and reached dangerous heights after
the full-scale invasion of the West Bank
in April 2002. During this invasion,
Israel destroyed Palestinian infrastru
cture and institutions, besieged the
headquarters of the late president
Yasser Arafat, and declared the
absence of a Palestinian peace
partner. Israel created conditions
designed to alter the structure of the
PNA in accordance with American and
Israeli objectives, couched in the
language of reform. It also began to
build the Separation Wall, which is
approximately 750 kilometers in length,
and will annex 58 percent of West Bank
land and establish new facts on the
ground to advance the Israeli agenda
for the desired contours of the final
resolution. Numerous local and
international reports provide relevant
data, clearly showing the systematic
destruction of Palestinian society
during the past four years.
Section Four: The Environment Constraining
Development and Independence
Israel began to build the
Separation Wall, which is
approximately 750 kilometers
in length.
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The peace process between the
Palestinians and Israelis came during a
period marked by dramatic global
changes. Indeed, it may be said that the
peace process was an offshoot of these
changes on the regional level. Most
important among these changes was the
collapse of the Soviet Union and
consequent consolidation of a new,
unipolar world order, and the first Gulf War
and deepening crises within official Arab
establishments overall. Without delving
into the details of political twists and turns
the peace process has taken since
establishment of the PNA, it may be said
that peace negotiations were the result
of underlying regional changes, which
pushed the parties toward negotiation of
a new formula for settling the conflict. In
reality, however, these negotiations were
in response to pressure by the United
States to realize its vision—which went
beyond merely settling the conflict in
Middle East.
To an equal degree, Israel has never
worked towards a principled, peaceful
resolution to their conflict with the
Palestinians. The Israeli vision of
settlement was limited to concessions
by neighboring nations in return for
normalization of Israeli-Arab relations.
Exploiting its undisputed superiority,
Israel rejected peace based on
recognition of the occupied people’s
right to self-determination and the
concessions it would require of Israel.
Within this general framework, Israel
was able to turn its back on the signed
agreements, and it continued to act as
an occupying power even after the
establishment of the PNA, particularly
given the favorable American treatment
of Israel in the peace process. The
Israeli occupation plan centers on
preserving most of the occupied land
while getting rid of the Palestinian
demographic burden by transferring
authority for overseeing the Palestinians
to another party.
Thus, the failure of the peace effort was
part of the general atmosphere of
negative developments in the
Palestinian situation, a scene
completed by the weak performance of
the PNA. The PNA failed to keep a
minimum level of its promises to build
a Palestinian government founded on
institutionalization, development, and
attainment of economic prosperity so
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as to pave the way for its eventual
sovereignty over the land and success
in the Palestinian national endeavor-
the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem
as its capital.
The changes cited above exacerbated
the overall repression of the
Palestinian people. Perhaps the failure of
the Camp David talks gave the
Palestinians and  Israelis renewed
justification for  opening a new chapter
in the conflict. On the Palestinian side,
Table 1-1: Land Confiscated in Residential Areas in the Path of the Wall,
according to Governorate, Ownership, and the Number of Families and
Individuals Who Were Displaced or Isolated West of the Separation Wall as
of August 20035
Box 1-7: Siege of the Holy City of Bethlehem
Since the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada, Bethlehem has been subjected to intense Israeli siege, cutting
the city off from the rest of the West Bank, especially the city of Jerusalem. As a result, Bethlehem‘s economic
base was totally destroyed, since it had hitherto been greatly dependent on tourism (and religious tourism in
particular). In 2002 alone, the city was under curfew for 156 days.
At present, Bethlehem is encircled by nine Israeli settlements and more than 10 kilometers of the Separation
Wall (whose length around Bethlehem is expected to extend 63 kilometers), in addition to approximately 78
barriers (checkpoints, cement and earthen blockades, and iron gates).
These measures have led to increased restrictions on freedom of access to the holy sites in Bethlehem and
Jerusalem, in contravention of Article 12 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which
includes the freedom of movement, and in contravention of the advisory opinion issued by the International
High Court on 9 July 2004, which mandated that Israel endure freedom of access to the holy places that came
under its control after 1967.
among the people at least, the idea of
negotiating with the Israeli government
became an absurd notion.  The
Palestinians grew certain that
attainment of national independence
would require creative modes of
resistance, and an active approach to
managing the conflict that went well
beyond sitting on opposite sides of a
negotiating table. On the Israeli side,
they deduced that Palestinians would
grant no concessions in the absence
of the use of military force.
5 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Survey on the Consequences of the Separation Wall on Residential Centers in the Path of the Wall, August 2003.
Governorate
Jenin
Tulkarem
Qalqielya
Salfit
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Total
Area of Confiscated Land (dunams) Displaced Persons
Persons Isolated West of
the Wall
Government
37143
2465
800
40
12
0
40460
Private
20261
37395
49077
6000
7934
3656
124323
Total
57404
39860
49877
6040
7946
3656
164783
Families
113
59
100
0
130
0
402
Families
918
1119
395
2
10040
8
12482
Individuals
664
422
600
0
637
0
12323
Individuals
5223
7166
2388
15
27220
85
42097
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Thus, the Intifada set the stage for
retrenchment by the warring parties.
The Israeli government found the
conditions favorable to commence
tearing down the recently built
foundations of the Palestinian national
endeavor—both its liberation and
state-building components. Israeli
policies unequivocally target the
abilities and potential of the
Palestinian people for systematic
destruction, through such measures as
Box 1-8: Excerpt from the Arab Peace Initiative6
 There will be no success for peace in the Middle East unless it is just and
comprehensive, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338,
and 425 and the principle of land for peace, and affirming the necessity of the
Syrian and Lebanese issues and their integral connection to the Palestinian
issue in achieving the Arab goals for a comprehensive resolution.
 The Council of the Arab League further calls for full Israeli withdrawal from
all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights,
to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied territories in the
south of Lebanon.
 Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be
agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194,
and the acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent
Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
 Consequently, the Arab countries shall undertake the following: Consider
the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and
achieve security for all the states of the region; establish normal relations
with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace; assure the rejection
of all forms of Palestinian repatriation in the Arab host countries.
demolition of homes and institutions,
bulldozing farmland, urban siege,
ethnic cleansing, and starving people
out. The Israeli occupation aims to
reduce all of the Palestiniansß viable
options to a bare minimum, and so to
bring about their eventual
collapse and surrender.
Internal and external pressures have
required the PNA to change the
structure of the executive branch. The
There will be no success for
peace in the Middle East
unless it is just and
comprehensive.
office of prime minister was created on
17 March 2003, and Mahmoud Abbas
(then Secretary-General of the Executive
Committee of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization) was charged with the
responsibilities of forming the
government, whose structure had been
ratified by the Palestinian Legislative
Council at the end of April 2003.
Perhaps the collapse of the Iraqi
regime and redoubled international
and regional efforts to end the freeze
in the Israel i-Palest inian peace
process pushed the Israel i
government to engage in the
process of implementing the Road
Map. The first steps were shaky
however, beginning with the failure
of the Aqaba summit between the
Palestinians and Israelis attended by
the US President George Bush and
Jordan‘s King Abdul lah I I .  The
summit fai led when the Israel is
The Israeli occupation plan
centers on preserving most of
the occupied land while
getting rid of the Palestinian
population
6 Clauses from the Arab Peace Initiative, which was announced at the conclusion of the 14th Arab Summit, held in
Beirut on 28 March 2002.
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attempted to tie the Palestinians to a
set of security conditions they had no
hope of implementing.
The cycle of violence subsequently
resumed. At the same time, the US
vision of a new political order in the
Middle East was being advanced by the
US administration while the official Arab
establishment became increasingly
fragmented over the issues of Iraq, the
war on terrorism and the issues of
democratic reform within Arab
governments, including an overhaul of
education curricula.
The government of Mahmoud Abbas
lasted a total of 130 days,8 but it did
succeed in effecting a few real changes
in the structure of PNA institutions and
their modes of operation.  Significant  fi-
nancial and administrative reforms took
place, including repatriating returns from
the national investment fund back into
the Palestinian treasury, abolishing price
controls on oil and cement and
breaking up those monopolies,
and enforcing some aspects of the Civil
Service Law. The most significant
Box 1-9: Isolation of Jerusalem
The issue of Jerusalem is among the most important and the most complex
issues in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is central to the framework
of the current peace process and negotiations. Since first occupying
Jerusalem, Israel has tried to isolate the city from its Palestinian surrounds
and erase the evidence of the city‘s Palestinian heritage on material and
nonmaterial levels. It has done so by applying pressure to the city’s
Palestinian residents through various means, such as preventing any new
residential or commercial construction, seizing property, closing institutions in
East Jerusalem (the most prominent example being the closure of the Orient
House), strangling the city with a settlement belt and the Separation Wall, and
confiscating the identity cards of Palestinian residents under various pretexts.
Added to these actions are Israeli attempts to elicit international recognition
of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, without taking into account
the applicability of the description “occupied land” to East Jerusalem and the
international resolutions on Jerusalem that affirm this fact.7
achievement was on the
political-security level: Prime Minister
Abbas brokered a truce in which the
Palestinian government fulfilled the
security conditions stipulated in the Road
Map without affecting Palestinian
solidarity or conceding the right
to legitimate resistance against
the occupation.
1-4-3 The Disengagement
Plan
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon first
announced the disengagement plan on
18 December 2003. This plan
represented the first step towards the
Israeli version of a long-term, phased
settlement of the conflict.   The core
objectives of the Israeli plan are
guaranteed Israeli security and
postponement of any final solution for
years to come.  Prime Minister Sharon
stated on 23 February 2004 his
intentions to bolster security through
continued construction of the
Separation Wall, withdrawal of the Israeli
army from the Gaza Strip, and rejection
of any further pressure on Israel to move
7 See the appendix at the end of the report for statistical information and indicators on Jerusalem.
8 Mahmoud Abbas, in his resignation speech before the Legislative Council on 4 September 2003, placed responsibility for the failure of his government on:   the United
States, which acted in accordance with Israeli government plans and did not push for implementation of the Road Map; on the Israeli government, which continued its
aggression against the Palestinian people; and, finally, on the Palestinian leadership, which did not facilitate implementation of his government’s policies, but rather
placed obstacles in its path.
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Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon announced the
disengagement plan as a first
step in the Israeli version of a
long-term, phased settlement
of the conflict.
forward in negotiations with the
Palestinians, which will likely ensure that
most settlements remain under
Israeli sovereignty.
A close reading of the disengagement
plan, or the plan for unilateral
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, reveals
a number of implicit dangers that
underscore the expansionist settlement
mentality of the Israeli occupation.
According to the Israeli plan, withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip will take place in
exchange for annexation of large
portions of the West Bank (specifically
Box 1-10: The Road Map
In December 2002, the Quartet (made up of the United States, the European
Union, Russia, and the United Nations) prepared a peace settlement
initiative that forms the basis for resumption of negotiations between the
Palestinians and Israelis. This plan, called the “Road Map,” includes three
stages, with the first stage lasting from October 2002 to May 2003, during
which time the two sides were to fulfill a number of obligations.
In the first stage, the Palestinian obligations were specified as follows: the
Palestinian Authority must bring to a halt to all forms of Palestinian resistance,
including incitement against Israel; restoration of  Palestinian-Israeli security
coordination; and preparation for electoral and constitutional appointment of a
Palestinian government, including creation of the office of prime minister with
wide executive powers.  The first tasks of this government would be to
implement the security provisions, achieve actual separation of powers,
reconstitute the Palestinian security agencies under a unified central
leadership, and implement the reform plans set down by the
international work team.
The Israeli obligations during the first stage consisted of:  halting attacks on
Palestinian civilians and their property, freezing settlement activity, and
withdrawing Israeli forces from the areas occupied since 28 September 2000,
concurrent with increasing security cooperation with the Palestinians.
The second stage, which was to end in October 2003, includes staging an
international conference to initiate negotiations to establish a Palestinian state
with temporary borders until the end of 2003. The third and final stage, which
was to end in 2005, includes an international conference to establish
permanent, final agreements on the issues of Jerusalem, the settlements,
and establishment of normal relations between the Arabs and Israel. Many
people maintain that the Road Map ended with the end of the commitment of
the main party—the United States—to work toward the plan’s implementation.
However, the United States maintains that it may be implemented if there is an end
to “acts of violence,” and it holds the two sides responsible for the plan’s failure. By
contrast, other parties, such as the United Nations representative, hold
Israel responsible for killing the plan.
The failure of the Camp David
talks gave the Palestinians
and Israelis renewed justifica-
tion for opening a new chap-
ter in the conflict.
the largest settlement blocs and the land
west of the Separation Wall). This plan
rids the Israelis of the largest portion of
the Palestinian population—what
Israelis refer to as the demographic
burden—while still preserving the
largest portion of occupied land. Further,
unilateral Israeli withdrawal places no
obligations on the Israeli government,
which will continue to control the
crossings, borders, water, and airspace
and, indeed, may invade the Gaza Strip
as it wishes. Moreover, such unilateral
steps create new facts on the ground,
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making it more difficult to move to the
final status issues or even implement the
agreements previously ratified
with the Palestinians.
1-4-4 The Institutional
Environment and Reform
Since the establishment of the PNA,
there have been calls for adherence to
the standards of institutionalization and
transparency in forming and managing
the Authority’s institutions.9 During the
years prior to the outbreak of the
Intifada, however, the experience of the
Palestinian Authority confirmed that the
general direction of Palestinian
Authority work would not be based on
establishing a state of institutions. This
was due to primarily to its general lack
of governing experience and because
much of the institutional legacy of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization
carried over to the newly established
PNA. Moreover, the values of
institutionalization run counter to the
authoritarian, individualistic nature of
the Palestinian political system.
The following chapter will analyze the
performance of PNA institutions in
detail. Here, it will suffice to say that
the performance of the Authority
institutions overall, given the wide
variations in their performance and the
extent of their responsiveness to
demands for reform and effectiveness,
remains far removed from what the
Palestinian public expects and needs.
The questions that the report
subsequently poses focus on:
 What is the extent of the capability
and authority of these institutions, and
what are the origins of their authority
and legitimacy?
 How can they empower the
Palestinian public if they are not
empowered themselves?
The varying degrees of vulnerability of
PNA institutions and their generally
inadequate response to the challenges
imposed by the Intifada confirmed the
need for institutional reform.
International pressure on the PNA to
restructure its institutions has
escalated.  As a result, a few
substantive changes in Palestinian
Authority operations have occurred,
especially in the following areas: the
constitution, the rule of law, the
independence of the judiciary, finance,
the security agencies, the legislative
branch, local government, and
corruption issues.
International pressure on the PNA
reached its height when the U.S.
administration tied the continuation of
the peace process to comprehensive
reform of the Palestinian Authority and
its modes of operation10, and the
installation of a new Palestinian
leadership. In early July 2002, the
Quartet Committee for the Middle East
Peace Process was established. In
September 2002, the Quartet publicly
affirmed that political, economic, and
security reforms in the PNA were a
central and integral component of the
peace process, a position which was
reiterated in the three-stage Road Map
officially presented to the Palestinians
and Israelis in April 2003.
1-4-5 The Internal Security
Situation
The absence of a central vision or
strategy and unified resolve has been
Since the establishment of the
PNA, there have been calls
for adherence to the
standards of
institutionalization and
transparency in forming and
managing the
Authority’s institutions.
9 On the Palestinian level, the General Oversight Report for 1996 was issued and published in 1997. On the
international level, a work team of international and local experts was formed under international auspices and headed
by former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, known as the “Independent Working Group for Empowerment of the
Palestinian Authority Institutions.ò In 1999 it issued the report “Empowerment of the Palestinian Authority Institutions.ò
As for the present internal Palestinian demands for reform, they were initiated within the Fatah movement (specifically,
among members of its Revolutionary Council and Central Committee) during April and May 2002, in addition to the
Legislative Council, which on 15 May 2002 issued a declaration on development and reform of the Palestinian
Authority institutions, encompassing the various constitutional, legal, executive, judicial, and financial aspects.
10 President Bush’s statement on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; made on 24 June 2002.
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reflected in the legal, societal, and
development situation. This situation is
evidenced in continuing transgression
of the law, a deepening entrenchment
of tribalism, and the erosion of national
Point of Light 7: Tireless Work in Government
Institutions
Despite the external and internal challenges, earnest efforts toward
institutionalization and development are visible in some agencies. This is
seen in some ministriesß serious, persistent efforts to provide services to the
Palestinian public. Despite criticisms of their shortcomings on quantitative
and qualitative levels, it must be acknowledged that these ministries fill
critical public service gaps in the areas of education, health, social affairs,
and labor.
In addition, some ministries do engage in comprehensive strategic planning
in terms of poverty alleviation, human development, and capacity building.
Numerous ministries have formulated short-term plans, and others have
formulated medium-term plans, in an attempt to connect their aid-based
performance to the development needs of the Palestinian people. Further,
the financial performance of PNA institutions has improved, wherein the
Ministry of Finance has cooperated with partners in setting budgets and
delineating payment and financial inquiry mechanisms. Finally, the
unification of the security agencies has gotten underway.
unity through factionalism, especially
between the main political groups within
Palestinian society. This potential for
conflict goes beyond threats of a clash
between various partisan groups within
the Palestinian Authority, its security
agencies, and its main party (Fatah).
Often, rulings of the Palestinian
Supreme Court were transgressed
(whether in political or civil cases),
promoting infractions against citizens
and their property. These transgressions
and infractions occurred due to the
absence of a firmly established legal
structure for promoting citizensß rights
and protecting their freedoms regardless
of standing, rank, or political or social
influence. Various infractions occurred
against media professionals and
journalists, such as the assassination
of one Palestinian journalist, the
abduction of foreign journalists, and
attacks on local and foreign media
headquarters. Moreover, on more than
one occasion there were tensions
between national and political activities,
and the rulings of civil and other courts
were not upheld.11
1-4-6 The Performance of
the Legislative Branch
The legislative branch has been widely
criticized by political and social groups
and the public in general since the
expiration of its legally mandated term
and for its ineffectiveness in terms of
oversight and legislative performance.
On 11 April 2004, the Improvement of
Status Law sparked discontent among
citizens, especially in light of the daily
hardships to which citizens are exposed
and which have led to record increases
in rates of poverty, unemployment and
malnutrition. This law stipulated that
ministers, Legislative Council
representatives, and governors are to
be paid $15,000 in bonus compensation.
It also outlines the salary scale for
ministers, governors, and Legislative
Council representatives. This was done
under the pretext of reform while the
28
11 The Palestinian Independent Commission of Citizensß Rights, Report on the Status of Palestinian Citizensß Rights
during 2003, pp. 131-179.
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Point of Light 8: The Conference on the Constitution
Drafting a modern Palestinian constitution requires harmonizing all  community-based efforts which lay the
constitution‘s foundation and ensure that all needs specific to the Palestinian context are fulfilled. This task will
take place on two levels. The first level is to achieve a balance between the demands of  development-based
progress on the one hand, and national political liberation as a vision of  comprehensive emancipation on the
other. The second level is achieving equilibrium among the various special interest groups within
Palestinian society.
To accomplish this task, on 27-28 September 2003, Birzeit University’s DSP held a conference on the
Palestinian constitution to broaden the horizons of rational, responsible debate. Its purpose was to bring
together the various visions and agendas for the proposed constitution and to provide an open and inclusive
environment for internal Palestinian dialogue, especially on the controversial issues of refugees and borders.
The desired outcome of the conference was to help form a comprehensive, integrated document which both
identified and addressed the myriad social and national issues.
It also aimed to ensure the broadest representation of the different Palestinian groups and to give expression to
their perspectives, visions, and needs in the process of drafting the constitution. The backgrounds of
conference participants varied. They included academics, specialists in the fields of media, development,
economics, and refugees, representatives of economic sectors and trade unions, private sector professionals,
labor representatives, and youth groups, in addition to delegates from all mainstream political groups and
parties. The concluding recommendations of the conference were:
 To recognize  the conference, along with its working papers and recommendations, as a starting point for forming
a broad coalition to lead the call to action for drafting a modern, democratic constitution and to offer a national
democratic vision based on fulfilling the dual tasks of national liberation and nation building.
 To provide institutional and popular grassroots support for the preparation of the constitution, through public
awareness activities, education, and mobilization, to ensure inclusion of wide sectors of society in the process.
Inclusion in the process will best ensure expression of the needs of the myriad groups, whose legitimate and rational
proposals will be incorporated within the proposed constitution.
  To affirm the need for mechanisms (such as the Constitutional Court) that will ensure respect for the
constitution and guarantee the objective application of its provisions.
Continuing the discussion on the constitution, a forum on the proposed Palestinian constitution was held in
Birzeit on 10 October 2003,12 through the cooperation of Birzeit University’s Development Studies Programme
and the Committee of Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon. The forum emphasized that the entire
Palestinian community possesses a shared perspective and a common fate, wherever they may reside. It also
affirmed that any proposed Palestinian constitution must include the same rights for Palestinians of the Diaspora
as for Palestinians residing in Palestine.
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12 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Programme, The Palestinian Constitution and the Requirements of  Human Development (research studies and working
papers), Editing team: Nader Said, Abdel Karim Barghouthi, and Aymen Abdel Majid, May 2004.
Civil Service Law remains unratified,
even though its provisions apply to the
largest sector of public employees.
This critical view of the performance of
the Legislative Council does not
invalidate some of the positive steps it
has undertaken. A number of laws were
ratified between 2002 and 2004, and
the text of those laws was published in
the official gazette of the PNA. The laws
that were passed and published in the
official gazette include: Judiciary
Branch Law No. 1 of 2002, Law No. 6
of 2001 amending certain provisions of
the Civil Status Law No. 2 of 1999,
Banking Law No. 2 of 2002, Water Law
No. 3 of 2002, the Basic Law of 2003,
Point of Light 9: Registration for the Palestinian
Elections
The Central Elections Committee succeeded in registering 72 percent of
Palestinians for the elections in spite of numerous external and internal
obstacles. One thousand seven (1007) voter registration centers were
established throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The centers opened
to Palestinian citizens on Saturday morning 4 September 2004, and
registered voters daily until 7 October 2004. To bolster the integrity of the
election registration process and its oversight, approximately 82 local
bodies and three international bodies monitored voter registration and the
elections, utilizing roughly 5,500 observers. A total of eight Palestinian
political parties and organizations also took part in monitoring the
registration process.
Box 1-11: The 100 Days Plan
The Ministerial Reform Committee was formed by presidential decree on 12
June 2002. It prepared, in cooperation with the international donors, a reform
plan for Palestinian Authority institutions known as the “100 Days Plan.” This
plan contained the donors‘ views of required steps for the Authority to undertake
on the path to reform. The most prominent components of this plan include:
1. Firmly establishing the principles of separation of powers, rule of law,
independence of the judiciary, and strengthening the judiciary system.
2. Restructuring ministries and Palestinian governmental bodies; issuing, in
this framework, a review of the Civil Service Law; and preparing a
modernized retirement system.
3. Preparing for presidential, legislative, and local elections.
4. Restructuring the Palestinian security agencies and unifying the police,
Preventive Security, and Civil Defense agencies under the authority of the
Ministry of Interior.
5. Consolidating the Authority’s financial revenues, establishing a Palestinian
investment fund to manage all of the Palestinian Authority’s commercial and
investment activities, regulating the relationship between the Ministry of Finance
and local bodies, and amending the process of preparing the General Budget.
the Legislative Council Bylaw, and the
Law on the Capital of Jerusalem.13
International pressure
reached its height when the
U.S. administration tied the
continuation of the peace
process to comprehensive
reform of the Palestinian
Authority.
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13 There are also many laws awaiting the president’s approval following passage by the Legislative Council on the
third reading, most important among them the Law of the Palestinian Child, the Illicit Earnings Law, and the
Amendment to the Monetary Authority Law. Further, some important laws have completed the second reading, most
importantly the Compensation Fund for Removing the Effects of Israeli Aggression. Some bills have also been
approved on the first reading, most importantly those for the Prisoners and Ex-Detainees, and the Administrative and
Financial Oversight Bureau. Some other laws have been accepted for general debate, most importantly those for
Public Electricity; the Judicial Clerk; the Supreme Constitutional Court; the Social Security Fund; Income Tax;
Insurance; and Commercial, Industrial, and Agricultural Chambers of Commerce. Some laws were referred to special
committees for their opinion, most importantly the laws for the Elections, Care for Youth, Lands, and Workersß Unions.
(See: the items issued by the Legislative Council, entitled “Draft Laws in the Legislative Council, 1 June 2004.”)
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Transgressions and
infractions occurred due to the
absence of a firmly
established legal structure for
promoting citizensß rights and
protecting their freedoms.
Point of Light 10: The Supreme Follow-up   Committee of National and
Islamic Forces
Political groups formed a coordination framework, known since the beginning of the current Intifada as the
Supreme Follow-up Committee of National and Islamic Forces (this is in the Gaza Strip, whereas the equivalent in
the West Bank is known as the Factional Coordination Committee). The committee controls the pace of
resistance against the occupation, in addition to playing a role in resolving internal disputes resulting from
differences in vision and approaches among the political factions and their resistance wings. The committee
included 13 political groups in addition to some national figures. Much of the time, it was able to forge agreement
to resolve internal Palestinian disputes, although its role remained restricted due to the lack of a unified national
approach constituting a framework for joint Palestinian action.
This committee was formed out of an awareness of the need for holding fast to points of Palestinian national consensus
to confront challenges posed by the occupation and reduce possibilities for internal repression, which could translate
into tensions or conflicts between political groups or between them and the Palestinian Authority. This awareness
transcended political competition and  differences in main goals and approaches and the resulting lack of consensus
among the numerous Palestinian political groups regarding modes of resistance.
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Box 1-12: The Absence of Law Creates an Environment Ripe for Corruption
≠ The Cement Scandal
In the “cement scandal,” Palestinian companies surreptitiously sent large quantities of Egyptian cement to
Israeli companies for use in construction of the Separation Wall and settlement activity (approximately 420,000
tons, according to Legislative Council estimates). This scandal was a distinctive chapter in the saga of
corruption.  It reminded people that fighting corruption is a fundamental component of reorganizing the internal
Palestinian situation and shoring up the development process in combating the challenges of occupation. It
also affirmed that corruption is a disease-like obstacle to development, progress, reform, and the realization of
national goals.
The number of laws promulgated in one
year is approximately 5-6 per year with
amendments, and 48 laws have been
approved thus far. Some of the detailed
laws adopted by the legislative branch,
such as the Independence of the
Judiciary Law and the Basic Law, were
ratified only after intense pressure was
brought to bear from the international
community. Further, the abolition of the
State Security Court occurred for the
same reasons, sparking debate and
controversy about the need to address
national and civil demands first, rather
than to respond to the pressure of
outside influences.
1-4-7 Chapter Conclusion
As seen above, the environment
constraining development and
independence in Palestine involves a
process of push-and-pull between
groupsß disparate visions, goals, and
methodologies. It is a complex and
dynamic mix of contradiction and
coexistence, confrontation and
vulnerability, liberation and
construction.  Yet the empowerment
that Palestinians seek has become
dynamic and lasting, rather than a mere
starting point for development. For
empowerment—any empowerment—in
situations such as ours, constitutes
creative action that preserves the
presence of the Palestinian individual
and society, applying and refining
individualsß innate energies in order
achieve emancipation from all forces
that deny their freedoms and right to
action, change, and initiative.
Point of Light 11: We Love Life Whenever We Can
Just as Palestinians make sacrifices to defend their freedoms and their right to independence, they also exert
efforts, to the extent possible, to contribute to the creative human endeavor—despite the difficult circumstances
in which they live. Perhaps this dialectical relationship between sacrifice for the sake of freedom and love of life
for the sake of creativity is reflected in the expression of Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish: “We love life
whenever we can.”
Additional shining examples of Palestinian creativity that have extended beyond the local framework to achieve
recognition in the global arena are: Edward Said, as a prominent thinker and musician whose books are read
worldwide; Sahar Khalifa, as a novelist whose works have been translated into various languages; Ahmed
Jadallah, a photojournalist who won a World Press Photo first prize in 2003, Bader Zama’rah, the young
person who won the United Nations Appreciation Award for his role in combating poverty through development
and activating the role of Palestinian youth as a representative of the Arab world; and Reim Al-Khatib, as the
youngest person in the world to earn the UNESCO International Computer Driving License.
Points of Light 12-15: Models of Cultural Events in Palestine
 Point of Light 12: The Khalil Sakakini Center: The center has hosted scores of exemplary art exhibitions and
musical productions, bringing in art and music from Palestine and all over the world.
 Point of Light 13: The Wednesday Meeting: There is a weekly meeting for culture and development in Gaza
organized by the Kanan Institute, and another to discuss political and strategic developments organized by the
Dar Al-Karama Institute. The importance of these two gatherings stems from their continuing treatment of
contemporary new issues in the Palestinian arena in the spheres of politics, development, and culture.
 Point of Light 14: The Cultural Palace: This is a Palestinian and international venture, bringing together local
efforts with funding from the government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme in order to
construct and launch the largest cultural structure for theater and the arts.
 Point of Light 15: The Abdel Muhsen Al-Qattan Foundation: It has organized numerous cultural and art
competitions to encourage a new generation of Palestinian artists and innovators.
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN THE
WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP
This chapter of the Palestinian Human Development Report (PHDR) focuses on human development
indicators. It should be noted from the outset that even the most rigorously collected quantitative data, while
significant, may fail to reflect a complete picture of actual conditions existing within the society.  Data
sometimes show progress in certain specific areas addressed by the human development indicators, but
may still not fully capture the whole social context. The qualitative dimensions of indicator analysis are very
rarely addressed in research studies and data they provide. International and local indicators used in the
field of human development cannot alone provide a true representation of the special conditions that exist
within Palestinian society. Those special conditions methodically destroy Palestinian society’s innate
potential to achieve any significant levels of sustainable human development at the macro level and in the
long term.
Chapter Two

The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) 2003 Human
Development Report includes a
classification of nations of the world
according to a predefined human
development index, which includes:
average life expectancy; adult illiteracy
rates (15 years and older); educational
levels whether primary, secondary, or
post-graduate; and GDP per capita
(estimated using average purchasing
power in US dollars). The UNDP 2003
placed the Palestinian territories among
nations enjoying an average or mid-level
of human development, equal to
Turkey’s and ahead of China, Iran,
Algeria, South Africa, Syria, Morocco,
India and Egypt. It occupied the 98th
position among 175 countries included
in the classification. Seeking to set
quantitative standards for measuring
“human development” ≠ which is defined
as an expansion of human choices-
tends to marginalize the concepts of
freedom, equality and justice.
It is in fact difficult to comprehend an
expansion of human choices that does
not also include an expansion of
individual and collective freedoms, of
equality between individuals and peoples,
and higher levels of social justice. This
index reduces human development to
mere indicators that do not reflect reality,
where freedom and development
opportunities are quashed and where
social justice is imprisoned. It does not
fully   account for circumstances and
conditions that hamper development of
human rights and freedoms. Therefore,
the Palestinian territories were placed, on
the Human Development Index, at the
same level as countries such as Turkey
and China, and higher than great nations
that have been independent for decades
and that possess enormous capacities
and resources.
The reality in the West Bank (East
Jerusalem included) and Gaza Strip is
an environment characterized by
continued occupation, colonization, and
land confiscation; methodical and
deliberate destruction of PNA
institutions; thousands of deaths, tens
of thousands of injuries and several
thousand prisoners; hundreds of
demolished homes; a quasi-paralyzed
dependent national economy;
partitioning of Palestinian territories into
small isolated strips; roadblocks and
closures; and the construction of a
Separation Wall to further isolate regions.
These conditions, many of which have
prevailed for decades, have most
recently resulted in doubling the
percentage of Palestinian families living
under the poverty line and an
exponential increase in unemployment
rates between 2000 and 2003.
Inexplicably, the Human Development
Index increased from 0.70 to 0.731
between 1997 and 2001. This increase
implies an improvement in human
development processes in the
Palestinian territories, which in fact fails
to reflect the true situation on the ground.
This quantitative distortion is due to the
intellectual bases used to establish the
Index. Such bases are situational. They
focus on what can be quantified and
ignore political dimensions, as they do
not take the relationships of power into
consideration (whether they are local,
regional or international), abuses and
restrictions on freedom of choice and
the growth and continuance of unequal
relationships at various levels. These
bases deal with societies as organic,
independent entities, completely
insulated from the consequences of the
surrounding international or regional
systems and from distortions in the
military, economic and diplomatic power
balances among different societies.
Furthermore, they either ignore or fail
to take into consideration the
differences within society itself.
Introduction:  Palestine and the Human Development
Index - A Critical Perspective
The current PHDR presents
measurement alternatives
and proposes additional
indicators that provide a more
comprehensive picture of the
situation.
Seeking to set quantitative
standards for measuring
human development tends to
marginalize the concepts of
freedom, equality and justice.
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The current PHDR presents measurement
alternatives and proposes additional
indicators that provide a more
comprehensive picture of the situation.
 The extent of Palestinian society’s
ability to secure international support,
whether official or unofficial. This
ability was affected by international
events that led to the rise of the US as
the world‘s single largest power as well
as the acceleration of the “war against
terrorism” and its consequences on
national liberation movements. These
consequences have left nations and
their people doubting the credibility of
concepts in which they once firmly
believed, such as the legitimacy of
resistance to occupation and the
universal importance of certain values,
such freedom and independence.
Nevertheless, international expressions
of solidarity with the Palestinian
people have grown stronger and more
capable of confrontation, especially on
the ground. Volunteers from abroad
actively demonstrate against Israeli
policies, especially those regarding
closures, roadblocks, and the
Separation Wall. They also played an
important role in protecting the
headquarters of the late President
Arafat during the Israeli siege of his
compound. They also organize
solidarity campaigns for the
Palestinian people within their own
countries, in addition to their local
activities in Palestine.
2-1-2 Social and Political
Indicators:
It is normal for social development
indicators to be affected by the political
environment and by changes within the
Palestinian economy, with unemployment
and poverty rates soaring and
dependency on local and foreign aid
increasing. Continued violence, weak and
poorly organized security forces
incapable of executing their duties
properly, and the gap between society
and its executive, legislative and
judiciary institutions have all played a role
in the regression of social indicators.
Among such indicators:
SECTION ONE:
INDICATORS SPECIFIC
TO THE   PALESTINIAN
CONTEXT:
AN INTRODUCTION
The total withdrawal of the
occupation forces would be a
prime indicator of Palestinian
development status
Continued violence, and
weak, poorly organized
security forces played a role
in the regression of social
indicators.
Tribal affiliations and
protective networks played a
much larger role in providing
assistance and support to
needy families, defusing
individual conflicts and
limiting occurrences of crime.
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Any thorough analysis of the human
development situation in Palestine must
consider the following sets of indicators:
collective indicators related to the
Palestinian cause, social indicators,
economic indicators, human indicators,
demographic indicators, educational
indicators, health indicators, and gender
indicators.
2-1-1 Collective indicators
related to the Palestinian
cause and the collective
rights of  Palestinians,
wherever they might be,
including:
 The extent to which United Nations
principles and resolutions related to
Palestine are implemented, including
Resolutions No. 242 and 338, and
resolutions concerning the right  to
development, the right to
self- determination and refugees.
 The Palestinian society’s level of
sovereignty, which is measured by
presence or absence of an occupying
power and the relief of the population,
the land within borders, and a country‘s
natural resources from external military
and political control.
 Measurement of the effect of
continued occupation on daily strategic
and practical decisions that need to be
taken by Palestinians, whether on the
individual or institutional level. Therefore,
the total withdrawal of the occupation
forces would be a prime indicator of
Palestinian development status.
 Tribal protection networks
strengthened during the past four years.
Tribal affiliations and protective
networks played a much larger role in
providing assistance and support to
needy families, defusing individual
conflicts and limiting occurrences of
crime. Such a result would usually be
viewed as positive. Unfortunately, it
demonstrates in fact a backward step
in the authority and effectiveness of
central government institutions and an
indicator of weakness in their
operations. It actually destabilizes the
foundations of any future Palestinian
state and contributes to a deterioration
of the infrastructure of Palestinian civil
society, which had been gradually built
up during the last several decades.
In recent years, Palestinian society
found individual and collective solutions
to its problems. It protected itself and
resisted a slide into the abyss of
internal violence, crime and chaos.
Palestinian society survived against all
odds; in the absence of any central
organizational or problem-solving
source of leadership, and in spite of the
pressure exerted by the chronic state
Palestinian society found
individual and collective
solutions to its problems.
Point of Lights 16-19: Coping Mechanisms within the Palestinian Society
One of the most significant examples of empowerment in Palestine is the mobilization of Palestinian
self-reliance, in a manner that enhances a collective ability to stand firm in the face of the occupier. Self-reliance
may well be one the most important aspects of Palestinian empowerment, reflecting the Palestiniansß creative
and successful approach to a constantly changing set of negative circumstances.   The following examples
illustrate adaptive developmental situations within Palestinian society in previous years:
 Point of Light 16 ≠ Self-sufficiency through Organic Agriculture: The idea behind this initiative is based
on the development of land reclamation practices and chemical-free agriculture using local resources alone.
The initiative was launched by a Palestinian returnee, who had decided to live and invest in his homeland. The
project expanded within five years to include animal husbandry (cows, sheep and poultry), and the venture’s
revenues fully covered his family’s needs and expenses. He was even able to start marketing his produce
within the local community.
 Point of Light 17 ≠ Rabbit Farm Prototype in Al Shawkeh Village: The particular relevance of this
developmental initiative, implemented by the Rural Woman Development Society (RWDS), resides in the fact
that it provides a model for working with poor rural women, one of the most marginalized segments of
Palestinian society. One of the RWDS’s biggest accomplishments was to identify available skills within the
community and evaluate the needs of these women in order to create appropriate projects. Women were
involved in all of the project’s stages, from implementation to marketing the final products. The pilot rabbit farm
was built at the end of 2003 with very limited resources (approximately $7,000). It now has 92 productive
rabbits. The whole project is conducted under technical and medical supervision to safeguard project assets
and to maximize production. (The capital investment is expected to be fully recouped within 2 years.)
 Point of Light 18 ≠ Union of Agricultural Relief Committees (Savings and Lending Program): The
Savings and Lending Program initiative allows  small group of rural women to pool their savings, and then
periodically offer  micro loans to  union members from the pooled capital for purposes related to the
development and empowerment process within the community.. The Union of Agricultural Relief Committees
now has 5065 members in 12 separate savings and credit associations. The micro loans are most often used to
finance women’s education and training needs, or to provide start-up capital for micro
businesses within the community.
 Point of Light 19 –Union of Women’s Social Work Committees/ Women’s Psycho-social Counseling
Center (Job Creation Program): This project provides training in the production of handcrafts to poor women,
and then purchases the handcrafts produced for resale.
Support to secular and leftist
democratic trends decreased.
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of dysfunction and a total lack of any
social impetus for unity and cohesion.
Notwithstanding the fact that data
indicate an increase in violent crimes,
these rates remain far less than what
would be expected by psychologists
and sociologists from any community
forced to endure similar pressures.
Palestinian society’s deeply rooted civic
tradition and its strong internal unity
contribute to steadfast adherence to
core values and a sustained focus on
the one key social issue: ending the
occupation and achieving Palestinian
freedom and independence.
The Palestinian human experience is
manifest in the capacity to maintain
self-control, relationship management
skills, family, professional and social
cohesion, a set of basic civil services
consistently provided by government
institutions, local voluntary support of
poor families, poverty alleviation
programs, and support from relatives
and friends abroad.
 Increasing factionalism within
Palestinian political environment, and
decreasing support to secular and
leftist democratic trends: The
contemporary history of the Palestinian
revolution, represented by organizations
such as the PLO and its sub-factions,
has been characterized by the fact that
it adopted a revolutionary proactive
stance with regard to the separation of
religion and state, and prohibited the
use of religion as a pretext for political
and financial gain. Palestinian officials
sincerely embraced the notions of
religious tolerance and the need for
peaceful coexistence of all religious
identities within Palestinian society.
On the opposite side, especially during
the past four years, the popularity of
conservative religious trends increased
sharply, particularly in Gaza, while the
authority of secular democratic
perspectives declined. Conservatism
has grown not only within Palestinian
society, but in all Arab nations and the
world in general. Thus, religious
agendas moved to the forefront in
political and social decision–making
processes and in future
development planning.
This trend towards overt religiousness
is expected to pose new challenges to
any political authority, both at the ballot
box and in military, financial and
institutional arenas, where the trend has
already gained a significant foothold in
recent years. The spread of religious
conservatism is also expected to exert
a negative impact on recent advances
in the areas of democratic governance,
individual and collective freedoms,
women‘s rights and foreign affairs,
particularly in relations with the
developed nations of the West.   The
popularity of the Fatah movement,
PLO’s largest faction, continues to
decline, and progress towards
democratization in governance is
haphazard.  Fatah’s authority and
influence in legislative and local
councils is on the wane as the
demographics of these groups
increasingly reflect the trend towards
religious conservatism.
 Empowerment programs designed
to support marginalized groups
contributed to an evolution in the social
standings of women, youth, children
and the handicapped. These groups are
now more readily able to assert
themselves as result of numerous
programs which provide training, raise
collective awareness and build internal
capacity. These achievements
represent significant advances on the
road to empowerment, but
empowerment will never be fully
realized without fundamental changes
in society‘s economic, social and
cultural structures, which ultimately
determine the extent to which
marginalized groups will benefit.  Full
empowerment demands the removal of
obstacles to growth found within these
structures and their external
manifestations (in legislation, cultural
Empowerment programs
designed to support
marginalized groups
contributed to an evolution in
the social standings of
women, youth, children and
the handicapped.
Empowerment will never be
fully realized without funda-
mental changes in society‘s
economic, social and cultural
structures.
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attitudes, religious belief and
educational curricula) and the ultimate
integration of these groups into the heart
of development and decision-making
processes.
Empowerment also requires active and
effective participation in the
decision-making process both inside
and outside the scope of the family unit.
At the same time, political and social
commitment to equal opportunity is
fundamental to the creation of an
environment conducive to the active
participation of marginalized groups in
civic life. Empowerment necessitates
major changes in the cultural framework
of Palestinian society, which sometimes
contributes to the social isolation and
political marginalization of specific
groups while reinforcing the authority of
other groups.
 The crisis generated by the
Palestiniansß plight and the resulting
stress on society have lead to the
entrenchment of a number of problems
which require attention and resolution.
Violence is present in every aspect of
Palestiniansß lives in addition to the
afflictions of unemployment and
poverty, an underperforming and
Box 2.1: Problematic Legal and Legislative Issues
Despite efforts exerted in the interest of improving the quality of existing Palestinian legislation, some difficulties
still hamper its evolution, i.e. loopholes, contradictory texts, or problems with application and implementation.
This legislative disorder is due to several factors: the absence of a Palestinian constitution; a heritage of     separate
and often conflicting legal traditions; a weak judiciary system; and a general disregard for a common rule of law
within society. The following examples demonstrate the legal quandaries inherent in some Palestinian laws:
The Handicapped Law No. 4 of 1999: Article 10.4.C. of the law stipulates that “government and non-governmental
institutions shall be compelled to employ the handicapped in at least 5 percent of their staff positions, each according
to the nature of its work, and to modify the physical premises in order to make it accessible to them”. This provision
is in line with another set forth in Article 24 of the Civil Service Law No. 4 of 1998, which stipulated that “A totally or
partially blind individual, or a physically challenged person may be appointed if their disabilities do not prevent them
from performing the duties of the position for which they have been appointed, by virtue of a medical certificate
issued by the competent medical authority, provided that they meet other health requirements”. However, the actual
hiring procedure of the civil service recruitment authority compels job candidates to undergo medical examinations
with very strict criteria, thus impeding the implementation of the two progressive laws and preventing many
physically-challenged people from taking up public service positions1.
The Palestinian Penal Code: One of the problems with this law resides in its traditional nature, which is at odds with
human rights standards for issues relating to women’s and children’s rights, family violence and sexual aggression.
Some examples include failure to provide special protection for children and to impose strict punishments for crimes
perpetrated against them. The same applies to elderly people, women and physically-challenged individuals. A clear
example of failure to provide special protection for children may be found in the provision of Article 208, which sets
the legal age for marriage at 15 years for women. Fifteen years is still defined as part of childhood by the Palestinian
Children’s Rights Charter; thus the established legal age for marriage for women is in direct contravention to the
Children’s Charter.  Palestinian law also contains no provisions related to family violence and domestic aggression,
making it impossible to prosecute such occurrences as crimes.
Family Law: Although there are few provisions regarding women in the civil status law, those that exist are
distinctly discriminatory. This is the case in the law’s definition of the “head of the family” as male and in
provisions related to the declarations of marriages, divorces, births and deaths.
Decreases will occur in
Palestinian life expectancy
rates, school enrollment rates,
and literacy levels, due to the
continued decline in the
economic situation.
1 Bahauddin Saadi, Appointing Physically-challenged Individuals in Civil Service Positions, Periodical, Palestinian
Independent Commission for Citizensß Rights, Issue No. 16, September 2003, p. 16.
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unresponsive government infrastructure,
and a general sense of insecurity due to
checkpoints and dangers associated with
highway travel.  In addition, the trends
are increasing towards uncontrolled
population growth, high school drop-out
rates, especially among females, rising
crime, decreased concern for the
environment, increasing instances of
defective products dumped in the
Palestinian market, continued
monopolies in the fuel and
communications markets, illegal
constructions, and a rapidly deteriorating
quality of life in small towns and villages
due to increased pollution, noise and
overcrowding.
 The collective negative impact of
these factors will certainly affect human
development indicators related to
education, health and other social
services. However, the effects of these
conditions cannot be quantified
instantly, as they all have significant
incubation periods. Eventually,
decreases will occur in Palestinian life
expectancy rates, school enrollment
rates, and literacy levels, due to the
continued decline in the economic
situation and the limited resources
made even scarcer by the confiscation
of Palestinian land and sources of fresh
water, and exploding population growth
among the poor.
2-1-3 Economic Indicators:
The Palestinian economy is unique in
that it is completely dependent on Israel
and can be virtually shut down by Israeli
policies of border closure and inter-city
travel restrictions. At present, the
Palestinian economy is so battered that
it is kept afloat by the financial largesse
of donor nations. Up until 1994, the
devastation of the Palestinian economy
has led to the rise of two contradictory
and simultaneous phenomena, namely
individual enrichment and collective
impoverishment. A condition of individual
enrichment was created by a general
improvement in Palestinian familie’s
disposable income, thus leading to
above-average living standards
according to world indicators..
Paradoxically, at another level, collective
impoverishment increased, as the
Palestinian economy lost the capacity for
independent growth and self-sustenance
and its ability to provide employment and
the basic necessities of life to its
population. The subjugation of the
Palestinian economy to that of Israel
works to the latter’s benefit, as it
solidifies its control over Palestinian
natural resources and the labor force
through the policies of occupation.  The
past four years, especially, have
witnessed intensification of these
adverse conditions, creating a new
situation in which individual
impoverishment and collective impoverish-
ment are occurring simultaneously.
2-1-4 Human Indicators:
The military conflict and the continued
occupation have resulted in the chronic
suffering of victims living a never-ending
tragedy. When discussing quantitative
indicators that describe such victims, it
is imperative to mention their broken
dreams, their unaccomplished projects
and their uncertain future. Therefore, in
order to understand the true nature of
the Palestinian condition, additional
human indicators must be examined.
2-1-5 Palestinian Refugees2:
 Population conditions: Approximately
4 million Palestinians live as refugees in
their country and abroad. Each and every
one of them dreams of returning to his/
her country, home and farm. In the West
Bank and Gaza, the number of refugees
has almost tripled, from 560,000 in 1950
to 1,562,192 refugees in 2003. Many of
these refugees live in camps officially
Refugees live in camps
concentrated into an area
that, if gathered together,
would not exceed 20 square
kilometers.
Collective impoverishment
increased as the Palestinian
economy lost the capacity for
independent growth and
self-sustenance.
2 The section regarding refugees is a quote from: Anwar Hamam, Palestinian Camps in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip and UNRWA’s Role in Empowering Refugees, background paper prepared for Palestine’s 2004 Human Develop-
ment Report.
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recognized by UNRWA.  The refugee
camp population in Palestine is
distributed as follows: 176,514 refugees
reside in 19 West Bank camps, and
478,854 refugees reside in eight camps
within the Gaza Strip. The remaining
906,824 refugees live in towns, cities and
unofficial camps scattered over the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. The dramatic
population increase is generating
extreme pressure inside the camps,
intensifying poor living conditions already
characterized by inadequate housing and
limited or nonexistent social services.
 More than 1.5 million refugees live in
camps concentrated into an area that,
if gathered together, would not exceed
20 square kilometers.   In other words,
each individual refugee has an average
of 32.8 square meters of living space.
In view of the fact that the campsß total
square meters have not changed over
time (the land on which they were built
is rented by UNRWA), and that the
number of refugees continues to grow,
individual living space is therefore in
constant decline. Hence, family homes
within the camps are intensely
overcrowded, and the situation is
expected to grow worse. Families in
which three members share one room
represent 40 percent of the population
in Gaza camps and 31 percent in West
Bank camps. The average size of a
refugee dwelling is 93.3 square meters
for a family of 6.6 persons in the West
Bank.  The average refugee home size
in Gaza is 107.9 square meters for a
family of 7.8 persons.
 Education conditions: School
registration rates in West Bank and
Gaza camps are relatively high for
primary school children. These rates
begin to gradually drop as the students’
ages increase. According to UNRWA
2002 statistics, the number of
schoolchildren enrolled in primary
schools was 177,458, while enrollment
dropped to 71,862 children in
secondary level classes. The general
average of female students rose to 50.6
percent, with 48.9 percent in Gaza and
59.1 percent in the West Bank.
 UNRWA schools in the West Bank and
Gaza are overcrowded in comparison
with schools in other areas.  The
average number of students per class
in UNRWA schools is 43, with an
average of 38.6 in the West Bank and
47.1 in the Gaza Strip.
 Furthermore, available data indicate
that refugees living in camps are more
educated than Palestinians residing in
other areas. In fact, 11 percent of camp
refugees reach post-secondary
education, while this percentage only
reaches 10 percent in cities and 9
percent in villages. The percentage of
female refugees who complete their
secondary education is 10 percent
higher than among non-refugees. As for
male refugees, the difference is only 5
percent higher. Forty-five percent of
registered refugees have received at
least ten years of schooling, compared
to only 35 percent of those living in
urban or rural areas finishing ten
years of school.
 The UNRWA financial crisis is
affecting the performance of UNRWA’s
teaching staff, with workers striking and
demanding better living conditions. The
conflict between UNRWA  administration
and workers also impacts the study
performance of students.
 Health conditions: UNRWA provides
health services to refugees through its
health centers located in all Palestinian
camps in the West Bank and Gaza. These
centers offer programs that focus on the
health of babies, women and pregnant
mothers. They conduct vaccination
campaigns and provide medical services
for the treatment of general diseases, in
addition to supplying medication. Such
centers refer serious cases to UNRWA
hospitals or other contract-bound
institutions. UNRWA covers 70 percent of
the treatment cost. Fifteen percent of
The financial crisis is affecting
the performance of UNRWA’s
teaching staff.
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UNRWA schools in the West
Bank and Gaza are
overcrowded.
UNRWA employees work in health-related
fields. The agency allocates 18 percent of
its budget to health.
Health conditions inside the camps are
in a state of constant degradation. In
general, the number of malnutrition cases
rose during the Intifada and reached 22
percent among refugee children.
Refugees’ psychological health also
suffered under deteriorated security
conditions.  The situation is most
apparent among children, who are
exhibiting increased behavioral
aberrations.   Many have become more
prone to violent behavior and suffer from
bedwetting and chronic anxiety.
Eighty-five percent of refugee parents
have reported negative behavioral
changes in their children.
2-1-6 Palestinian Prisoners:
 The report issued by the Ministry of
Prisonersß Affairs on September 15, 2004
stated that the number of Palestinian
prisoners now totals 5874 prisoners,
distributed as follows: 630 prisoners from
Gaza (10.7% of the total number of
prisoners), 4824 prisoners from the West
Bank (82.1%), 328 prisoners from
Jerusalem (5.6%), and 92 prisoners from
regions within the 1948 borders (1.6%),
in addition to the 1400 other prisoners
who have not yet been registered in the
Ministry’s records. There are 15
prisoners who have spent more than 20
years in Israeli prisons and 409
prisoners incarcerated for
more than 10 years.
 Among the total number of prisoners,
there are 1893 detainees who have
been tried and sentenced (32.2% of the
total number), 920 common-law
prisoners who have never been indicted
(15.7% of the total number), and 3061
detainees awaiting trial or undergoing
investigations (52.1% of the
total number).
 Since the Al-Aqsa Intifada of September
2000, more than 300 female prisoners
have been jailed, in addition to 3 female
prisoners who already were in detention.
One hundred nine female prisoners are
still being detained, representing 1.8
percent of the total number of documented
prisoners. The following figures describe
the situations of the women currently held:
22 married prisoners, 18 mothers, and two
live births in prison.  Forty-one female
prisoners have been tried and sentenced,
63 are detainees, and five are
common-law prisoners. The total number
of prisonersß children amounts to 75.
 Data indicate that there are more than
150 detainees who have been in jail
since before the Al-Aqsa Intifada who
suffer very poor health. Some suffer from
heart conditions, others from cartilage
infections, while others suffer from acute
arthritis and severely impaired eyesight.
There are around 900 prisoners who are
afflicted with chronic diseases. Some
were arrested after being shot and did
not receive appropriate medical care.
Two detainees are hemiplegics.
 The report states that 99 percent of
detainees have been subjected to torture,
with 73 percent having been placed in
freezers, 85 percent having been
intimidated, 90 percent were forced to
stand for hours on end, and 95 percent
suffered from sleep deprivation, in
addition to other internationally prohibited
means of torture which are still commonly
used against Palestinian prisoners.
 One hundred seventy-one prisoners
have died in prison, 69 of those due to
torture  (40.3%), 34 from medical
negligence (19.9%) and 68 homicides,
prisoners who were deliberately killed
during detention (39.8%)3.
Prisoners’ families suffer from greatly
reduced living standards, as the majority
of detainees are young people who were
Prisoners‘ families suffer from
greatly reduced living
standards.
The number of children
arrested since the beginning
of the current Intifada
exceeds 2500 children below
the age of 18 years.
3 Ministry of Prisonersß Affairs, Press Report on Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Prisons, Ramallah 15/09/2004. Also cf.
Palestinian Prisoner’s Club, The Chains Will One Day Be Broken, Periodical Annex, Issue No. 3, 21/02/2004.
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Box 2.2: Palestinian Children: Victims of Detention and Exploitation in the
Conflict
All international conventions regarding human and children’s rights emphasize the necessity of protecting children’s
lives and well-being. They also establish guidelines for children‘s affairs and for the protection of their freedoms.
Nevertheless, these conventions are not observed by the Israeli occupation forces. The number of children arrested
since the beginning of the current Intifada exceeds 2500 children below the age of 18, of whom 391 are still under
detention. More than 100 of them are below 16 years of age4.
Children who are detained in Israeli prisons5 are being deprived of their basic rights, including arbitrary arrest,
failure to advise them of the reason for their detention, depriving them of the right to contest the charges filed
against them, in addition to enduring physical and psychological torture, especially during interrogations and in
order to pressure them into working for Israeli security forces.
A former child prisoner stated: “The soldier asked me: “Why were you throwing stones?” then he tried to
scare me by yelling to his comrades: “Where are the sticks? Do you have a power outlet here? Are the dogs
here yet?”… Then, immediately after that, he threw himself at me and I could feel his fists and heavy ranger
boots kicking me all over my body”6.
Beyond that, the matter of recruiting children to work with Israeli security forces through pressure and intimidation is
generating numerous legal complaints relating to children’s rights in the Palestinian territories.  Israeli authorities
ignore international conventions which protect civilians and prohibit forcing them to collaborate with an occupying
power. As for Palestinian resistance groups, they abide by their declared positions not to recruit children, considering
that the current struggle against the occupation is a popular uprising and not an armed conflict between two armies.
Hence, one cannot say that children have been forced to participate and hence, they may not be described as boy
soldiers. In all cases, the issue of children remains problematic in this field.
The demographic issue is a
top developmental and
political priority with an
emphasis on fertility rates.
the primary breadwinners for their
families. Beyond the economic
dimension, there are many human
aspects of detention that worsen the
suffering of prisonersß families, such as
the prolonged absence of a family
member in a society where family ties are
very strong; the psychological impact on
4 Ministry of Prisonersß Affairs (Child and Youth Department), Report on Child Prisoners in Israeli Jails, October 2004.
5 For more details, please refer to reports issued by the Ministry of Prisonersß Affairs and by the World Movement for the Defense of Children, (2000 ≠ 2004).
6 Save the Child Institution, Sweden, One Day in Jail Seems Like a Whole Year: Palestinian Children Tell Their Stories, 2004, p. 26.
7 For more information regarding demographic indicators, please refer to the publications of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, such as Statistical Monitoring
of Social and Economic Conditions within the Palestinian Society, (First Quarter 2004), p. 17-19.
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the family of detention circumstances on
such prisoners ≠ hunger strikes, torture,
etc.; the difficulty and sometimes
impossibility of obtaining the right to visit
your loved one in prison. Female
members of prisoners’ families usually
bear the heaviest burden imposed by the
loss of the family’s main financial provider.
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The demographic issue is a top
developmental and political priority, with
an emphasis on fertility rates.
Traditionally, fertility rates are integrally
linked to culture. Researchers consider the
high fertility rates in the Palestinian
territories a result of social customs and
tradition, both of which encourage large
families and prefer early marriage for girls.
Nevertheless, the bulk of development
literature supports the theory that political
stability, economic growth, expanded job
opportunities and lower rates of poverty
would simultaneously elevate the status
of women in Palestinian society and slow
the burgeoning rate of population growth.
Moreover, a controlled population growth
rate may be achieved through: a clearly
established demographic policy in
addition to political commitment on all
institutional levels; a wider understanding
of the consequences of the current
population growth; and institutionalized
family planning in order to help
Palestinian society realize its ambitions for
development and guarantee an acceptable
quality of life for future generations.
 Population size and distribution: The
number of Palestinians living in the West
Bank and Gaza, as of first quarter 2004,
is estimated at 3,767,000 persons, of
whom 1,909,000 are male and 1,858,000
are female — a gender ratio of 102.7
males for every 100 females. The
geographic distribution of Palestinians is
as follows: 2,385,000 persons in the West
Bank and 1,382,000 in the Gaza Strip.
Roughly 56.4 percent of the total
population resides in urban areas, 28.5
percent in rural areas and 15.1
percent in camps.
 Population density: Population
density in the Palestinian territories is
considered to be high, especially in the
Gaza Strip, which is ranked as one of the
world’s most densely populated areas. In
general, Palestinian population density in
2004 was estimated at 636 persons per
square meter, with 428 persons per
square meter in the West Bank and a
staggering 3853 persons per square
meter in Gaza. These wide statistical
variations in demographics are due to the
fact that Israel controls the major part of
Palestinian lands, and persists in its land
confiscation policy, building and
expanding settlements, building ring
roads, and most recently confiscating and
isolating lands in order to build the
Separation Wall.
 Low average age of the
Palestinian population: The
population pyramid shows that
Palestinian society is a young society,
considering the width of the pyramid’s
base.  Young people (below 15 years)
constitute a high proportion of the
population in comparison to other age
groups. Data has shown that
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are
younger on average than those living
in the West Bank. The percentage of
children below 5 years was evaluated
in mid-2003 at 17.8 percent (17% in the
West Bank and 19.2% in Gaza). The
percentage of individuals aged between
0 and 14 years was estimated, in the
same year, at 46.1 percent of the total
population living in the Palestinian
territories (44.3% in the West Bank and
49.2% in Gaza). The same statistics
indicate a drop in the percentage of
individuals over the age of 65, who
represent 3.2 percent of the
Palestinian territoriesß population (3.3%
in the West Bank and 2.7% in Gaza).
 Fertility: Fertility rates in Palestinian
territories are among the highest in the
world, if compared to other similar
countries, especially Arab countries. In
1999, the Palestinian fertility rate was
5.9 children per family, compared to 4.4
children per family in Jordan and 3.3
children per family in Egypt.
 Emigration: Statistical data indicate
an increase in the internal migration
rates in the years that followed the
creation of the PNA. Internal migration
during the first three years that followed
the establishment of the PNA
(1994-1997) rose to 29.1 percent as
compared to an average annual rate of
17.2 percent between 1990 and 1993.
In 1997, the rate of Palestinian
individuals owning a permanent
dwelling outside the Palestinian
territories reached 10.5 percent of the
total population, divided between the
West Bank and Gaza at a rate of 65.3
percent and 34.7 percent, respectively.
Results show that nearly half of those
who came back from abroad came back
after the creation of the PNA, and that
53.6 percent of them were males, while
46.6 percent were females8.
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8 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Monitoring of Social and Economic Conditions within the
Palestinian Society, (First Quarter 2004), p. 19.
Political stability, economic
growth, expanded job
opportunities will elevate the
status of women.
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The reason behind the increase in the
number of males returning is due to the
fact that many male individuals came
back without their families, in addition
to the return of many single male
Palestinians working or studying
abroad. There are other indicators that
Box 2.3: Palestinian Emigration Abroad
The results of the opinion poll conducted by the DSP
(Survey 19, 28/09/2004), show that 5 percent of the survey sample declared
that one of their family members had permanently emigrated from the
Palestinian territories during the Intifada. Eleven percent declared that one
of their family members had left the Palestinian territories for study or
temporary work purposes   during the same period.
 The percentage of surveyed individuals expressing a desire to emigrate
has reached 18 percent (according to gender: 24% males and 12% females).
 Furthermore, results have shown that 25 percent of youth (18-27 yrs.) wish
to permanently emigrate (27% males and 16% females), in addition to the
fact that 37 percent wish to leave the Palestinian territories on a temporary
basis, for work and/or study purposes.
 Results also show that readiness for permanent or temporary emigration is
higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, with 21 percent of the Gaza survey
sample expressing the wish for permanent emigration, compared to 16
percent in the West Bank. Furthermore, 43 percent of the Gaza sample wish
to temporarily emigrate compared to 34 percent in the West Bank.
show a decrease in the number of
people coming back due to the harsh
living conditions endured by
Palestinian citizens. Some data indicate
that the rate of returnees has dropped
from 10 percent to 6 percent 9.
9 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Monitoring of Social and Economic Conditions within the
Palestinian Society, (First Quarter 2004), p. 19.
10 Ministry of Education and Higher Education, A Report on the Impact of the Occupation on Palestinian Education,
Ministry of Education web site: www.mohe.gov.ps.
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As was the case with all other sectors,
the Palestinian education sector has
suffered from Israeli aggression, with
countless educational facilities closed
or deliberately destroyed. From the
beginning of the Intifada through May
2004, 1289 schools were closed and
282 schools destroyed. Education
sector losses reached $5.2 million in
primary and secondary schools and
4.85 million at the university level. There
were 723 students killed during the
SECTION THREE:  EDUCATION INDICATORS
2-3-1 Impact of Israeli Measures on the Education
Sector in the Palestinian Territories
Intifada, including 493 school students,
196 university students and 27
teachers, along with many thousands
injured or taken prisoner.10
Despite these measures, and ever since
Israel occupied the Palestinian
territories in 1968, maintenance of high
educational standards has constituted a
major element of the Palestinian
strategy to surmount the challenges of
Israeli military occupation. Investment in
the education sector remains a
fundamental empowerment tool and
provides a basis for sustainable
development objectives in the
Palestinian territories.
Within this vision, education has two
aspects: material and moral. The first
aspect is based on the fact that
education improves Palestinians’ living
conditions by opening doors to
employment and reduces the economic
consequences of their physical
Box 2.4: The Separation Wall and the Educational
Process
Completing the construction of the Separation Wall will have a negative
impact on an estimated 170,000 students in 320 schools, who will be on the
outer side of the wall, while more than half of them will attend schools
located on the inner side of the wall.  For example, there are 150 teachers
and 650 students in the District of Tulkarem alone who have difficulty
reaching their schools. It is expected that these numbers will increase
dramatically once the wall is completed. The number still does not include
those schools which have been damaged or will be demolished. Education
costs for families will increase as students are forced to travel long,
circuitous routes from their villages to their schools which will be located,
once construction is completed, on the opposite side of the Separation Wall.
Thus, a bad educational and economic situation will be made even worse.
Confiscation of land owned by the Al-Quds University in order to build the
Separation Wall represents a clear example of Israeli aggression against
Palestinian educational institutions. The decision was disapproved of even
by the Israelis themselves. Students of Hebrew University issued a
statement objecting to their government‘s actions, and 30 professors,
teachers and lecturers from Hebrew University took part in a sit-in organized
at Al-Quds University.
Completing the construction
of the Separation Wall will
have a negative impact on an
estimated 170,000 students.
Maintenance of high
educational standards has
constituted a major element of
the Palestinian strategy to
surmount the challenges of
Israeli military occupation.
innovation, human rights, women’s
rights, non-violence, scientific thinking,
open-mindedness, tolerance, and the
respect of personal opinions?
Education is a pivotal pillar of
empowerment and for decades has
served as major factor in ensuring
Palestinian society’s capacity to face
and overcome crises, both individually
and collectively. Palestine’s overall
schooling rates were the highest in the
Middle East and North Africa. Despite
the fact that Palestine occupies a
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displacement. From the moral
perspective, large numbers of
well-educated individuals within
Palestinian society provide some
immunity against attempts to dissolve the
Palestinian national identity and shred the
Palestinian socio-cultural fabric. The
Palestinian Human Development Report
of 2002 asserted that education,
learning and curricula were major pillars
of emancipatory human development. It
is certain that specialized institutions have
taken major steps to safeguard the
educational process and improve its
performance.
Nevertheless, many issues are being
raised with regard to the quality and type
of education offered to students such as:
To what extent has the Palestinian
educational environment adopted the
requisites of emancipatory human
development? Does Palestinian
education create a true sense of
citizenship in the hearts of students?
Does it produce good citizens
possessed of the values of creativity,
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somewhat lower economic position
among medium-income states, its
educational performance is nevertheless
advanced among countries of
the same category.
However, the quantitative indicators
showing high educational performance
do not paint a complete picture of
Palestinian educational reality, unless
quality of education indicators is taken
into account. Such qualitative indicators
include curricula excellence indicators,
the relationship between educational
institutions and society, the quality of
vocational and professional training
received by teachers, the quality of
educational methods and capacities,
and levels of creativity and rational
thought achieved by the
education process.
Point of Light 20: Continuation of the Educational Process despite the
Challenges
The Ministry of Education and Higher Education, along with other institutions responsible for the maintenance of
primary, secondary and university level schooling, has demonstrated tremendous resilience in facing down the
common practices of occupation. They created emergency plans to ensure the continuity of the educational
process. Alternate schooling sites were set up in homes, mosques, and other community centers. Secondary
school certificate examinations were held on time and universities and other educational facilities found ways to
continue all activities.
These strategies proved to be very efficient in countering Israeli military aggression on Palestinian towns and
urban centers, as well as the forced closure procedures and curfews. The Ministry and UNRWA have begun work
on programs to remedy violence in schools. They are also working hard to integrate the concepts of human rights
and gender equality into their curricula.
Some consider that the Palestinian
educational system, in spite of its
successful expansion to accommodate
upward population trends, has not yet
fully achieved its most basic task: i.e.
preparing upcoming generations to
meet the demands of the future. They
believe the Palestinian educational
system must adapt in order to expand
each student’s ability to learn over a
lifetime to make the development of the
student the central focus of the
education process, rather
than rote learning.11
At the same time, others believe that
educational institutions are seeking
innovation, development and
capacity-building among those who have
made education their career, in addition
Education, learning and
curricula are major pillars of
emancipatory human
development.
Quantitative indicators
showing high educational
performance do not paint a
complete picture of
Palestinian educational
reality, unless quality of
education indicators is taken
into account.
11 For more information about this subject, please refer to Ramzi Rihan, Palestine and the Knowledge Society, in Knowledge Society and Development Capabilities,
previous reference, p.99-106.
12 The official age for kindergarten enrollment is from 3 years and 8 months to 5 years and 8 months. As for children less than 4 years old, they attend kindergartens
under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and which only attract 1% of children.
to organizing the institutional framework
of education in order to meet
tomorrow’s challenges.
2-3-2 Public Schooling
Kindergartens
The kindergarten12 sector’s educational
importance resides in the fact that it
deals with children at a flexible and
sensitive age, one at which children are
particularly open to psychological,
physical and mental development.
However, in Palestine, this sector does
not meet international norms and
standards. Kindergartens lack curricular
and educational programs designed to
enhance children’s capabilities,
creativity, and skills. Their programs are
restricted to the processes of teaching
children how to read and write. They do
not know how to employ games as
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learning tools (a standard practice
throughout the world for this age group),
and lack professionally trained preschool
and kindergarten level educators
specifically qualified to teach children of
this age.  At this age, Palestinian children
The number of pupils
registered for kindergarten
has decreased.
Box 2.5:  Kindergartens ≠ Forming the Future
If, as stated in the previous chapter, empowerment requires investment in human beings in order to realize
their full potential and creative powers, then this definition takes on a deeper meaning when it comes to
children. Many educational and child-rearing institutions attempt, through their own unique systems and
curricula, to help children acquire skills, values, and knowledge adapted to their readiness, capacities and
needs.  Not all methods are successful. The degree to which children acquire adequate skills, values and
knowledge determines their future and their capacity to work as active members of their society.
However, kindergarten conditions in Palestine ≠ in general ≠ are showing signs of declining competencies
in skills required to adequately supervise children during this delicate stage. In this regard, the following
issues should be noted:
 Kindergartens are being established without any planning for the needs of the children and the needs of the
various locales where they are established. Many of them are simply profit-making ventures. Most
kindergartens lack professionally trained staff with a background in lower primary education.
 Most kindergartens focus, in their curricula, on preparing children for primary school in the areas of reading,
writing, and basic math, while ignoring the importance of encouraging and developing children’s social skills,
respect for authority figures and the need for regular supervised exercise periods designed to release excess
energy in a healthful and positive manner.
 Some kindergartens are affiliated with political or religious groups, which means that children are
indoctrinated with ideological values at the expense of developing their general mental capacities.
Furthermore, kindergartens that are related to religious groups tend to infuse into children a set of traditional
religious values that express the group’s religious views and beliefs.14
 Qualitative supervision and control over kindergartens does not exist.   The role of the Ministry of Education
and Higher Education is restricted to mere technical supervision, and this authority is delegated over a vast
array of departments within the institution.
13 Ministry of Education and Higher Education ≠ National Education for All Agency, Education for All: Reality and Challenges ≠ The Summarized Report, Part One, 2004, p. 9.
14 Refer to the enquiry published in Al Baydar Journalistic Annex, issued by the Development Studies Programme, in regard to this subject: Al Baydar, Issue No. 44, 18
March 2004, p. 4.
are rarely recognized as independent
persons ready for learning -a prejudice
which negatively impacts educational and
social development. Kindergartens are
often considered as nothing more than
day-care centers.
Table 2-1: Statistical Indicators Regarding
Kindergartens13
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Indicators
Number of kindergartens
Number of classes
Number of educators
Number of male kindergarten pupils
Number of female kindergarten pupils
Total number of pupils
Total enrollment rate for both genders
Number/percentage
847
2761
2668
36,578
33,578
70,170
29%
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The public sector plays almost no role
in education during the preschool and
kindergarten years.  It is an enterprise
left entirely to the private sector, as well
as to charitable and women’s
organizations, and UNRWA. The
Ministry of Education mounted a
modest effort to organize kindergarten
education by setting certain hygiene
standards that must be met in order for
a kindergarten license to be issued.
However, the issue is still under debate.
The following table provides some
information regarding Palestinian
kindergartens.
Other data received from the
Palestinian Central Statistics Bureau
indicate that 70,255 pupils registered
for the 2003-2004 school year, i.e.
7,177 pupils less than four years ago.
This drop may be due to many
reasons, possibly due to declining
levels of public safety or the
perception thereof due to the current
circumstances (61% according to
Survey No. 16, Development Studies
Programme, June 2004). Furthermore,
the citizens ß economic situation,
especially with increasing
unemployment rates, may prevent
families from meeting all of their
children’s needs, including kindergarten.
Schooling
The number of students enrolled in West
Bank and Gaza schools for the 2003-2004
school year totaled 1,017,443 students of
both genders, and 37,226 teachers. It is
clear, according to these statistical data,
that the education sector is the largest in
Palestine, whether in regard to the number
of beneficiaries ≠ students ≠ or the labor
force.  Teachers constitute the largest
employment sector in Palestine. Despite
the tremendous expansion of this sector,
it still enjoys the highest level of public
confidence of all Palestinian sectors and
institutions — 82.4 percent of Palestinians
are confident in their school system.15 The
education sector ≠ especially public
education ≠ has undergone dramatic
development since the establishment of
the PNA in 1994, especially in the areas
of employment, school construction, and
improvement of school education quality.
Supervising Education
Available statistics indicate that the PNA
supervises 69.4 percent of all schools.
These schools provide education to 69
percent of all Palestinian students. UNRWA
supervises 24.7 percent of schools, thus
providing education to 25 percent of the total
number of students in the Palestinian
territories. As for the private sector, it
supervises 5.9 percent of schools with 6
percent of the total number of students.
Palestinian schools are divided,
according to gender, into three
categories: boys ß schools, which
represent 34 percent of the total
number of schools; girlsß schools, which
also represent 34 percent of the total
number; and coeducational schools,
which represent 32 percent of schools.
The percentage of students in
coeducational schools is far less than
the percentage of these schools in the
total number of schools. As a matter of
fact, available data show that the
number of classes in these schools
does not exceed 20 percent of the total
number of classes. Coeducational
schools are, for the most part, restricted
to basic elementary levels (first to fourth
grade), and are scattered throughout
small towns or urban areas. A number
of private schools also adopt the
coeducation system. Separating
genders in school reflects the
conservative traditional educational
vision, thus preventing the development
of normal relationships between
students of both genders in
Palestinian schools.
15 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Programme: Opinion Poll No. 17, 4-6 June 2004.
The education sector
-especially public education-
has undergone dramatic
developments since the
establishment of the PNA.
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Drop-Out Rates
The act of “dropping out“ or permanently
leaving the school system in Palestine
occurs for economic, social and
educational reasons, as well as for other
50
reasons related to political and security
conditions. The main economic reasons
are poverty and lack of job opportunity.
Social reasons include family problems,
custom and tradition, which mostly
affect girls (in the 2001/2002 school year,
16 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Programme and UNICEF, Palestinian Children on the Job Market (Participatory Qualitative Study), Ramallah, 2004.
From the educational point of
view, the curricula are
criticized for not doing enough
to encourage creativity and
scientific thinking,
Box 2.6: The Five-Year Plan for Educational Reform (2001-2005)
The Ministry of Education and Higher Education crafted a new strategy aimed to keep up with the evolution of teaching
methods and meet the challenges of a modern educational system. This strategy’s main goals include: providing
enrollment opportunities to all school-aged individuals, to improve the quality of education; to develop official and
alternative education; to develop organizational capacities; and to develop human resources within the educational
system.
The basic principles of educational development include: education is a   human right; education is the basis for
citizenship; education is a social and economic development tool; education sustains democratic governance;
education is a continuing innovative and mutual process. It is certain that if these concepts are efficiently
integrated within the educational process and the curricula they would play an essential role in empowering
Palestinian individuals and society.
Box 2.7: Palestinian Children on the Labor Market16
Harsh economic and social conditions and the absence of legislation that protects children from exploitation
have pushed Palestinian children into the job market to seek employment to support themselves and their
families. The following conclusions discuss some of the results obtained following a study undertaken by the
DSP, in collaboration with UNICEF:
Factors that push children to work: Participation in providing for the     family’s livelihood and basic needs;
the sense that schooling is futile and the desire to learn a trade; provision of the working child’s personal needs,
especially in poor families.
Nature and place of work: Boys perform many types of work not suitable for their age group, such agricul-
tural work, construction work, car repair, stonecutting, etc, while girls usually undertake tasks traditionally
related to women such as sewing and house cleaning. These children are often    compelled to work in places
far away from their homes — a large                    percentage of them work inside Israel.
Risk sources for children: Working children are often exposed to   numerous risks, namely the risk of
being killed, shot or arrested by   occupation forces; exposure to sharp objects, toxic gases and heavy
machinery; sexual harassment or beating.
Work impacts on children’s health and sanity: Working children are    exposed to severe physical stress
causing chronic pain in various parts of their bodies and shortness of breath. Many children also feel afraid,
insecure, anxious, frustrated, as well as many other emotions that affect their physical and mental health.
Relationship to school: The results of the study have shown that 70 percent of working children are
school dropouts who claim that the harsh treatment they received from their teachers and peers was
behind their decision to quit school. Others state that it was their academic                      incompetence that
pushed them to drop out of school and seek other life opportunities. The need to help support the family
is causing more and more children to quit school and join the job market.
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early marriage was the reason behind
64 percent of drop-out cases involving
female students). Educational and
cultural reasons include falling behind
in studies, in addition to poor education
quality or hostile or improper behavior on
the part of a teacher. Finally, political and
security-related reasons include
occupation measures such as arrests,
restrictions on travel and reduced
access to schools.
Despite all of the above reasons, data
indicate a steady decline in the
drop-out rate, which reached around 7
percent in elementary grades for both
Point of Light 21: Universal Education: “Education
That Excludes No One”
The Ministry of Education and Higher Education has adopted the Universal
Education concept, in collaboration with UNESCO, and with the support of
the Diaconia Institute in Sweden. This program promotes the principle of
equal rights to all student categories to integrate individuals with special
needs into mainstream schools.
The Universal Education concept includes a series of procedures to train
teachers to work with special needs students, providing them with adequate
learning tools, and to adapt curricula to serve the needs of the largest number
of student categories. This program has succeeded in integrating 259 schools
by the end of 2003, providing mainstream education for 67 totally
sight-impaired students, 1128 partially sight-impaired students, 67 totally or
partially hearing-impaired students, and 563 physically disabled students.
genders in the 2002-2003 school year.
In secondary grades, drop-out rates
average 3.7 percent (4.8% for female
students and 2.6% for males).
Illiteracy in Palestinian Society
According to 2003 data, the illiteracy rate
among individuals aged 15 and older is
3.7 percent for males and 12.6 percent
for females. These data indicate a
decrease from the rates     recorded in
1997, when they amounted to 7.8
percent for men and 21.3 percent for
women, thus reflecting a clear
progression in the push for eradicating
Seventy percent of working
children are school drop-outs.
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Data indicate a steady decline
in the drop-out rate.
Point of Light 22: Adult Education Program (Ya..noon)
Palestinian community and official institutions have endeavored, over the last years, to reduce the rate of
illiteracy in Palestinian society, considering education one of the most important access routes to development
and empowerment. There are many illiteracy eradication programs sponsored by various institutions. These
programs often use the media because of its vital role in the developmental process, and in view of its capacity
to create social trends. Programs presented by the media largely contribute to developmental and social
issues, by spreading progressive developmental and cultural concepts and sponsoring public debates on
subjects such as education, health, and unemployment.
Within that framework, Birzeit University’s Development Studies Programme produced the “Yanun” TV series for
learning and civic culture, which is intended for adults and young people of both genders. This 17-part series deals
with the issues of early marriage, pregnancy, children, gender, education, refugees, emigration, and the
environment. This series allows men and women to learn at their own pace through television, using educational
material based on active learning methods and personal initiative. Yanun also provides institutions involved in
civic education with materials that deal with various social issues and which may be used with all social classes.
The Yanun series was produced by a Palestinian production firm called “Smart Frame”.
Palestinian universities play a
major role in the academic
preparation of tens of thou-
sands of Palestinian students.
illiteracy over the last six years. In
addition, it should be noted that illiteracy
rates among women are 3.4 times higher
than among men. By comparing results
from the West Bank with those collected
in Gaza, illiteracy rates among men in
Gaza are 7 percent higher than in the
West Bank, while illiteracy among
woman in the Gaza Strip is 1 percent
less than in the West Bank. Illiteracy
rates according to residence clearly
indicate the quality of educational and
cultural services provided within various
demographic areas, with cities
recording the lowest rates, followed by
camps, then villages. This clearly shows
that camp residents (refugees) give
great importance to education when
compared to village residents.
Furthermore, it is generally noted that
the     percentage of individuals who read
and write is on an upward trend, despite
the persistence of the gap between men
and women in this regard.
Palestinian Curricula
School curricula, and especially the
textbook, are the main tools for
teaching and conveying educational
messages to students. With the
creation of the Ministry of Education and
Higher Education, a new vision for
preparing Palestinian curricula was
born, one which would reflect a uniquely
Palestinian context and perspective,
and stay abreast of all scientific and
technical advancements. The Center
for Developing Palestinian Curricula
was established in 1995. The curricula
plan was completed in 1998 and the
new curricula launched in the
2000-2001 school year. These curricula
have been put in place for eight grade
levels. The plan is expected to be
completed with implementation of the
new curriculum for secondary school
students (9th through 12th grade) in the
2005-2006 school year. The main
educational developments taken into
consideration within the Palestinian
curriculum are:
1. Teaching English as of the first
elementary grade.
2. Teaching Technology as of the fifth
elementary grade.
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A new vision for preparing
Palestinian curricula was
born, one which would reflect
a uniquely Palestinian context
and perspective,
Box 2.8: A Gender Analysis of the Palestinian Curriculum ≠ Starting Again
The 2002 Human Development Report included an express criticism of the weak gender dimension in
Palestinian curricula. The committee in charge of the curricula sent a memo to the work team explaining how
keen committee leaders were to incorporate gender sensitive references into the new curricula. Despite
improved gender sensitivity in some Palestinian curricula books, quantitative and qualitative analyses
undertaken on a sample of textbooks, regarding masculine, feminine and neutral expressions appearing in
content situations, roles or images, produced the following conclusions:
 Masculine idioms are much more commonly used than feminine idioms in the sampled books. The masculine
form is usually chosen to illustrate situations and exercises, with men’s names and pictures of men surpassing
female references.  Most stories‘ protagonists are male, and they are usually depicted as the strong, intelligent
characters, i.e. hero, scientist, sportsman, writer, inventor… while women are presented in secondary roles, and
often portrayed in situations that take place inside the home.   Occasional instances can be found in which women
are engaged in non-traditional work or activities.
 Stereotypical gender roles are confirmed through the frequent depiction of women in the home, performing
housework and other traditional roles.  References to female pioneers or women in non-traditional situations
are too infrequent.  Women are also typically portrayed as sentimental and non-analytical, while men are
rational and methodical.
 Inconsistent or incorrect usage of gender-specific language.  Frequently, textbooks do not correctly employ
the proper forms of the root word, and colloquial expressions are frequently masculine in nature.
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Points of Light 23 to 26: The Community-Based
Development Role for Palestinian Universities
 Point of Light 23 ≠ Community Service Center (SSC) ≠ Al Najah
National University: This initiative highlights and underscores the
important socio-developmental role that can be played by Palestinian
universities. The SSC’s objective is to empower individuals to solve their
own social problems, and to strengthen the perceived value of volunteer
work. The SSC offers an integrated program of three types of social
services; guidance and referral, local social work, and volunteering. The
SSC raised the profile of the university in the local community; promoted
the concept of volunteerism by attracting large numbers of volunteers from
the student body and the local area from all age groups and social classes;
built capacity within other social organizations; and collaborated on
numerous humanitarian programs that serve children, the elderly, the poor,
victims of the Intifada, and patients afflicted with thalassemia.
 Point of Light 24 ≠ Community Action Center ≠ Al-Quds University: The
center launched the Community Action Center as part of the Palestinian
Curriculum for Physical Education with the slogan “For you, my country”. This
initiative is based on the view that children and youth form the foundations of the
future, and that communities must promote extracurricular activities that reinforce
a sense of belonging within a collective Palestinian culture. The center
implemented these activities during academic year 2003-2004, in ten schools
spread throughout East Jerusalem and its suburbs, with the help of 45 student
volunteers. Community Action Center activities included approximately 700
students, of both genders, aged between 11 and 14 years.
 Point of Light 25 ≠ Islamic University (Project of the Center for Assistive
Technology to the Blind): The Assistive Technology Center was established
in late 2000. Its objectives are to assist the blind in the use of advanced
technology by training them to use computers and to produce materials and
curricula specifically designed for blind students.  Currently 61 blind students
of both genders attend Islamic University.
 Point of Light 26 ≠ Women’s Community College (Specialization in Jewelry
Making): The project idea is to provide free professional training to refugee
women, from poor marginalized social classes, in the art of goldsmithing using
the latest modern techniques in order to prepare them to enter the job market.
A more proactive role in the
dissemination of progressive
thought and cultural
openness is one of the major
challenges facing
higher education.
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3. Introducing subjects such as health,
environment and civic education as
independent topics.
4. Preparing for the introduction of
computer technology, contemporary
issues, economics and management
into 11th and 12th grade curricula.
Nevertheless, despite the many
positive changes in the Palestinian
curricula and the complete evolution in
some areas, its content is still subject
to criticism. From the educational point
of view, the curricula are criticized for
not doing enough to encourage
creativity and scientific thinking, and
they are also criticized for not
sufficiently reflecting gender sensitivity.
Moreover, they are criticized for failing
to meet the objective of realizing
studentsß full potential and encouraging
creativity, especially because the
introduction of the new curricula did not
coincide with a strategy for training
17 For more information, please visit the website of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education: www.moe.gov.ps
and the website of the Palestine National Information Center: www.pnic.gov.ps
Box 2-9: Statistical Indicators for Higher Education
in Palestine17
 The number of students enrolled in university colleges and facilities in the
Palestinian territories totals 123,600 students of both genders, representing 4
percent of the population. The students are distributed among 11universities,
5 colleges and 25 community colleges.
 There are 9,000 employees working in higher education institutions, 45
percent of whom are academics.
 Higher education institutions provide 288 educational fields of study and
award diplomas, bachelor’s degrees, Master’s degrees and PhDs.
 The higher education operational budget for academic year 2003-2004
totaled $85 million.
 Roughly $42 million in financial aid is provided to 150,000 students annually.
 The Ministry of Education established the National Board for Certification
and Quality, which launched its operations in mid-2002.
 Higher education enrollment rates in the Palestinian territories rose at the rate
of 6.4 percent for male students and 11.6 percent for female students between
academic years 1997-1998 and 2002-2003. The statistically larger increase in
women’s enrollment rates may reflect an increased social awareness of the
value ofeducation for women. In addition, difficult economic conditions have forced
many male high school graduates directly into the workforce out of financial
necessity within families.
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teachers in the new methods and
provide necessary teaching materials. In
addition to the foregoing, regarding
books as the sole source of knowledge
creates stagnation and can actually
counteract efforts to keep up with the
evolution of educational advances.
2-3-3 Higher Education
Palestinian universities play a major role
in the academic preparation of tens of
thousands of Palestinian students for civic
and professional life. Although the
significance of this role is clearly
recognized, education at the university
level in Palestine now faces a
number of  challenges.
Palestinian universities must use their
influence in the areas of economic,
cultural and scientific research to
facilitate and speed the processes of
empowerment and development.
Universities and their academic teams
must become a major catalyst for the
creation of a qualified professional
workforce, both adaptive and
innovative, which will propel the
national economy forward and
stabilize Palestinian institutional
infrastructure.
Palestinian education at the university level
must keep up with scientific and
technological trends throughout the world.
Universities must become financially
self-sustaining, and must maintain close ties
to the Palestinian private sector to ensure
that programs of study reflect the needs of
society.  They must assume a more
proactive role in the dissemination of
progressive thought and cultural openness,
while promoting respect for Palestinian
traditional values and the national
character.  If universities succeed in
meeting these challenges, social
advancement and qualitative gains in
empowerment will be assured.
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Point of Light 27: Achievements of the Ministry of
Health
Despite the existence of internal and external restrictions placed on the
Ministry of Health, it still achieved a number of qualitative and quantitative
gains in the quality its services and performance. The Ministry ≠ as well as all
other health sector institutions –successfully dealt with the large number of
Palestinian deaths due to Israeli aggression, as well as with the partitioning
and closure of its key service areas. The Ministry maintained service at its
facilities throughout the Palestinian territories, including those in remote
rural areas. Statistical indicators show progress in many areas, such as
reduced infant mortality rates, expanded health insurance coverage, and
improvements in the number and quality of services specifically
provided to women.
SECTION FOUR:  HEALTH STATUS INDICATORS18
Israeli violence against Palestinian
civilians is one of the primary causes
of deteriorating health conditions in the
Palestinian territories. During the
current Intifada, occupation forces
deliberately targeted the Palestinian
service infrastructure, including the
vital sectors of health and education.
According to Palestinian Ministry of
Health estimates, the number of
Palestinian injuries incurred as result of
Israeli aggression during the period from
29 September 2000 to 31 December
2003 totaled 28,272, in addition to 2,726
killed, 707 of which were children. Israeli
checkpoints hamper the work of
medical services organizations by
preventing paramedics from accessing
injured persons and by refusing to allow
ambulances to transport them to the
hospital.   At least 103 Palestinians died
at checkpoints due to deliberate Israeli
delays, in addition to 31 instances of
miscarriage and 55 live births.
Twenty-nine Palestinian medics were
killed by Israeli fire, while 424 others
sustained injury while attempting to
assist the wounded. Recorded data
also show that 335 cases of aggression
against ambulances occurred, in which
37 vehicles were totally destroyed.
Other data show 945 cases of
ambulances being prevented from
reaching hospitals with patients on
board, in addition to 285 instances of
the deliberate destruction of health
facilities in Palestine. Data also indicate
that 40 percent of Palestinian families
have experienced difficulty obtaining
medical services for their children
(44.6% in the West Bank and
32.1% in Gaza).
2-4-1 Health Conditions
Infant Mortality
Infant mortality rates recorded in the
Palestinian territories for the past ten
years show significant improvement.
Prior to the establishment of the PNA, the
infant mortality rate stood at 27.3 deaths
per 1000 deliveries. That rate dropped to
25.5 deaths per 1000 deliveries in the five
years following the establishment of the
PNA.   (In Gaza, however, the rate
actually rose to 27.3 deaths per 1000
deliveries, without significant variations by
Israeli violence against
Palestinian civilians is one of
the primary causes of
deteriorating health
conditions in the Palestinian
territories.
Data also indicate that 40
percent of Palestinian families
have experienced difficulty
obtaining medical services for
their children.
18 Ministry of Education and Higher Education, A report on the impact of the occupation on Palestinian education,
Ministry’s website: www.mohe.gov.ps.
More than 64 percent of
Palestinian families reported
trouble obtaining food during
the current Intifada.
The chronic malnutrition rate
among Palestinian children
below 5 years has reached
10.2 percent.
gender.) The improvement in the West
Bank might basically be due to the
combined efforts of the PNA’s Ministry of
Health, the UNRWA, and NGOs, through
the national immunization program,
health education, and the increase in the
number of motherhood care and primary
health care centers.
Women’s Health
  Mother’s mortality: Women of
reproductive age (15-49 years)
represent 22.3 percent of the total
number of women.  Maternal mortality
rates recorded in the Palestinian
territories stood at 12.7 per 100,000
births (21.3 in Gaza and 6.7 in
the West Bank).
 Births: 84 percent of births take place
in hospitals, with hospital stays ranging
between 1.4 days for natural births and
3.4 days for Caesarian-section births.
Fifteen percent of births taking place in
public hospitals are Caesarian sections.
Miscarriage rates were reported at 113
and 107 cases out of 1000 pregnant
women in Al Chifaß and Khan Younis
Hospitals, respectively.
 Family Planning Programs: The
number of family planning clinics
increased from 97 clinics in 1997 to 197
clinics in 2003. Available data show that
51.4 percent of married women use at
least one family-planning method. The
Ministry of Health provides
contraceptives at affordable rates, i.e. 4
NIS (about $1) for a monthly supply of
birth control pills (used by 34.8% of
women) and 12 shekels (about $3)
for an intrauterine device
(used by 34.3% of women).
Nutritional Conditions
Nutritional survey data for 2002 collected
by the Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics show that 63.4 percent of
Palestinian families reported trouble
obtaining food during the current Intifada.
Shortages in food supplies resulted from
the many sieges and lengthy curfews, as
well as the high unemployment rate and
overall deterioration of the economic
situation. Many Palestinian families lost
their primary source of income during this
period. Twenty-six percent of Palestinian
families were forced to rely on food
donations. In addition, the chronic
malnutrition rate among Palestinian
children (below 5 yrs.) has
reached 10.2 percent.
Health Authorities
Four separate sectors supervise
Palestinian health care services:  the
public sector, local community
organizations, private concerns and
UNRWA.  Seventy-eight hospitals
operate in the Palestinian territories,
with a total of 4,679 beds. Twenty-three
hospitals are affiliated with the Ministry
of Health and they contain 55.9 percent
of the total number of beds. The ratio
of beds per person is of 1 bed per 779
persons. The Ministry of Health
increased the total number of beds
available by 38.2 percent between 1999
and 2003. Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics 2002 data showed 1 bed
per 741 persons.
Hospitals are distributed by area of
specialty as follows: 39 general
hospitals, 21 maternity hospitals, 14
hospitals for specialized types of
treatment and 4 rehabilitation and
physical therapy centers. The practice
of external referrals for specialized
treatment continues, due to the fact that
the Palestinian health sector has only
the minimum required technical and
human resources in major areas of
medical specialization, such as
cardiology and oncology, and has no
capacity at all in less common areas of
specialization. The ratio of physicians
to population was 1.5 percent in 2002
(0.99% in 1997).
The ratio of hospital beds per
person in the Palestinian
territories is one bed per 779
persons.
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Box 2.10: Green Space in Palestinian Cities
 A comprehensive public health agenda must include strategies for the preservation of natural and environmental
resources in order to achieve improved quality of life and sustainable development. The creation of “green space”
within urban areas ≠ multipurpose public parks, playing fields for sports, public gardens, natural and manmade
bodies of water ≠ is universally considered beneficial to the population and to the natural environment. Natural
green space within Palestinian cities is rapidly shrinking as a result of haphazard urban expansion and the lack of
adequate zoning oversight by municipalities and other planning authorities.
The Israeli policies contribute to the destruction of green space as well, through the confiscation and partition of
Palestinian land in order to build or expand settlements, constructing ring roads and prohibiting Palestinians
from expanding their settled areas to accommodate population growth. There are currently 260 Israeli  settlements
built on Palestinian land, inhabited by 435,000 Israeli settlers.  Seven hundred thirty kilometers of ring roads have
been constructed (on Palestinian land) to link these settlements to one another.
Point of Light 28: Environmental Protection
The Road Safety and Environmental Protection Center has started to pave sports fields and children’s
playground areas using shredded automobile tires to create environmentally friendly surfaces. Used tires are
recycled into a sturdy but cushioned surface under play equipment areas, or even filled with earth and used as
flower planters to beautify public places.  Between the end of 2002 and 2004, seven such gardens were built in
West Bank towns (Deir Ibzigh, Beit Aor Al Tahta, Qbayya, Qrawa Bani Zeid, Birzeit, Abou Qash, and Kafr
Eddeek). Roughly 12,000 children, of both genders, are expected to reap the benefits from the new and
innovative play areas.
SECTION FIVE:  ECONOMIC INDICATORS
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The Palestinian economy is undeniably
vulnerable to a host of external influences,
most notably the Israeli policies related
to occupation.  These policies include:
restrictions on the movement of goods
and people; denied access to urban
centers, costly delays at ports and
crossing terminals; and a system of
geographic partitioning and security
measures which adds significantly to the
cost of overland transport of local
products. The following economic
indicators provide a statistical picture of
the effects these policies have had on the
Palestinian economic situation for the
past three years.
Box 2.11: Obstacles Facing the Health Sector in Palestine
Many Palestinian health facilities are severely overcrowded, especially small local clinics serving areas where
population growth has outstripped the growth of the health care infrastructure. Generally speaking, health care
centers and hospitals are not situated according to the demographic distribution of the population.
Pharmacies attached to public hospitals and clinics, affiliated with UNRWA or located in small communities are
constantly in short supply of prescription medications, especially drugs for chronic conditions such as diabetes
and high blood pressure. Palestinian hospitals rarely perform complicated       surgeries of the brain or heart or
for cancerous tumors, due to a lack of qualified physicians and proper medical equipment.
2.5.1 Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and
Economic Sectors
The Palestinian GDP dropped 13.1
percent between 2000 and 2003 to
$4,019 million.  GDP per capita for the
same period dropped 24.4 percent to
$1,108.70.  The Palestinian Gross
National Product (GNP) also dropped
by 15.7 percent between 2000 and
2003, with a corresponding drop in GNP
per capita of 28.8 percent.
Israeli occupation has affected the
overall performance of individual
Palestinian economic sectors as well.
Total industrial sector losses amounted
to $540,000,000 at the end of 200120.
Employment in this sector decreased
between 2000 and 2003 from 14.3
percent to 12.5 percent21. The 2004
World Bank report covering the effects
of the 27 months of the Intifada reported
that only 7 percent of industrial
facilities managed to maintain
pre-Intifada production levels. The food,
textile, leather and plastic industries
were hit hardest. A slight change was
recorded in the industrial sector’s
contribution to the GDP for this period,
but the numerical figure does not
reflect the true extent of the regression
in the industrial sector.  Value added
statistics for the industrial sector dropped
13 percent between 2000 and 2002.
Employment in the agricultural sector
grew from 13.7 percent in 2000 to 15.7
percent in 200322. The agricultural
sector absorbed some of the laborers
who used to travel every day into Israel
to work, but who became unemployed
as result of the closing of the Israeli
borders to Palestinian laborers.  The
employment increase in the sector is,
therefore, not due to any structural
improvements in its capacity to provide
jobs.  Agriculture’s contribution to the
GDP rose from 8.5 percent to 9.3
percent in 2002, although the sector’s
value added figures for the
same period dropped.
The Building and Construction Sector
depends heavily on the importation of
basic construction materials (cement,
steel and wood) from Israel. Work on
hundreds of public and private
construction projects was halted during
much of the Intifada, as well as in the
factories that process the imported raw
materials into various components used
in the building industry.
Tourism, however, was undeniably the
hardest hit sector of the Palestinian
economy. The industry suffered a
near-total shutdown, causing
regression in all related economic
indicators.  The number of hotels in
operation dropped from 106 in 2000
to76 by 2003. The number of guests
and overnight stays dropped 86 percent
as of the second quarter 200323.
The financial sector, which includes
banking and capital markets, was also
greatly affected. After posting total net
profits of $21,900,000 in 2000, the
collective net profits of commercial banks
operating in Palestinian territories
dropped to $8,600,000 at the end of 2003,
despite the fact that their assets increased
in value, from $412.4 to $520 million
during the same period. Funds on
deposits fell from 38.4 percent to 30.4
percent, which indicates regression of
credit quality within the banking system24.
The newly established Palestine
The Palestinian GDP dropped
13.1 percent between 2000
and 2003.
19 Nasr Abdel Karim, An Evaluation Study of the Impact of the Palestinian National Authority’s Developmental
Economic Policies on the Right to Work in the Transitional Period, Center for Democracy and Workersß Rights, 2003.
20 Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Manpower Survey, various issues (2000 -2003).
21 Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Manpower Survey, various issues (2000-2003)
22 Visit the web site of the Palestine National Information Center: www.pnic.gov.ps
23 Palestinian Monetary Board ≠ Department of Studies and Monetary Policies, Statistical Leaflet No. 71, unpublished
data, 2004.
24 Nasr Abdel Karim, Performance of the Palestinian Banking Sector During the Transitional Period Between Private
Sector Expectations and Bank Management Estimates, Financial and Banking Studies Magazine, Arab Academy for
Finance and Banking, 2003.
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The creation of “green space“
within urban areas is
universally considered
beneficial to the population
and to the natural
environment.
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Securities Exchange lost 40 percent of
its value during the first
year of the Intifada25.
2-5-2 Foreign Trade
Foreign trade constitutes one of the
basic elements of the Palestinian
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Its
impact on the GDP has always been
negative, considering that historically,
Palestine’s imports have always
exceeded its exports. Trade with Israel
alone accounts for 77 percent of
Palestine’s overall foreign trade.
Consequently, the closures and sieges
occurring during the Intifada deeply
impacted the Palestinian
balance of trade.
Exports dropped nearly 42 percent in
2002, while imports fell by 41.5 percent,
compared to their 1999 levels. The
relative weight of imports in foreign trade
being much higher that that of exports,
the decrease in import levels actually
improved the Palestinian trade deficit by
41.4 percent26. Although reduction of the
national trade deficit is ostensibly a
desirable outcome, the drop in imports
was in fact accompanied by an equal
drop in the level of exports, which
illustrates that the overall Palestinian
foreign trade situation is
structurally flawed.
Palestinian export levels are very
sensitive to events on the ground, a fact
that only serves to exacerbate the
already existing trade deficit. Low
levels of exports are attributed to many
factors: (1) the high cost of transporting
the goods from the manufacturing
location to final markets, due to Israeli
obstacles, thus increasing their overall
cost and reducing their competitiveness
on foreign markets; (2) importers
stopped carrying Palestinian-made
goods in favor of products from other
countries whose delivery capabilities are
more dependable; and (3) Palestinian
producers focus on meeting local
demand for goods and forego
opportunities to penetrate foreign markets
due to the numerous logistical
difficulties associated with
manufacturing for export.
2-5-3 The Labor Market
The Palestinian job market and its
associated indicators clearly reflect the
impact of Israeli actions directed at
Palestinian labor during the Intifada.
The number of Palestinians working in
Israel has dropped by more than 50
percent between 2000 and 2003, down
to 57,300 workers in 2003. This loss of
Israeli jobs further aggravated an
already serious unemployment problem
in the Palestinian territories where
jobless rates hover at 25.6 percent of
the total workforce, and spike to 38.4
percent among young males.
Employment levels in Gaza are
chronically lower than in the West Bank,
with unemployment rates reaching 29.2
percent in Gaza compared to 23.8
percent in the West Bank. Furthermore,
unemployment affects men (26.9%)
more than it affects women (18.6%)
probably because of the high
proportion of males working in Israel
unemployed after the onset of the
current conflict.  Total participation in the
workforce also dropped slightly, from
41.5 percent to 40.4 percent.
Palestinian women have a lower rate
of workforce participation than many
other countries. Palestinian women
constitute only 12.8 percent of the work
force (9.2% in Gaza and 14.7% in the
West Bank) It was also noted from
manpower surveys that the average daily
wage has increased both in the West
Bank and Israel, reaching 72.2 and 125.1
NIS, respectively. The wage increase is
The tourism industry suffered
a near-total shutdown,
causing regression in all
related economic indicators.
Trade with Israel accounts for
77 percent of Palestine’s
overall foreign trade.
25 Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Trade Statistics, various issues.
26 Ministry of Finance, General Budget Data, various years.
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Unemployment rates have
reached 29.2 percent in Gaza
and 23.8 percent in the West
Bank.
Arab nations pledged $10
million per month to pay the
wages of Palestinian civil
servants.
The published budget data of
the PNA shows a chronic
deficit.
attributed to decreased available
Palestinian manpower in Israel, and the
depreciation of the shekel, the primary
wage currency. Average daily wages in
Gaza remained virtually unchanged at 52
NIS per day.
2.5.4 General Treasury
General Treasury revenue in the
Palestinian territories is derived from
three sources: (1) taxes levied on
commercial activity undertaken in the
Palestinian territories; (2) employment
taxes levied by Israel, on behalf of the
PNA, then transferred back to the PNA
in the form of revenue; (3) aid given to
Palestinians by international donors.
Revenues from these three sources
have dramatically dropped over the last
three years, with revenue from general
commerce taxes decreasing by 42.5
percent as compared to their pre-Intifada
levels, down to $207 million in 2003. The
loss of tax revenue is due to
the general slowdown in Palestinian
economic activity.
Employment tax revenues, which
constitute more than 60 percent of the
PNA’s budget, dropped by 46.2 percent
to $324 million.  Israel habitually
withholds tax revenue due to PNA as a
form of collective punishment.  Israel
transferred a portion of the monies due
at the beginning of 2003 after the
appointment of the new Palestinian
Minister of Finance. However, the level
of uncertainty surrounding the
continuance of regular revenue
transfers remains high, and depends in
large part on the whims of the
Israeli government.
International aid is the third significant
source of Palestinian treasury revenue,
and total support levels have changed
considerably since the beginning of the
Intifada.  Arab nations pledged $10
million per month to pay the wages of
Palestinian civil servants. Despite
wavering commitments on the part of
some Arab nations to pay their
respective shares, more than $920
million was transferred by the end of
2003. Total aid received over the last
three years exceeded $3 billion, in
comparison with the $1.47 billion
received between 1998 and 2000. Fifty
percent of foreign aid goes to job
creation programs and humanitarian and
emergency relief while the remainder is
used to support the functions of the
PNA‘s current budget.  Generally
speaking, efforts to rehabilitate and
expand the Palestinian infrastructure
and its manufacturing sector received
little funding during the Intifada.
Changes in the PNA’s sources of
revenue have had an impact on the
general budget deficit and on the PNA’s
public debt. The PNA’s published
budget data shows a chronic deficit, as
well as a new off-budget “accounts
payable“ line item totaling $50 million
appearing in 2000.  The accounts
payable item represented remittances
or checks issued by the PNA for which
no official budget allocation exists.   The
“payable” amount rose to $155 million
in 2001 and when added to the actual
Box 2.12: The Increase in Public Debt
During the ten years since the inception of the PNA, there was a constant
increase in its indebtedness, until it amounted, in the year 2000, i.e. six
years after its founding, to roughly $392 million.  During the first year of the
Intifada, the public debt rose to more than $840 million. This clearly depicts
the magnitude of the financial crisis endured by the PNA since its creation.
The public debt continued to increase until it reached its peak in 2003, when
it exceeded $990 million27.
27 Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index.
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budget deficit amounted to $371
million.  This figure continued to grow
throughout 2002 and totaled $753
million ($328 million in deficit + $425
million “due”).
The 2003 budget showed substantial
improvement in that there was no
scheduled shortfall due to increased
foreign assistance. The amount of the
deficit covered by foreign aid amounted
to $747 million. In addition, employment
taxes released by Israel on account from
previous years amounted to $480
million, of which the PNA used $415
million to settle accumulated overdue
amounts. Moreover, loan premiums
amounting to $65 million were also
settled, thus reducing the budget
deficit to zero.
In view of the size PNA’s financial
problems, it is easy to see the effect of
this ongoing crisis on the government’s
level of public spending, as well as the
consequences in terms of reduced
levels of public services.
2-5-5 Prices and Living
Standards
The cost of living and the prices of most
consumer goods have noticeably
increased since the start of the current
Intifada. Data collected by the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
indicate that record-high consumer
prices were reached during 2003, when
prices stood at 137.7 percent, i.e. an
increase of 37.7 percent compared to
prices in 1996. This increase came as
a result of a rise in the index prices of
the majority of basic consumer goods
classified according to key expenditure
groups. The highest price increase was
recorded in the transport and
communication group, where prices
rose by more than 73.5 percent, from
their 1996 levels, while average prices
dropped in the entertainment goods and
services group. Another factor has also
played a key role in price increase —
the sharp depreciation of the Israeli
shekel over the past few years.
Furthermore, there appear to be
considerable differences in price levels
between various Palestinian regions,
whereas the consumer price index rose
by 40.8 percent in the West Bank, while
it only rose by 36.1 percent and 27.7
percent in Jerusalem and Gaza,
respectively28.
This necessarily has an impact on the
living standards of Palestinian families,
especially taking into consideration the
high unemployment rates currently
recorded all over the Palestinian
territories, and the drop in (or total
absence of) income for the majority of
Palestinian families, 72.3 percent of
which depend on earned income to
cover their expenses. The results of the
survey undertaken by the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics have shown
that more than 35.5 percent of families
in the Palestinian territories have
suffered from poverty in 2003,
according to consumer spending patterns.
On the other hand, the relative poverty
index has shown that 67.6 percent of
families have suffered from poverty
according to income, considering that
the average poverty line for a
six-member family is set at 1,800 Israeli
shekels in 2003 (around $395). Survey
results also show the importance of aid
in alleviating poverty among
Palestinians.   More than 64.5 percent
of families describe themselves as poor,
but assert that direct financial aid would
help lift them out of poverty. Seventy
percent of families surveyed stated that
providing job opportunities is the main
factor which would serve to change
their      financial  circumstances.
28 Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Press release regarding the basic results of poverty survey in the Palestinian
Territories, 2003.
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There was a constant
increase in the PNA‘s public
indebtedness, exceeding
$990 million in 2003.
The Palestinian CPI reached
a record high of 137.7 percent
in 2003.
More than sixty-seven
percent of Palestinian families
lived below the poverty line in
2003.
Box 2.13: Feminization of Poverty
There is a close relationship between female poverty in Palestinian society
and the nature of the male-dominated job market. A closer look at the job
market reveals a horizontal and vertical segregation between men and
women, which, in itself, has a negative effect on women, especially those
who live below the poverty line. In 2002, poverty rates among female-headed
families reached 30 percent, while they only reached 20 percent among other
families. According to the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, there is a
drop in the participation of women in the workforce (13.4% in 2000, down to
12.7% in mid-2004), which constitutes one of the lowest female labor force
participation rates in the world. As for unemployment among those who are
aged 15 and older, the rate is 30.5 percent among men and 19.1 percent
among women. This does not constitute a positive indicator for women,
because the qualitative significance of this rate and its relationship to job and
education opportunities must be taken into account. Moreover, women
receive lower wages than men, in all sectors, with men’s average daily wage
reaching 78.1 shekels compared to 63.1 shekels for women.
SECTION SIX:  GENDER INDICATORS29
29 Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Department of Policies and Studies, Women and Development Priorities:
A participatory View, Ramallah, 2004.
30 Such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the Convention for Eradication of all Types of
Discrimination against Women 1979, which stipulate the necessity for empowerment of women.
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Universal participation in development
is considered a basic human right
according to United Nations
resolutions30, and everyone must take
part in the development process in
order to reap its fruits.  The UN’s
Millennium Development Goals contain
a special clause dedicated to gender
equality and the
empowerment of women.
Women’s participation in development
bears double importance in the
correlation between participation and
development. No real development is
possible without women’s participation.
This importance is also rooted in the
existing gap between men and women,
when it comes to opportunities, choices
and living conditions.
Gender is a key element of the human
development concept. Measuring
women’s participation in the
developmental process is key
development indicator and a
comparison guide. Understanding that
human development is “a process that
expands the choices that are available
to peopleò, there is a resulting need to
aggressively promote true equality
between men and women.
In Palestine, statistical data indicate
weakness in women’s participation in
the official development process,
whether in the job market or in public
institutions’ decision-making
procedures. Contradictions exist
between what these indicators state
quantitatively and what they
qualitatively signify.  Additionally, some
indicators are misleading regarding
women’s participation in the
development process. For instance, in
spite of the increase in women’s
education levels, there is no
corresponding increase in women’s
participation in professional
occupations. Although women
constitute roughly half of all university
and higher education institution
graduates, women’s participation in the
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job market reached only 12.8 percent
in 2003. At the same time, increases in
early marriage rates and a fertility rate
of 5.9 children per family are observed.
Available data shows that women’s
access to decision-making and
policy-implementation positions is still
very limited, especially when one
considers the sacrifices and suffering
they endure as result of the occupation.
These data indicated that women
constituted 49 percent of voters in the
first legislative elections of 1996, but only
3.7 percent of the total number of
candidates, and they secured only 5.6
percent of Palestinian Legislative
Council seats. As for Ministry leadership
positions,  women headed only two out
of 25 ministries — the Ministry of Higher
Education and the Ministry of Social
Affairs — from 1996 to 1998; and then
only one ministry — the Ministry of
Social Affairs —  from 1998 to 2003.
During the Al Aqsa Intifada, there were
three cabinet shuffles, none of which
included appointments of women, until
the creation of the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs in 2003.
As for local council leadership, the
percentage of women appointed to the
councils did not exceed 5 percent of the
total number of appointees. In the
policy-making process, women held
15.2 percent of director generalships
and higher positions, 12 percent of
directorship positions, and 25 percent
of section head positions. Furthermore,
the percentage of female civil servants
tends to increase as the relative
importance of the position decreases.
Finally, women’s participation in the
judicial system is very limited, and only
7 percent of all judges are female (10
judges, including 6 in the Gaza Strip).
Several reasons may lay behind the
marginalization of women at the
policy- and decision-making levels. In
addition to the occupation’s hindrance
of all development processes, there is
a strong connection between a
woman‘s socio-economic status and
her ability to reach decision-making
positions. Poverty reports show a clear
increase in the percentage of families
headed by women (11 %), and that the
overall percentage of poor families
headed by women is greater than that
of poor families headed by men.
Furthermore, the early marriage and
school drop-out (especially at
secondary levels) rates are related to
popular culture, with female drop-out
rates reaching 4.8 percent in 2003 (at
the secondary school level), compared
to 2.6 percent among males.  Overall,
the drop-out rate for this period declined
(8.2% in 1998). This may be due to the
PNA’s efforts to improve educational
services, and the role played by various
institutions to raise public awareness as
to the importance of female education.
Reasons behind female drop-out rates
often include early marriage.  Nineteen
is the average marriage age for women
in Palestine, which means that half of the
girls get married under the age of 19.  One
can assume that at this age, they are not
sufficiently qualified, either academically
or professionally, to participate in the job
market,  and that they are more
vulnerable to the threats of
discrimination, domestic abuse
and violence.
The creation of the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs was not accompanied
by a comprehensive commitment to
create national public policy that would
contribute to improving the conditions
of women. Female representation in
ministries, parties and communities
organizations is still very limited. An
indication of the weak levels of political
participation of Palestinian women is
demonstrated by the decreasing
number of women in executive,
legislative and local institutions. Female
representation on the Palestinian
National Council does not exceed 8
Women‘s access to
decision-making and policy
implementation positions is
still very limited.
Women‘s participation in the
judiciary system is very low.
Eleven percent of all
Palestinian families living
below the poverty line in
Palestine are
headed by women.
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Point of Light 29: The National Campaign to
Promote Women’s Participation in Elections
Palestinian women have taken part, throughout Palestine’s recent
contemporary history, in the national liberation movement. Women‘s active
participation is needed so that progress can be made in improving the
condition of all women in Palestine at the social, political and economic level.
Thus, since the inception of the PNA, many women’s initiatives were launched,
seeking to improve women’s conditions and enhance their participation in
political and social life. The “Campaign for Women’s Participation in
Elections” was the latest of these initiatives. It coincided with the public
debate with regard the laws that organize local and legislative elections.  The
campaign emphasized the need to adopt laws that promote a policy of
positive intervention on behalf of women, by establishing a quota for 20
percent female representation on local councils and on the Legislative Council.
The campaign was launched by the General Palestinian Women’s Union, which
is a popular organization of national stature which serves as an umbrella
organization for a large number of women‘s groups. The Union launched an
initiative to open a public dialogue among women’s groups, political parties, and
other civil society organizations, in order to secure the largest possible support
for the female quota concept. This campaign’s activities expanded to include
many Palestinian regions, with dozens of workshops and training sessions held
on the topics of women’s participation and elections.
The campaign’s various activities increased levels of support for the female
quota concept within Palestinian society, with various public opinion polls
indicating that 70 percent of Palestinians favored the establishment of a
female quota. The campaign also enjoyed the support of 45 Legislative Council
members, and achieved its first success with the amendment of the local
elections law, with Article 29 now stipulating: “The following text shall be
added to Article 47 of the Local Council Elections Law No. 5 of 1996:
‘Whenever there are female candidates, female representation on any local
council board may not be less than two seats among those having secured
the highest number of votes”.
Many women’s initiatives
have been launched, seeking
to improve women’s
conditions and enhance their
participation in political and
social life.
The creation of the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs was not
accompanied by a
comprehensive commitment to
create national public policy
that would contribute to
improving the conditions of
women.
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percent, while the Legislative Council
has only 5 women members out of a
total of 88. Within the executive
authority, the current Cabinet includes
only two women ministers, while
women    represent only 12.5 percent
of the 250 directors general currently
appointed in various ministries.
In municipal and local councils, the
percentage of women never exceeded
1 percent until the elections held in late
2004, when the percentage leapt to 17
percent. Moreover, women’s
organizations have not yet attained the
required level of effort coordination to
actively promote women’s issues.
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The Role of Palestinian National Authority Institutions in Society
Building and Empowerment of the Palestinian People
This chapter analyzes the role and performance of PNA institutions in terms of their ability to empower the
Palestinian people and to rebuild Palestinian society, which has suffered considerable damage during the past
four years. The analysis will address the separate areas of institutional operations, characteristics and
performance.  This chapter will also examine empowerment as a concept, as well as its function as a tool for the
reinforcement of institution-building.   Finally, it explores the role of empowerment in the facilitation of internal
capacity-building within society, and its potential to bolster sustainable and balanced development.
Chapter Three

Introduction
This chapter analyzes the role and
performance of PNA institutions in
terms of their ability to empower the
Palestinian people.  It also looks at the
impact they have had on the process
of rebuilding Palestinian society, which
has weakened and deteriorated
significantly during the past four years.
In the context of the PHDR, the term
“empowerment“ refers to all aspects of
social activity and interaction including:
political, legal, administrative, financial and
institutional reform; effective political
participation; assurance of freedom of
speech, pluralism and organization; the
development of effective antipoverty
strategies; and the acceptance of common
visions and agreed upon goals in
confronting Israeli policies of occupation.
It also refers to the development of a
strategy unified in both content and
implementation method.  This strategy
must incorporate political and
resistance-related processes, and must be
followed by all members of PNA
institutions, NGOs and the private sector
in order to achieve Palestinian aspirations
and goals and to reinforce the capacity to
strive for liberation.
Institutional empowerment ≠ the focus
of this chapter ≠ is an important
component of development. Strong
institutions are critical to Palestinian
society, especially in view of the
relentless effort to destroy the
Palestinian will.  A sense of
determination is required to construct an
institutional framework that will prove to
the entire world that the Palestinian
people can build and lead a democratic
state based on effective participation and
rational governance. Therefore, each
time the Palestinians come close to
achieving any level of institutional em-
powerment and democratic governance,
it is expected that the Israeli occupation
forces will redouble their efforts to
destabilize Palestinian society.
Understanding the nature of the
challenges that impede development
and empowerment initiatives increases
the potential for overcoming those
obstacles. Institutions can expand and
intensify social problems and crises as
easily as they can help overcome them.
In other words, institutions can reinforce
the status quo or challenge it,
depending on the conditions present.
Because institutions are so influential
in either reinforcing or destabilizing
society’s beliefs, values and behavioral
patterns, those in the Palestinian
territories are increasingly the focus of
attention for foreign governments,
political parties and civil society, as well
as regional and international
organizations and forums. This
increased level of attention from the
outside is shown in a number of ways,
including the current demands for
reform  ≠a condition put forward by
donor countries, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and
various international agencies which
provide the PNA the support and
assistance needed to implement its
developmental programs. In the Arab
region (including the Palestinian
territories), calls for reform (particularly
those from the United States) have
gained considerable strength and can
exert a powerful influence not only on
politics, social welfare and the economy
but also on cultural values.
In the Palestinian case, the relationship
between efforts to produce sustainable
development and the need for reform
has become clearer. Any work to
address one area automatically impacts
and influences the other area.
Therefore, if Palestinians proactively
address the case for reform, their
aspirations for sovereignty and
independence might still continue to
face numerous obstacles and
challenges.
The empowerment process
includes the development of
a unified strategy in both
content and implementation,
and incorporates political and
struggle-related processes.
The Palestinian people can
build and lead a democratic
state based on effective
participation and rational
governance.
Democratization of all aspects
of political life within a pluralistic
system leads to rotation of
power and  leadership.
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In order to prevent this, maximum
mobilization of Palestinian resources is
needed. Within this idea, the need to
identify the role of PNA institutions
within the empowerment process
becomes obvious, as well as the need
to advance an understanding of the role
of the empowerment process itself in
institution-building and creating
comprehensive, balanced and
sustainable development within
Palestinian society.
Box 3-1: Arab Reform ≠ Conceptions and Visions1
The Alexandria Document issued by the Conference on Arab Reform Issues:
Vision and Implementation (March 2004) identified the resources needed to
advance reform within Arab societies. Participating governmental and civil
society organizations concluded that advancing reform efforts is important,
urgent, and fundamental to all aspects of national development, including:
 Political reform: Democratization of all aspects of political life within a
pluralistic system that includes rotation of power and leadership.  Steps
required to achieve political reform include ratification of constitutional and
legislative amendments to ensure the following: separation of powers,
conducting periodic elections that prevent monopoly over power, revamping
of political institutions and structures, and ensuring public freedoms, such as
formation of parties and an independent news media.
 Economic reform: Building an infrastructure that provides an environment
conducive to the efficient functioning of the public and private sectors,
encouraging privatization, improving the quality of production and upgrading
the output of underperforming economic sectors.
 Social reform: Enhancing familial relations and reconsidering certain
traditional values, promoting the creation of a well-informed society by
focusing on education and providing a conducive atmosphere for building
such society, ensuring social stability through the equal distribution of
resources and ensuring the full participation of all levels and classes of
society, such as ethnic and religious minorities, children, youth, women,
poor and marginalized social groups.
 Cultural reform: Laying the grounds for rational thinking, safeguarding
intellectual and religious freedoms, providing an environment conducive to
the strengthening the foundation of a democratic culture, reforming cultural
institutions and encouraging cultural exchange with other nations.
Cultural reform requires
laying the grounds for rational
thinking, safeguarding
intellectual and religious
freedoms, and providing an
environment conducive to the
strengthening the foundation
of a democratic culture.
If Palestinians proactively
address the case for reform,
their aspirations for
sovereignty and
independence might still
continue to face numerous
obstacles and challenges.
1 See also: papers issued by the Conference on Reform Priorities and Mechanisms in the Arab World, Cairo 5-7 July
2004, and the text of Tunisia Declaration, 22-23 May 2004.
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Ten years after the establishment of PNA
and its institutions and four years after
the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the
Palestinian situation is defined by
several important and complex attributes
that greatly impact the role and
performance of Palestinian institutions
in terms of empowerment.  These
characteristics influence in turn the
overall Palestinian political, economic
and social situation. Some of the major
attributes include:
 Serious but inadequate efforts to
build and reform institutions: The
Palestinians have made significant
progress in the area of reform. Several
organizations have exerted effort to
sustain progress made in
institution-building and to improve
performance within those institutions.
Certain ministries were abolished and
some were merged with other
structures, while new ministries were
created (such as the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs). In addition,
specialized committees now handle the
task of reforming the operational
functions of PNA institutions. Significant
advances have been achieved in
promoting transparency and accountabil-
ity in the area of national finance.
 Continuous but uncoordinated
attempts to build institutions: Most
attempts to promote institution-building
within the PNA depend on personal
commitments of the respective institutions‘
leadership or the availability of international
financial support. Regrettably, few or none
of these attempts are coordinated or linked
with other efforts in order to create a
unified vision towards
comprehensive reform.
  Ambiguity and contradiction of
constitutional bases governing  the
Palestinian political system: There have
been serious attempts to develop a
Palestinian constitution that agrees with
and complements the Palestinian Basic
Law and the Declaration of Independence,
which serve as a constitutional framework
in the absence of a constitution. However,
a succession of disparate and often
conflicting legal systems and regional
variations in both interpretation and
enforcement result in widespread
ambiguity and confusion in a number of
crucial areas, including: the freedoms and
rights of individuals; the legitimacy and
scope of the governing authority; common
objectives, and the nature of the
relationship between the government and
the society it governs on both an individual
and collective level.
 Maintaining the heritage, traditions,
values, culture, methods and
approach of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) in managing the
public domain has lead to the
dominance of political, factional and
personal factors over professional
considerations and competence.
Consequently, systems of
accountability, modern management
and the rule of law have been
weakened.  The incentive to create
institutions designed to empower
society remain weak and efforts to
modernize Palestinian life are symbolic
and/or superficial.  True
decision-making power was never
vested in and remained outside official
institutions and structures, such as the
PLO National and Central Councils, the
Legislative Council, even the PNA
Council of Ministers or the
Prime Minister.
 Traditional structure of the
political system: The Palestinian
political system is based on an alliance
of political elites, security apparatuses
and traditional social structures and on
a network of relations of loyalty and
personal and interest-oriented
connections with people in power at all
levels. The system of personal alliances
Section One:  Main Characteristics of the Palestinian
Political System
The Palestinians have made
significant progress in the
area of reform.
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Box 3-2: Excerpts from the Proposed Palestinian
Constitution (Third Revised Draft, 15 May 2003):
Although Palestinian society is not yet ready to create a comprehensive
constitution, which requires that the conditions of independence and liberty   exist,
this situation does not preclude discussion of the development of a constitution.
Two separate areas of public discussion exist on the constitution issue.
The first represents a view held by a large number of Palestinians believing
that discussion of the constitution is important at this time so as to advance
the formulation of a vision for the future. The second area deals with the
international pressures on the PNA to develop a constitution that
incorporates the reforms demanded by external parties. Nevertheless, some
of the draft articles in the new constitution are irrefutable and should be
included in any final document.
Article 1: Palestine is an independent state enjoying full sovereignty with a
republic system of government. Its territory represents an integral unit with
borders as of the fourth of June 1967 without breach of international
resolutions related to Palestine. All those living in this territory are subject to
the Palestinian law solely.
Article 3: Palestine is a peace-loving state that denounces terrorism,
occupation and aggression, calls for solving international and regional problems
by peaceful means, and adheres to the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 19: All Palestinians are equal before the law, enjoy civil and political
rights and assume public duties without any discrimination based on race,
gender, color, religion, political opinion or disability.
Article 23: Women have the right to full participation in social, political,
cultural and economic life. The law seeks to remove obstacles that prevent
women from participating in building the family and society.
is accompanied by a host of illegal
practices, such as bribes, corruption
and various means of bypassing or
disregarding the rule of law. In spite of
a nominal level of pluralism in this
system, features of authoritarianism are
still present.
 Weakness of the Palestinian
political system and a chronic
failure to take initiative: The system’s
inability to manage the confrontation
with the Israeli occupation stemmed
from an uncoordinated and disordered
approach to the dilemma, coupled with
internal polarization and competition for
power.  The Israelis capitalized on the
Palestinians‘ internal state of disarray.
 Weak legislative and judicial
authorities: The legislative authority
faces numerous challenges, including:
the absence of clear constitutional and
legal references, restrictions imposed
by agreements with Israel that limit
legislative powers, marginalization of its
role by the executive authority and
submission to the influence of political
sphere, and the lack of information and
documents required to decide
directions for developing, implementing
and evaluating public policies. The
judiciary authority also suffered similar
challenges, examples of which are:
prior agreements which impose
restrictions on its powers, absence of a
constitution governing relationship
Palestine is an independent
state enjoying full sovereignty
with a republic system of
government. Its territory
represents an integral unit
with borders as of the fourth
of June 1967 without breach
of international resolutions
related to Palestine.
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Women have the right to full
participation in social,
political, cultural and
economic life.
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between the branches of power, the
patchwork legal heritage in Palestine,
the reluctance of the executive
authority to establish the Higher Judicial
Council, interventions by the executive
authority in the judiciary system and
usurping a number of its functions,  such
as appointing, promoting and transfer-
ring judges, rationalizing inconsistent
salary scales, dismissing and retiring
judges, establishing courts, and
extensive and persistent intervention in
the affairs of the Justice Ministry.
 Large number of fragmented
security apparatuses: At the time of the
writing of the Human Development
Report, nine separate security
organizations exist, each employing a
large number of forces, with each branch
reporting directly to the PNA chairman.
The functions and powers of these
organizations overlap and are often
contradictory.  Within the organization, the
hierarchy of power is ill-defined, and
procedures, rules and  regulations are
unclear or nonexistent. The unsurprising
result is a state of confusion and chaos
and a total  absence of  discipline.
In July 2004, this state of chaos resulted
in a serious confrontation in the Gaza
Strip, with a number of people wounded
and killed. The seriousness of this issue
becomes more pressing in view of the
pressures on the Palestinians and
Competition for donor funds
sidelines prioritization of the
Palestinian domestic agenda.
Point of Light 30:
Reforming the Palestinian Security Apparatuses ≠ Initial Steps Requiring
More Reinforcement2
Following the establishment of PNA and the subsequent creation of its various security apparatuses, several
positive developments were made in terms of improving the organizational function of the security forces. A
number of upgrades were made in the areas of human resources (training courses for security personnel in
human rights and proper civil procedures) and the structure and functionality of individual departments.
However, these developments were reversed when the security personnel and their operations centers       became
the targets of Israeli army forces.
The targeting of Palestinian security forces led to a complete disintegration of the security situation for Palestinian
citizens.  Internal and external calls for reforms within the security apparatus were renewed, and especially for the
reinstatement of the rule of law. From the Mitchell Report to the Road Map, all agreements called for security
reforms designed to effectively fight terrorism and for the merger of the nine security apparatuses in three
organizations reporting to the authorized Minister of Interior.
Major steps achieved in relation to the security apparatuses include:
 Merging three security apparatuses within the Ministry of Interior and creating a Council for National Security.
The Council coordinates and supervises reforms in the security apparatuses and monitors all security-related
issues in the PNA-controlled areas.
 Work is underway to train the security personnel and reorganize the security forces to enable them to carry out
their functions. Several projects have been proposed in this regard.   Jordan and Egypt would be responsible for
developing and implementing the training program for these forces, in addition to providing institutional and
NGO-directed training for security personnel on principles of human rights and democracy.
2 See: Ahmed Abu Dayyeh, Reform Process in the PNA Institutions: Reform Motives, Requirements, Mechanisms and Achievements, Palestinian Center for Political
and Survey Research, January 2004.
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demands for reform that come from
several international parties with distinct
political agendas. Recently, many
powers related to the security
apparatuses were transferred to the
Prime Minister following the death of the
Palestinian President Arafat.
 Scarcity of internal resources:
Palestinian resources are scarce. The
impact of such scarcity intensifies when
combined with habits of extravagance
and wastefulness, poor planning, lack
of transparency, poor participation
and the spread of a cultural
acceptance of illegal gains.
 Great dependency on external
assistance: In spite of the well-known
positive implications of external aid,
there have been negative repercussions
associated with it as well in Palestine.
As Palestinian institutions compete for
donor funds, prioritization of the
domestic agenda is sidelined, and
those agencies lacking the personnel
and expertise to secure donor funding
are further marginalized.  In addition,
foreign aid negatively affects PNA
legitimacy, sovereignty and independent
decision-making processes and,
consequently, affects the concept and
3 Wael Qdeih, Economic and Financial Reforms in the Palestinian Authority, in the Journal of the Palestinian Planning
Center, Issue 9 and 10, January and June 2003, website: www.oppc.pna.net
Point of Light 31: Financial Reforms in the PNA3≠
A Step in the Right Direction
The issue of financial reform was first addressed in a Presidential Decree issued
on 15 January 2000, as well as in a number of issues brought before the Higher
Council for Development. These issues include unifying all budgetary resources
in a central account and promoting transparency of the public financial system in
order to facilitate the systematic implementation of a budget. Major issues
discussed at that time include transferring the department responsible for
salaries to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in order to control the scope of public
sector employment. These measures are expected to ensure PNA financial
stability in the short and intermediate terms.
Major deficiencies in PNA financial performance prior to the initiation of the
current reforms include: PNA involvement in non-transparent commercial
activities, insufficient operating funds at the MOF, a rapid increase in current
spending levels as result of the enormous expansion in government jobs, and
the management of most PNA assets and commercial activities in a covert
manner. Significant financial reform efforts since mid-2002 include:
The Palestinian Investment Fund: The bylaws of the fund were approved on
14 August 2002, merging all PNA commercial activities and investments into
the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF). The establishment of the PIF codified
national investment policy and the management of public revenue, whether
inside the country or outside. In addition, profits from these investments of
public funds are directed to a unified account in the PNA treasury.
The government‘s economic role: The new reform vision is based on the
notion that trade is a matter for the private sector and the role of the government
is limited to the provision of the required basic services—a sound infrastructure
and modern regulatory and legal environment.  The government must also
create a social security network to address the needs of the underprivileged
social groups. The role of government in the economy should focus on the
responsible collection of tax revenue rather than profit-making.
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The principle of a unified treasury: Unifying revenues and depositing them in
a unified treasury account is considered the biggest achievement of the PNA.
Continued adherence to this practice will improve the management of public
revenue and public expenditure in accordance with the general budget approved
by the Legislative Council.  Public expenditures will be subjected to internal and
external audits, and financial observers from MOF maintain a presence within
government ministries to audit transactions and ensure their validity.
Management of public revenue: The financial reform program has
focused on the management of public revenue with the intention of
creating highest possible level of accountability. Achieving an organic link
between revenues from investments and the budget and channeling the
revenues to a unified central treasury is considered a major step towards
consolidating public revenues and reinforcing the principle of placing all
public funds under the direct control of MOF.
General budget: The statement of general budget for 2003 has been
received with an unprecedented level of acceptance by the Legislative Council
compared to previous PNA budgets and was seen as a professional effort
that deserves implementation. The 2003 budget met international standards
and included an objective presentation of conditions it was expected to
reflect. The budget was based on realistic assumptions and included a
monitoring mechanism not present in previous budgets. Therefore, this draft
budget represents a major step forward compared to previous budgets,
although it was largely linked to collecting revenues due from taxes taken by
Israel.
Total revenues in the draft budget were estimated at NIS 6.392 billion, whereas
expenditure was also estimated at NIS 6.392 billions, which means that there
would be no budget deficit in the event the revenues are channeled to the
public treasury as expected. The total revenue figure included local revenues
of NIS 2657 million and grants and aid to the public treasury at NIS 2675
million, whereas revenues from grants to fund development projects reached
NIS 1060 million. The total expenditure included current costs at NIS 5.222
billion, development expenditures funded by the treasury at NIS 110 million,
and development expenditures funded by donor countries at NIS 1.06 billion.
Civil service law: Early in 2003, the MOF developed a timetable for gradual
implementation of the financial aspects of the civil service law promulgated
in 1998 according to the financial resources available to the PNA. It
emphasized that all new government employment within the PNA should be
completely halted until organizational structures are developed and endorsed
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the civil service law and the
housing and transport of employees enrolled in the civil service are
completed. In light of the above, $2 million was to be allocated per month in
the draft overall budget law for the fiscal year 2002, in addition to the line
item “salaries and wages“. In its session on 17 May 2003, the Council of
Ministers decided to terminate the services of employees in the civil service
whose ages exceeded 60 years with the disbursement of a pension equaling
75 percent of their original salaries and the profession‘s allowance. No
extensions are to be granted to any employee without a decree by the  Council
of Ministers until the new retirement law is issued.
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practice of Palestinian citizenship.
Widespread reliance on donor aid within
the PNA, the political opposition and the
Section Two:  Palestinian Institutions ≠ Role and
Performance
Effective monitoring of
institutions and councils at the
operational level is difficult,
especially in the absence of
clearly stated professional
standards to evaluate
performance.
NGO community makes it very easy to
disregard the need for domestic
accountability to the Palestinian community.
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Official Palestinian institutions fall into three
main categories: political institutions,
operational institutions (including security
apparatuses) and local councils. Political
institutions are those deciding the goals,
programs and policies of the government
in general, in addition to determining the
budget and the nature and direction of
organizational management. Political
institutions include the Office of the
President, the Office of the Prime
Minister, the Legislative Council and the
Judiciary Authority. Operational institutions
are the providers of services, including
ministries, councils, centers, bureaus and
authorities. Finally, local councils are
composed of municipal and
village councils.
Some representative PNA institutions
reflect to a certain extent the overall
pattern of Palestinian governance and
provide significant indications as to the
status of other institutions. These
institutions vary in terms of history,
physical and human resources, quality of
leadership and types of service they
provide.   The rules and regulations that
govern their structure, functions, and
relationships are often ambiguous.
Institutions are frequently bureaucratic in
nature, and many deliver substandard
services.   Inadequate attention is paid to
the functions of strategic planning,
goal-setting and prioritization.  Their
development resources are limited, and
those resources that do exist are  often
mismanaged.
3-2-1 Political Institutions:
This category of institutions consists of:
the executive authority comprised of the
Office of the President, the Office of the
Prime Minister and the executive staff,
the legislative authority (the Legislative
Council) and the judiciary authority.
3-2-2 Executive Authority:
The Office of the President is linked to
several departments, bureaus, offices
and apparatuses and a large number
of consultants and directors general, in
addition to numerous institutions and
councils. In general, these institutions
share a common ambiguity of
employment standards, bases for
promotions, and enforcement of laws
and court rulings. Effective monitoring
of these institutions and councils at the
operational level is difficult, especially
in the absence of clearly stated
professional standards to
evaluate performance.
The Office of Prime Minister is a recent
creation. It is supposed to serve as the
implementing authority of the programs
areas controlled by the legislative body,
including: policy implementation,
administrative organization, budget
development, law enforcement, ministry
oversight and ensuring public order and
security.
Close examination of the general
budget presents a clear picture of gaps
in the performance of PNA institutions,
which prevent them from positively
contributing to the required development
and empowerment processes. In spite of
technical and essential improvements
in many aspects of the budget, several
practices remain unchanged.
More than 3000 new jobs were added
in 2003, mostly in governmental
institutions that already suffer from
inflated numbers of employees. Public
funds were also allocated for several
public institutions and structures
without identifying the person
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Box 3-3: Palestinians‘ Assessment of the Executive
Authority
Opinion polls indicate that the Palestinian public holds a variety of opinions
as to the performance of the executive authority. Various perspectives
differentiate between the individual governing bodies in terms of function
and performance, as well as in strength of criticism leveled at the organization
and calls for public accountability. Although 70 percent of the Palestinians
acknowledge corruption is present in executive institutions, the institutions
themselves are not viewed as uniformly corrupt. Up to 80 percent believe
corruption exists in ministries and government bureaus, 75 percent believe it
is present in the security apparatuses and police, but only 41 percent believe
it is present in the presidential office. Respondents apparently differentiate
between the top executive post and all the other governing bodies and
institutions.  The conviction that corruption is absent at the highest levels of authority
might be an indication of public fear and/or respect of this institution, in which
case people would hesitate to openly question the integrity of the
presidential office. Whatever the reason, this institution is viewed as less
corrupt in comparison to other institutions.
In addition, executive institutions are frequently mentioned by the public when
asked about means to confront corruption, with 92.5 percent stating that this
task would require control over the role, performance and practices of these
institutions.4 The Prime Minister‘s office is viewed by the public in a
comparable way. For example, 60 percent believe that Ahmed Qurei’s
cabinet is unable to eliminate corruption, 54 percent believe it is unable to
control the internal situation and 57 percent think it does not possess the
ability to improve people‘s economic situation.5
responsible for oversight of the
expenditure before the Legislative
Council. The budget also did not
outline the details of the financial and
monetary situation in the public
treasury, debts and loans and plans for
their payment, and PNA investments in
local and external structures and
businesses. The budget is also
criticized for the fact that the share of
social development (education, health
and social security) remains below the
desired level, not exceeding 25 percent
of the total budget.6 In addition, due to
the enormous size of employment in the
public sector, expenditure on wages
and salaries and other related aspects
has consumed about 60 percent of the
budget, leaving only a small proportion
for production sectors, as low as 1
percent, for example, for the agricultural
sector. The increased percentage of
public debt, exceeding 15 percent of the
GNP and Israel‘s failure to transfer
clearance tax amounts to the
Palestinians, caused further disruption
to the integrity of the general budget.
4 See, Bassem Ezbidi, Corruption and the Palestinian Political System in Corruption in Palestine, edited by Bassem
Ezbidi,Palestinian Research and Studies Center, Nablus, 2001. See also public polls issued by the Palestinian
Research and Studies Center, Nablus, Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and Birzeit University
Development Studies Programme, all of which have shown comparable figures and classifications.
5 See, in particular, Poll No. 4, January 2004, issued by the Polls and Survey Research Center, Najah National
University, Nablus.
6 For example, allocations for social services ($52.6 million) were only a little higher than those for security and public
order ($43.3 million). See Ministry of Finance, Comparison of the Total Current and Capital Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2002-2004 at http://www.mof.gov.ps/comparison3-dollar.htm.
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Box 3-4: Reallocation of the PNA Budget7
The different data and analyses of the PNA budget indicate the need to
reallocate the budget in order to include the following:
1. Elimination of debts and loans, especially those spent in non-production
areas which do not produce developmental outputs.
2. Giving more weight to social development programs to replace the
numerous unwarranted, non-productive expenditures.
3. Inclusion of basic line items in the budget that take into consideration the
difficult living conditions of people affected by the  prevailing situation,
including those affected by the Separation Wall.
4. Linking the general budget to considerations of population growth and
the interests of future generations and their rights to education, health,
adequate civil services, job opportunities and a decent life.
5. Reevaluating the budget law as a legal framework for the Palestinian
development plan in order to make i t  more compat ible wi th
empowerment-related goals.
Legislative Authority:
The legislative authority is composed of
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
elected in early 1996 during a period of
political negotiations between the Pal-
estinians and Israelis. Its mandate,
responsibilities and authority were
delineated in the agreements signed by
the two parties and in the Palestinian
elections law. The PLC has been facing
great difficulty in executing its functions
and tasks, such as legislation,
representation, debate, supervision,
monitoring,    investigation and
constitution amendment. The difficulty
arises in part due to constraints and
limitations imposed by agreements
signed with the Israelis; the
marginalization of the role and position
Box 3-5: Palestinians‘ Assessment of the Legislative
Authority
Palestinian public confidence in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is
low. A public opinion poll8 indicated that only 28 percent of the Palestinian
public trust the PLC, compared to a similar figure of 31 percent of people
who have confidence in PNA institutions and ministries. In addition, 48
percent believe that corruption is present in the PLC, putting the PLC in an
intermediate position between ministries (80 percent) and security
apparatuses (75 percent) on one side and the executive (41%) and the
judiciary (45%) on the other.
Only 28 percent of the
Palestinian public trusts the
PLC.
7 See the proceedings of the first conference on the PNA general budget, 17-18 December 2003, Towards a Wider
Participation, issued by Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, pp. 51-52.
8 Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, Public Poll No. 16, 4-6 June 2004.
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of the PLC by the executive authority;
the ambiguous constitutional
relationship with the executive
authority, the predominance of a single
faction (Fatah movement); a lack of
sound qualitative and quantitative data
needed to make decisions and to shape
the general political atmosphere, and the
relative inexperience of PLC members.
Judiciary Authority:
There are a great number of internal and
external difficulties and challenges facing
the judiciary authority,9 effectively
preventing it from carrying out its duties.
The result is increased power and status
in the executive authority and the
violation and endangerment of the rights
and freedoms of individuals. These
difficulties and challenges include: the
executive authority‘s tendency to dominate
and control; the absence of a governing
constitution; the patchwork quality of the
legal system; the existence of multiple
court systems; an undefined power
structure with no clearly established
responsibilities; the shortage of trained
independent judges, legal materials and
funds; poor facilities and services. These
internal shortcomings combine with
constraints imposed by agreements
signed with Israel on the mandate and
Box 3-6: Palestinians‘ Assessment of the Judiciary Authority:
A public opinion poll10 published by the DSP indicated that 43 percent of the Palestinian public has confidence in the
judicial system and a comparable proportion of the public believe that the judiciary in Palestine is corrupt. In addition,
89.2 percent of the respondents believed that the absence of a strong judicial system is an important or very
important reason for the existence of and the increase in corruption. Nevertheless, citizens believed that the judicial
system is an important tool for conflict resolution and maintenance of the social order, including combating of
corruption. The same poll indicates that confidence in tribal reconciliation committees has reached 57 percent.
powers of the three branches of authority,
including the judiciary.
Operational Institutions:
These institutions include several
ministries, councils, departments and
bureaus providing civil services. These
institutions were established and
developed very rapidly, without a clear
work plan and strategy for expansion
and creation of new units, departments,
activities and initiatives. Presently there
are 63 operational institutions, and
these include 27 ministries and a large
number of councils, institutions,
bureaus, centers, offices, authorities,
and committees functioning in
dependently from ministries, such as
the PCBS, PECDAR, the Palestinian
Broadcasting Corporation, the Civil
Aviation Authority, the Ports Authority,
the Energy Authority, the Water
Authority, General Petroleum
Corporation and others.
Employment figures and organizational
structures vary between the different
governmental units. Some ministries,
such as Education and Health, employ
thousands of staff, while others have
only few employees.  In addition,
communications and organizational
breakdowns are common between
bureaus, authorities and ministries that
are supposed to cooperate and
coordinate. Clear organizational and
management directives are generally
absent.  These operational institutions
89 percent of the respondents
believed that the absence of
a strong judicial system
explains the presence and
increase of corruption.
9 The judiciary authority has a great importance in terms of empowerment. It has the responsibility of ensuring justice in the country by setting criteria for the resolution
of disputes between individuals, protection of their freedoms and rights, application of the law and judicial review, and judgment of the constitutionality of laws and
regulations. The judicial authority decides in disputes over law enforcement and rights to be approved, amended or revoked in order to ensure harmony of interests and
stability of relations in the society. Therefore, this authority must be kept away from the daily political practice and struggle of powers and interests, although it stands at
an even level with the two other authorities. At least theoretically, it possesses power that enables it to subjugate both of them to its control and trial. In order for the
judicial authority to properly carry out its role, it should remain independent from the two other authorities and from public opinion in order to avoid being included in the
struggle of powers and interests and to maintain its ability to administer justice effectively. The judicial authority includes trial courts, courts of appeal, the Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Court.
10 Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, Public Poll No. 17, 4-6 June 2004
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include direct civil service providers as
well as other organizations that do not
provide civil services directly to the
public, but rather support in some way
the provider network.
There is a large gap between the level of
services provided today and people’s
actual needs. The Human Development
Report presents below a number of
illustrative examples to demonstrate the
mechanisms, obstacles and opportunities
related to the work of these institutions.
Ministry of Health (MOH):
In almost every society, the ministry of
health functions as a key civil service
provider. In Palestine, the MOH is one of
the few ministries which adapted its
functions to accommodate the chronic
state of emergency within Palestinian
society. At the same time the ministry
faced multiple obstacles preventing it
from delivering the needed level of
performance including mobility
restrictions, border closures, very large
numbers of injuries within the population,
medical equipment and medicine
shortages and an inadequate budget.
The MOH was forced to halt
implementation of its five-year strategic
development plan in order to focus on the
delivery of emergency services to the
Palestinian population.
An opinion poll was conducted to
determine the public’s assessment of the
performance of health institutions and the
quality and quantity of the services they
provide under current conditions. Poll
data indicate that 65.5 percent of the
respondents view services provided as
inadequate, 81.7 percent believe that the
number of hospitals is insufficient and
81.3 percent believe there are too few
physicians in various fields of specialty
within the Palestinian healthcare system.
In addition, 43.6 percent of the
population polled reported they did not
benefit personally from the services
offered, 66 percent believed that health
institutions discriminate to varying
degrees between citizens seeking
healthcare. Another 61 percent believed
that health institutions do not provide
special places for patients with chronic
diseases, 72.1 percent believed heath
care centers are not equipped with the
necessary tools and training  to handle
emergency cases, and 72 percent
perceived the quantity of Palestinian
health care services available
inadequate given the population size.
Generally speaking, this opinion is more
commonly held among residents of poor,
densely populated or remote areas -
reaching a high 81.5 percent among
camp residents, 71.9 percent among
village residents and 69.3 percent of the
urban population. Only 13.4 percent
believe that health institutions provide
adequate health education programs
within local communities.
Eighty-two percent believe healthcare
institutions need internal restructuring of
human resources in order to improve
their performance. However, 81.6
percent of the respondents have never
offered suggestions or constructive
criticism regarding the quality of services
offered to them and 66.7 percent have
never submitted any complaint
regarding instances of improper
behavior by a health staff member.
Although 33.3 percent did submit
complaints, 62.6 percent of those who
complained report that their complaints
were not acted upon by the health
institution.  Finally, 31.2 percent reported
that they are not covered by any type of
health insurance for various reasons; 44
percent because they believe the
services are inadequate, 37 percent
because they can not afford to pay the
premiums, and 19 percent because they
believe they do not need the insurance.11
Although important, these perceptions
require verification in terms of their
65 percent of the
respondents believe the
health care services provided
by the Ministry of Health are
inadequate.
Due to the difficult situation,
MOSA developmental
initiatives have been cut back
in favor of additional relief
services.
11 See results of a poll conducted by Panorama Center on the performance of health institutions in Palestine, covering
63communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Poll results were published on 8 June 2004 in Al-Ayyam Newspaper.
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compatibility with the actual needs
based on a realistic assessment.
Ministry of Social Affairs
(MOSA):
MOSA provides a number of permanent
programs in addition to temporary
programs and projects implemented
within emergency initiatives, such as
poverty alleviation measures,
psycho-social support services for
children and families victimized by
Box 3-7: Summary of MOSA Staff’s Appraisal of its
Role in the Development Process
 MOSA’s vision and goals range from relief-centered goals for the direct provision
of aid and services to developmental goals designed to build capacity within
targeted groups. Relief services predominate over developmental services,
particularly as the developmental plans initiated by MOSA prior to the Al-Aqsa
Intifada have declined in favor of emergency aid plans targeting groups adversely
affected by the Intifada. MOSA employees believe that its goals and plans are not
communicated well internally and that it has achieved only limited success in
reaching its goals due to a number of internal and external challenges.
 MOSA developed a number of internal rules and regulations, but according
to staff, the regulations are inconsistent and unclear, leading to numerous
breaches and violations, especially at higher levels of management. The
regulations are highly centralized in nature, particularly those that deal with
financial procedures.  The regulations themselves are often amended
without those changes being clearly communicated to staff.
 Staff recruitment is conducted in a variety of ways, including free competition
through the personnel department or appointments by a presidential decree, which
are often of a political nature. The same inconsistencies apply to job descriptions,
which are unclear and often not implemented. Procedures for delegation of
authority also occur based on a combination of old rules and regulations; often
procedures are communicated orally, with no written follow-up.
 Needs and programs: MOSA identifies the needs of the target population
through its staff (general directorates and field offices). There is no
mechanism for periodic review, with the exception of a few ambiguous
provisions in the rules and regulations. In addition, these needs are seldom
subjected to critical examination, and often programs are designed according
to the availability of funds, with no clear link to MOSA plans and strategies.
 Major constraints obstructing the work of the MOSA, according to its
employees, are first financial constraints; second, the poor (or lack of)
coordination between the different directorates and between the West Bank and
Gaza Strip; and third, various political, factional and personal hindrances that
prevent professional advancement.
Israeli violence, and support to families
of the killed and the wounded. Due to
the difficult situation, MOSA
developmental initiatives have been cut
back in favor of additional relief
services due to increasing poverty and
unemployment rates.
At the same time, the increasing
poverty rate has increased demand for
MOSA services even as its budget is
reduced. Social aid services are
modest and often barely address the
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most basic needs of the recipients. In
some instances, checks are issued to
needy individuals by MOSA, but they
cannot be cashed because the MOF
failed to transfer the required funds. The
following box provides more information
on the MOSA role and its performance
by summarizing the majority viewpoints
of MOSA employees.
Ministry of Education and
Higher Education (MOEHE):
Educational services have also suffered
under the adverse conditions afflicting
Palestinian society. MOEHE was forced
to halt implementation of a number of
its programs and projects, such as
building new schools, maintenance of
the existing educational infrastructure,
and programs to improve the quality of
education overall.
The current conditions have also resulted
in delay or halt to the implementation of
educational developmental programs,
training and certification workshops, and
the procurement of educational
technology, such as science labs,
libraries, computer facilities, sports and
cultural facilities. Implementation and
oversight of programs in the areas of
inclusive education, integrated education,
special education, parallel education,
self-administered schools, literacy and
adult education programs have
also suffered.
Ministry of Labor (MOL):
The MOL has made significant strides
in the alleviation of suffering in the
working sectors in Palestine.  It created
the General Directorate of Employment
which actively coordinates with other
institutions, including PECDAR and
local councils, to implement job
creation programs and to distribute
unemployment checks. Nevertheless,
the MOL has failed to create
sustainable, long-term solutions for the
inevitable challenges that will be
created by a continually declining labor
market and increasing
unemployment levels.
Like other Palestinian institutions, the
MOL has had to limit its efforts to the
provision of modest relief assistance in
the form of food supplies and cash to
very needy cases seriously affected by
the Israeli policies.  The MOL tried to
develop a set of criteria and distribution
mechanisms to address the increasing
and chronic unemployment levels in the
private sector, ministries and NGOs. In
spite of improved performance, cases
of confusion have still occurred, when
names of employed and persons not in
need were included on lists of persons
seeking work, resulting in the
elimination of names of many
unemployed people who are in real need.12
Point of Light 32: Temporary Employment Program
The MOL seeks to accommodate unemployed workers in public institutions
and NGOs within the temporary employment program. In 2004 the number
of beneficiaries totaled 54,048 persons out of 235,395 persons registered at
MOL employment offices as actively seeking work. In order to solve
problems related to selection and to ensure the delivery of services only to
those most in need, selection criteria were developed taking in consideration
the age, marital status, gender, number of children, educational level, health
status and date of registration at the employment offices.
12 Al-Ayyam Newspaper ≠ 7 April 2004.
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On several occasions, workers have
publicly rejected the principle of
welfare or handouts and demanded
instead full-t ime employment or
legitimate compensation for work
performed. This position was evident
in demonstrations organized in Gaza
in front of the PLC on 1 May 2004,
where workers demanded that the
PNA provide them with a social
security fund and job opportunities
instead of temporary relief assistance.
They also demonstrated for the
holding of elections, indicating a clear
linkage in the public mindset between
the reduction in unemployment and
poverty and active participation in the
civic affairs.
On several occasions,
workers have publicly
rejected the principle of
welfare or handouts and
demanded instead full-time
employment or legitimate
compensation for work
performed.
Point of Light 33: Bread Protests ≠ Workers’ Spontaneous Mobilizations in
the Gaza Strip
The first instances of the mobilization of the Palestinian work force took the form of stay-in-strikes and
demonstrations known as the Bread Protests. These mobilizations started (in mid-2002 and recurring in May
2004)       spontaneously without a central directive by trade unions or labor organizations. The workers sent
messages to decision-makers, stating: In order to reinforce our determination, sustain our dignity and protect
our            children from illness and despair, we ask you to ensure us permanent job opportunities. Enough with
poverty and hunger! We are not beggars! We need jobs in order to ensure a decent livelihood. We demand
measures to limit unemployment and provide a social security fund.
Perhaps the factor that makes these spontaneous labor mobilizations a point of light in Palestinian life is recognition
of the workers‘ awareness and demand of their civil and human rights. They spontaneously created a link between
the Palestinian struggle for liberation and the larger social struggle for attainment of human rights and dignity. The
demonstrations occurred against a background of deteriorating economic conditions and unprecedented
unemployment rates, especially for workers who lost jobs in the Israeli labor market.  They occurred in response to
ineffective employment programs and inadequate reaction to the crisis by labor unions and other labor
representation organizations.
The MOL did not pay sufficient
attention to development of long-term
strategies, especially in areas related
to collection of labor market data. In
contrast, they focused on immediate
and short-range plans and initiatives
and remained too long in crisis
management mode, at the expense of
comprehensive strategic and
long-term planning.
Non-service Institutions
and Ministries:
This category refers to institutions and
ministries that do not provide services
directly to the public. These non-service
institutions also face constraints that
negatively impact their performance. A
major impediment is the lack of a clear
strategic objective, causing confusion in
terms of areas of jurisdiction, programs,
and work plans to cope with the difficult
conditions resulting from the Israeli
occupation. Therefore, institutional
response to community needs and to the
challenges resulting from the Al-Aqsa
Intifada remains weak and limited. The
following are some contributions made
by these non-service institutions:
 Creating emergency programs.
Examples include: programs by the
Ministry of Energy to address energy
shortages, repair damages inflicted on the
electricity network, and provide assistance
to citizens unable to pay their electricity
bills.  The Ministry of Housing offers
temporary residences for families who lost
their homes due to demolition or shelling.
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 Adapting existing programs to
emergency conditions. For example,
PECDAR converted a number of its
developmental programs to emergency
and rehabilitation programs and
subdivided some of its large-scale
programs into a series of small-scale
programs in order to deliver maximum
benefit across the highest possible
number of target groups and
service areas.
 Providing targeted aid to specific
groups most heavily impacted by
Israeli aggression. For example, the
Ministry of Supply food allocation
program distributes food supplies to
those in need, assures a constant
supply of basic foodstuffs to the
marketplace and reallocates food
supplies to besieged areas.  The
Ministry of Waqf contacts local and
foreign donors to provide assistance to
poor Palestinian families and to raise
funds to cover the costs of Hajj for
relatives of those killed during the Intifada.
 Assessment of community needs.
For example, the Ministry of Supply
conducted a study on the effectiveness
of boycotting Israeli goods. The
Ministry of Housing and Public Works
prepared an inventory of buildings,
establishments and infrastructure
facilities damaged or destroyed by the
Israeli army. The Ministry of Planning
and Ministry of National Economy
studied and quantified economic losses
and recommended measures to
alleviate the scope of those losses. The
Monetary Authority is working to
safeguard the interests of local banks
through management consultations and
guidance, including the recommendation
of development of emergency
committees to address the issues of
clearance taxes, currency and
monitoring of bank activities.
Local Councils:
During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, local
councils faced multiple and
extraordinary challenges stemming
from the weakness of the PNA and its
institutions and the scarcity of
resources. Some local councils were
forced to close doors. Emergency plans
were created in response to conditions
resulting from closure and siege. These
plans included: repairing damaged
roads, creating municipal tax relief
programs for families affected by the
Intifada, job creation, providing
assistance to owners of demolished
and damaged houses, and exempting
a large number of families from paying
water and electricity bills.
There are 412 local councils14 supervised
by the Ministry of Local Government
(MOLG), which have significant collective
impact in terms of empowerment. Some
of the ways in which local councils
impact the empower process include:
Point of Light 34: A Project for Training Islamic Community Leaders in
Development and Economy
The Nablus District Department of Waqf and Religious Affairs initiated this project in order to train imams and
female preachers on communication, dialogue, and mutual respect. The impetus for this project is recognition
of the wide role and broad scope of social influence that imams and female preachers wield within the society
through the mosque and religious television broadcasts. This training project is unique in that it was both
conceived and funded locally, reflecting the importance of tolerance as a religious and national priority in the
Palestinian conscience. Within this project, 60 imams and female preachers were trained on 13 different topics
related to development, human rights and the economy.
Local councils faced
extraordinary challenges,
causing some of them to stop
providing services as result of
the last four years of
occupation.
13 Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Planning, A Framework for the Palestinian Mid-term Development Plan 2005-2007.
14 Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens‘ Rights, 2003, Ninth Annual Report, pp. 116-117.
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 Change of roles: Siege conditions
have increased levels of self-reliance
within local communities. In several
cases, local councils were able to achieve
unprecedented examples of
infrastructure rehabilitation and
community participation.   Many small
towns made remarkable progress at the
economic, social and environmental
levels, while advances in large urban
areas were comparatively slower, due to
overcrowding, environmental pollution,
declining standards of public health
(especially in the area of hygiene
services), shrinking green space and
deterioration in levels of new
construction and infrastructure expansion.
 Creation of common service
councils: Several common service
Box 3-8: Ministry of Planning and the Palestinian
Mid-term Development Plan 2005-200714
The decline in the humanitarian situation in Palestine, as evidenced in by
numerous social, economic and other indicators, prompted the PNA to
develop a new strategy to adapt to the prevailing conditions. A major element
of this strategy is to link emergency relief programs to development plans (within
a mid-term development plan 2005-2007). This plan emphasizes projects and
programs and promotes economic and social stability, focusing on job creation
to combat unemployment and other strategies to mitigate the adverse
economic impact of the Separation Wall. Main objectives of this plan include:
 To address humanitarian and social needs resulting from increased
   population growth.
 To respond to the special needs of the marginalized social groups.
 To alleviate the impact of  physical destruction in both the public and
   private sectors.
 To improve the effectiveness of services provided by PNA institutions and
   local councils.
A number of mechanisms were developed to achieve these goals. Some of
them can be implemented immediately; others will be put into effect when
current conditions stabilize.   These mechanisms include:
 Investment in the infrastructure as a tool for job creation.
 Encouraging private sector investment and job creation by giving priority
to those production sectors with high employment capacity and which
serve the local market, such as agriculture, housing and construction.
 Promoting the systems of education, health care and social services.
 Acceleration of reform processes and rehabilitation of public institutions.
councils have been created through
active coordination between the local
councils of adjacent geographical
locations. The joint or shared
approach to the provision of key
municipal services has effectively
reduced costs and improved the
quality of services rendered. There
have been several successes in this
regard, although some councils have
not made significant progress in this
regard due to internal conflict or lack
of resources.   In addition, common
councils have not yet been created in
many other areas.
 Appointing rather than electing:
Membership on a large number of
councils was based on appointment by
the MOLG, as elections have not been
Several joint service councils
have been created through
active coordination between
the local councils of adjacent
geographical locations, which
has effectively reduced costs
and improved the quality of
services rendered.
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conducted recently. This practice has
weakened the democratic nature of the
councils and kept municipalities
subjugated to the control of central
government.  In response to objections,
officials claimed that council members
were not “appointed” but rather
“selected” due to extraordinary
conditions in order to enable citizens to
self-manage their affairs. In their
opinion, the “selection“ is a compromise
between elections and appointment. This
system of appointments revives tribal
traditions within Palestinian society,
obstructing empowerment processes
needed to create solidarity and cohesion
within society. However, this situation
started to change by the end of 2004, with
the launching of  election processes in
several local councils in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
 Strict supervision by the central
government: In general, local councils
Point of Light 35: Mazra‘a Sharqiya Municipal Council
is Elected, Not Appointed
The first village council in Mazra‘a Sharqiya was established in 1965. The
town continued to be managed by elected or appointed councils until the start
of the first Intifada, when the village council was dismissed by a decision of the
United National Leadership of the Intifada. On 8 February 1996, elections were
held in Mazra‘a. These were the only free and direct elections for a local
council conducted in the Palestinian territories at that time and on the initiative
of the village residents themselves.
In 1997, the MOLG decided to upgrade the village council to a municipal
council with wider powers. The significance of these elections in Mazra’a is
based on the fact that they were conducted on the initiative of the village
residents under their own management and supervision. The elections
reflected a strong sense of community participation and involvement, as well
as their willingness to challenge the conditions of Israeli occupation and
regain control of their own affairs from the PNA.
are subjected to the control of a powerful
central authority which controls
decision-making on many local issues.
This style of governance, although
appropriate for many aspects of public
affairs management, can have the effect
of restricting local initiative and inhibiting
the natural development and
advancement of governing expertise
within the local councils.
 Scarce tax revenues: Taxes represent
only 25 percent of the total revenues of
Palestinian local councils, compared to 80
percent in developed countries and 71
percent in the other developing countries.
The situation is further complicated by the
existence of multiple tax structures, which
vary from one local council to another.
 Low budget allocations for
development: Development allocations
include the construction of schools,
health centers and public facilities,
purchase of government vehicles and
property, development of commercial
areas and industrial zones. The
percentage of local council budgets
allocated to development is often as low
as 10-20 percent, generating excessive
reliance on external grants and other
forms of assistance.
 The absence of local council
representation in 25 percent of the
West Bank: Development status
varies by area, particularly in terms of
coverage by water and electricity
services.  The areas served by local
By the end of 2004, election
processes were launched in
several local councils in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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councils tend to be more highly
developed that those areas
without councils.
 Poor adherence to constitutional
provisions relevant to local councils:
In this regard, councils are restricted
from participation in the planning,
prioritization, budgeting and budget
allocation processes.
 Traditional perspectives within the
local councils themselves: Most
local council leaders still perceive the
council‘s role in a traditional way, i.e.
limited to the provision of customary
services, such as water, electricity and
public sanitation. In the absence of a
clearly defined role for local government
in day-to-day life, the role of local
councils will remain limited to individual
interpretations of their leaders and
members, and will depend on the
availability of material and human
resources. In addition, the impetus for
local councils to embrace the concepts
empowerment and human
development and to integrate those
concepts into the functions of local
Point of Light 36: Children’s Municipal Councils
Children‘s municipal councils grew out of the Child-Friendly Cities initiative
implemented in the Palestinian territories during 2002. The idea was born of
the collective vision and effort of UNICEF, the municipal councils, parents
and teachers, who were concerned by the limited opportunities for the
participation, development and interaction of children in community life.
Proactive participation in civic life through mechanisms such as children’s
municipal councils provides early instruction and promotes progressive
thought and widespread awareness in areas such as community conflict
resolution. These councils have improved the status of young people in a
variety of ways, including providing them with opportunities to influence
decisions that will affect their lives, encouraging them to become partners in
the decision-making process, creating an environment conducive to the
development and implementation of supportive children‘s policies, and
changing adult perceptions of the children‘s capability and potential to
contribute in a meaningful way to civic life.
Currently, children‘s municipal councils exist in the following cities: Jericho,
Gaza, Jenin, Nablus, Rafah, Hebron and Tubas. Each council has a
membership of 30-40 young people with equal representation of males and
females, as well as representation for children with disabilities. Members of
these councils are selected through a democratic election process in their
schools. Children independently develop programs that reflect issues of
concern to them, prioritize them, and adapt them to accommodate the input
and advice of their parents and from other local community institutions.
It is hoped that these councils will mobilize governmental and non-
governmental partners, such as religious leaders, local community leaders
and school administrations, to work on achieving the following: support for
children‘s participation, increased attention to children‘s issues, and
assistance with designing, implementing and evaluating the children’s
small-scale projects through increased awareness of their unique needs.
However, this hope has to withstand the challenges and difficulties that face
children‘s municipal councils and children in general, in view of the current
security situation and the obstacles imposed by the prevailing system of
values and perceptions within Palestinian society.
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councils remains limited, especially in
the areas of gender equality, early
childhood and youth programs, and
environmental awareness.
In spite of an impressive roster of
services and the support and relief
activity administered by the local
councils, the public still believes they do
not provide services adequate to the
demand. In fact, the failure of the scope
of services to meet local demand is due
to scarce financial resources, the
ever-increasing needs of a growing
population, and the damages inflicted on
existing programs and service
infrastructure by Israeli occupation forces.
The public criticizes local councils for not
providing more opportunity for consistent
community involvement in decisions on
local projects of concern to the public.
They are also criticized for a lack of rules
and regulations for the delegation of
authority and for follow-up on issues and
complaints, non-adherence to
transparency and accountability
practices, and for the ambiguous
power-sharing relationship between the
local councils and the governorate office.
The following box provides some details
on the role, performance and conditions
of local councils.
Box 3-9: Overview of Councils in the West Bank and Gaza Strip15
 Legitimacy: In the absence of elections, the legitimacy of local councils may be seen from two opposing
perspectives.  The first perspective is that appointments and political nepotism preclude true representation of
community residents, while the opposing view holds that legitimacy derives from community participation in
council activities, not from the manner in which the leadership of the councils is appointed. There are also two
opinions regarding the encouragement of community participation. The first opinion holds that people’s
participation in identifying their needs and priorities contributes to the success of the councils and reinforces
their legitimacy. The second opinion claims that community participation should be limited in order to avoid
confusion that may result from excess input from multiple sources.
 Coordination between local councils: The strength and degree of inter-council relationships vary. On one
hand, there are instances of fully-coordinated relationships that include the implementation and administration
of joint municipal projects. Coordination is also manifested in the existence of the common service councils,
particularly in the area of infrastructure. On the other hand, many local councils make little or no effort to
coordinate with counterparts or logical service partners. However, it is generally agreed that developing active
bilateral and multilateral coordination schemes between the different municipalities is desirable and important.
 Relation with PNA institutions: Relationships between municipalities and ministries take different forms.
The MOLG plays the role of supervisor and coordinator of local councils, which includes monitoring, financial
control, planning and implementation of local council programs. The Ministry of Planning interacts with local
councils on allocations of funds for public works at the municipal level.  Municipalities receive funding from the
MOF either directly or through the MOLG. There is no evidence that these two ministries coordinate on needs
identification.  The Ministry of Labor coordinates with local councils to provide job opportunities for the
unemployed. The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) provides assistance for projects to rehabilitate municipal
infrastructure and provides a degree of technical assistance. Some local councils rate their coordination with
the MPW highly, while others think that levels of coordination are inadequate. Local councils are subject to
monitoring and control by multiple bodies and multiple levels. In addition to the internal control mechanisms,
external control is exerted from two sources: the MOLG and the General Control Institution.
 Limited resources: Municipal resources are limited, especially financial resources. Councils must seek grants
and aid from external donors, which increases their dependency on outside funding and contributes to the
deterioration of self-reliance. Limited resources have greatly reduced the amount of social spending (on health,
education and public security) by local councils.
15 This analysis is derived from information and interviews with representatives of a number of local councils, including: Habla Municipality, Al-Ram Local Council, Jenin
Camp Services Popular Committee, Beit Hanoun Municipality, Wadi Al-Salqa Municipality and Rafah Municipality.
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In the light of the above, the question to
ask is: Do Palestinian institutions
operate with a collective vision and
programs designed to facilitate
empowerment? Is there a common
perception or interpretation of
empowerment and a set of harmonized
goals and strategies in order to achieve
empowerment at multiple levels of
Palestinian society? In order to answer
this question, a number of institutions
(service providing and non-service
oriented) were approached and asked
to identify their visions and assess that
vision in terms of its ability to achieve
empowerment. Different population
segments were also approached in
order to obtain their assessments and
appraisal of programs, activities and
services offered by these institutions.
A number of conclusions
were reached, mainly:
 The majority of institutional officials
believe their departments do possess
clear visions, although they were not able
to expound on the content
of  those visions.
 Confusion exists between having an
organizational vision in professional
terms and slogans based on national
and ethical sentiments, such as saying
that the vision of the Ministry is
“embodied in the principle of
democracy and accountability” or that
it strives to “create a Palestinian
generation characterized by
consciousness and pride in their
homeland, people and cause and
prepare them to confront life challenges
and contribute to the building of their
state and homeland, etc.”
 Visions are dominated by an abstract
and generalized tone, such as saying
that the future vision of the Ministry is
related to reaching “social well-being
through a future comprehensive
perspective of the Palestinian society.”
 Visions, goals and development plans
Section Three: Overall Evaluation
range between the over-generalized
and the too specific, as reflected in one
statement by an institution that the
features of its development plan are
“basically derived from the national
development plan“ and by another
institution that its plan is “to ensure one
hospital bed per 600 citizens and
provide adequate health services in
order to avoid the need for
referrals abroad.”
 Although visions were often unclear
and sometimes nonexistent, institutions
were more readily able to define their
goals, since it is probably easier to
quantify a concrete goal that to
formulate a vision.  However, clear
relationships between institutional goals
and institutional vision were
again missing.
 Most visions lack clearly defined
implementation strategies and fail to
identify target groups and/or
beneficiaries.
 Often visions, goals and strategies
were not differentiated, although some
institutions were successful in
formulating their goals clearly and
accurately. A good example is
MOEHE, which stated its goals as
providing students with opportunities
to enroll in basic education, improving
the quality of education, and
upgrading education in order to
develop human resources.
  There was clear disagreement
between personnel at different levels
regarding the existence of an
insti tut ional vision. Some staff
members believed their institutions
had mult iple visions, which
underscores the lack of an internal
communication and coordination
within institutions.
 Recipients of public services are
apparently unsatisfied with the quality,
quantity and method of distribution of
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those services, especially those related
to social welfare, such as education,
health and social security. This
dissatisfaction is not only attributed to
destructive measures by the Israeli
occupation forces, but is also linked to
the size and type of available
resources, means of quality control and
budget allocations. This state of
dissatisfaction reflects a perception of
poor accountability mechanisms, which
reinforces the alienation and
marginalization of the different
population groups.
Apparently, the level of public confidence
in certain service providers, such as
education and health, is higher than
confidence in the output of other
political, social and economic
institutions. This is evident in the high
level of public confidence in the MOEHE
and the MOH (82.4 percent and 60
percent respectively) and low confidence
in PNA institutions in general, the
Legislative Council, and political parties
and organizations, none of which scored
confidence levels over 31 percent by the
public. Low public confidence levels are
also scored by the judiciary (43 percent
compared to 57 percent confidence in
tribal reconciliation), police and
security apparatuses.
These findings indicate that people’s
confidence in institutions decreases
when the output is related to general
rights, national, political and security
issues.  Confidence increases when
institutional outputs are tangible and
direct services, such as education and
health. The implications of this
conclusion are significant in its
relation to empowerment, as it
indicates that policy-making
institutions have a lower impact on the
overall process of social
empowerment than do the government
organizations that provide services
directly to the public.  Another
implication is that empowerment
processes are only mobilized when
people participate and directly interact
in these processes and are involved
with the outcomes and consequences.
The Palestinian public generally
doubts that most PNA institutions are
capable of identifying and responding
to their collective needs. A total of 58
percent of people believe that PNA
institutions are not able to meet the
day-to-day living requirements of the
population, 33 percent think PNA
institutions do not fulfill their obligation
to address social issues, such as
conflict resolution, 35 percent think
they do not provide public security, 57
percent believe that they do not
confront and combat corruption or
enforce the rule of law generally, in
addition to 44 percent who believe that
PNA and its institutions have lost both
authority and legitimacy.
Many obstacles prevent PNA institutions
from promoting and facilitating the
process of social  empowerment. The first
set of obstacles is generated by
constraints within the overall political,
economic and social atmosphere in which
these institutions operate. Examples are:
interference and oppression from Israeli
occupation forces, a weak Palestinian
economy almost completely dependent
on Israel, the lack of a Palestinian
strategic vision, political miscalculations
and missteps, the restrictive nature of
agreements signed with Israel, and a
shortage of financial resources. Internal
or self-imposed obstacles, on the other
hand, include those that stem from poor
administration, planning and
programming skills such as:  the lack of
a clearly defined body of rules and
regulations for management of public
affairs, a general lack of institutional
experience, inadequate measures taken
at the institutional level to address the
impact of Israeli aggression and to
respond to general community needs, as
well as a low level of cooperation and
coordination among these institutions and
with other organizations, suc h as those
in the NGO community and the
Palestinian private sector.
The level of public confidence
in certain service providers,
such as education and health,
is higher than confidence in
the output of other political,
social and economic
institutions.
A total of 58 percent of
people believe that PNA
institutions are not able to
meet the day-to-day living
requirements.
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The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Society Building and
Empowerment of the Palestinian People
This chapter examines the role of Palestinian civil society organizations in the empowerment process by
analyzing their performance, relationships within their sector and with other social groups. The objective is
to assess the adequacy of their efforts to confront and overcome the challenges to Palestinian society, and
to aid in the establishment of a vibrant, viable state for the Palestinian people.
Chapter Four

Palestinian society includes two types
of social institutions. The first is the
traditional social institution,1 which
includes tribes, clans, extended families,
urban, rural, familial and sectarian
networks and religious groups. The
second type is the modern institution,
such as political parties, charitable
societies, trade unions, professional
associations, women‘s associations,
NGOs, media and advocacy groups and
other service-providing organizations.
Both types of social constructions are
present and active in Palestinian
society and represent different
perspectives, whether related to
Palestinian cultural heritage, modern,
western or traditional patriarchal values.
The traditional social institutions and
modern institutions differ from each other
in their vision, goals, form and structure.
However, similarities also exist - in
purpose and in practice - as they both
adhere at a very fundamental level to a
common system of traditional values.
Consequently, both traditional and
modern institutions reflect, albeit in
different ways, the basic values system
of the society that creates them.
Because these institutions do vary
widely in their practical interpretation and
application of the traditional Palestinian
value system, it should be noted that the
conclusions drawn in this chapter do not
apply to every institution equally.  The
purpose of the analysis is to monitor the
significant trends within the two types of
social structures and to assess the
impact they have on the development
process, given the challenges they face.
4-1-1 Palestinian Tradition
and Modernization as Pos-
sible Empowerment Tools:
Palestinian culture played an important
role as an inhibitor of the social and
cultural disintegration that might
otherwise have been the result of the
Israeli occupation.  Palestinian culture
possesses a unique heritage of
structures, values, traditions, behavioral
patterns and custom which are deeply
ingrained in the collective consciousness
of the people.  Palestinian culture plays
two opposing roles: the first as a
strengthening agent for the fundamental
linkages within society and a catalyst for
empowerment; and the second as a
stumbling block for development and
modernization -  a hindrance to
progression of development and
modernization within society.
In general, both traditional and modern
institutions are affected by economic,
value-driven and behavioral structures.
In this sense, Palestinian society
remains almost feudal, although it was
largely impacted in 1948 and again in
1967 by the culture of forced
displacement, as well as other external
influences. A hybridization of
Palestinian cultural values occurred
when returnees and refugees brought
with them their own unique relationships,
values and social structures.   Some of
these dated back to their communities
of origin, those from which they were
expelled in 1948 or 1967, others were a
reflection of the refugees‘ communities
of exile, from which they returned in
1994.  The traditional, homogeneous
Palestinian culture continued to exert
significant influence in spite of
transformations and assimilations
inflicted on refugee and native
structures, values and cultures.
Palestinian modern institutions do not
share a uniform level of enthusiasm for
western-style modernization. Some
strive to achieve modernization and the
process of development in the context
Section One: Palestinian Civil Society Organizations
Their Structures, Culture and Performance
Palestinian culture played an
important role as an inhibitor
of the social and cultural
disintegration that might
otherwise have been the
result of the Israeli occupation.
1 These social institutions are those based on traditional inherited relationships rather than on voluntary acquired
ones. They represent a pattern of structures into which an individual is born or which he/she inherits.
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of and as a reflection of traditional
social values. Others see modernization
as a system in which prefabricated,
foreign social systems are
superimposed onto the Palestinian
framework.  Still others reject the
concepts of modernization outright, and
prefer to take Palestinian society back
to the days of conventional thinking,
which are now completely out-of-step
and antithetical to any aspirations of
holistic human development.
In general, however, most modern
institutions and organizations
view modernization as an escape route
from the cultural-historical predicament
in which the Palestinians now find
themselves.   Some believe that
traditional institutions and their cultural
and religious values hinder the efforts
of Palestinian society to catch up and
interact with the modern world. They see
the existence of traditional institutions as
a factor in the continued retardation of
growth in Palestinian society.
Unfortunately, more modern Palestinian
institutions have not performed
effectively enough to serve as
convincing alternatives to the traditional
ways of doing things.  They have,
however, achieved some success in
bringing about a degree of social
pluralism and have mobilized resources
for change in several areas.
Palestinian society must unify its
methodologies and consolidate its
resources if it is going to effectively
expedite the process of institution-build-
ing and modernize its traditional civil
society organizations while preserving
their contribution to Palestinian life.
Some echelons of Palestinian
leadership and the cultural elite do
recognize the need for modernization,
and have achieved a degree of success
in realizing this goal.
Most modern institutions and
organizations view
modernization as an escape
route from the
cultural-historical predicament.
4-1 -2  T he Cul ture  o f
Palest in ian  Civ i l
Society Institutions:
Tribes, clans, families, urban and
sectarian networks and other traditional
institutions have great influence at the
social and political levels. They wield
this influence through their systems and
organizational mechanisms, habits,
traditions, laws, symbols and ritual
celebrations of holidays and the
seasons, which hold great emotional
appeal and a sense of belonging for
its members. Traditional institutions
draw members together through
relat ions of kinship, communal
property, central places of worship,
collective charitable endeavors and
group social activi ty.  They are
self-funded, and solicit donations,
pledges, Zakat (Islamic charitable)
funds, and pool revenue from
common properties, which grants
them certain level of independence
from both modern community
institutions and official authorities.
Traditional culture shapes the
performance of some modern institutions
and organizations.  Sometimes,
modernity is simply a veneer overlaying a
deeply traditional core. For example, the
rise of modern political parties and
government structures does not
necessarily mean that they espouse
modern or progressive thought and
values.  Palestinian political factions and
parties still display to a large degree the
organizational culture and behavioral
habits of traditional institutions, whether
consciously or unconsciously.  They also
maintain the loose structure and tribal
dynamic of traditional institutions as
opposed to the more rigid, disciplined
approach of a modern political party.
Palestinian political groups do have a long
history in the civil society arena and have
played important functions in the
Traditional institutions play an
important role in the
maintenance of social
cohesion.  Cultural norms,
habits and traditions work to
form an unwritten social
contract that regulates
relationships between different
parts of the community.
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introduction of modern values to society
and in the provision of community services.
4-1-3 Interaction of
Traditional and Modern
Institutions:
Traditional institutions play an important
role in the maintenance of social
cohesion.2 Cultural norms, habits and
traditions work to form an unwritten
social contract that regulates
relationships between different parts of
the community and prevents
breakdown within the social system.
Some modern social institutions also
have the potential to play a
constructive role in the maintenance
of social cohesion, although their
activities are governed by conflicting
or ambiguous laws issued by various
official authorities— Ottoman, British
mandate, Jordanian, Israeli
occupat ion, or Palest in ian. For
example, v i l lage and municipal
councils have failed to fully execute
their expected role in the planning
and organization of the activities of
local communities. Often, they are
too closely affiliated to the executive
authority. Or, through election or
appointment, they do not operate
under a clear mandate from the
community they serve, and must
constant ly respond to an
ever-changing legal framework and
set of political conditions.
Relationships between traditional and
modern institutions within Palestinian
society have both positive and
negative aspects. The two types of
organizations have not yet been able
to achieve a mutually beneficial method
of interaction. This failure is attributed
to two factors: first, defects in both types
of institutions and in their performance,
and second, the role of external factors,
especially the Israeli occupation, in
reinforcing contradictions in respective
institutional goals. To a degree, each
has adapted to the other‘s existence
within society, but adaptation is not
adequate if the two are to work in
tandem to guide Palestinian society
forward on the path to sustainable
development. The reliance of certain
political parties on a tribal system of
Box 4-1: Palestinian Empowerment:  Between Grassroots Mobilization and
Authoritarian Dominance
The first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 provides interesting examples of rational modernization in light of the
significant role played by civil society organizations in the conflict. Men and women, adults and children, all
participated in the struggle against the Israeli occupation, challenging traditional barriers that previously
prevented their participation. The involvement of new groups helped mobilize traditional institutions to engage
in Intifada activities and to promote its objectives. During the Intifada, Palestinians voluntarily created their own
systems to replace services previously provided by the Israelis. However, internal relationships within
Palestinian society were disrupted by a change in the political course taken after the Intifada.
After the establishment of the PNA and during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, many achievements of the first Intifada were
reversed and steps towards modernization were marginalized or annulled. A tide of traditional conservative culture
swept over official and informal institutions. In the second Intifada, popular participation in decision-making and
problem-solving was blocked and the tasks left solely to official institutions, which failed to provide a convincing
state-based alternative. As result, traditional social organizations, particularly the patriarchal system, regained their
status and began to exert negative influences at both the formal and informal levels. Palestinian society was
effectively split into two directions: the modern direction generated by the first Intifada and the reverse towards
tradition that took place after 1994 and was intensified during the second Intifada.
2 Migdal, Joel, State and Society in a Society without a State, pp.395-397, and Peretz, Don, Palestinian Social Stratification –The Political Implications pp. 412-414 in
Ben-Dor, Gabriel-Ed.; (1978); The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict, Ramat Gan, Turtledove Publishing.
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leadership represents a clear
example of the interest-oriented
cooperation and adaptation that
characterizes the relat ionships
between modern and tradit ional
Palestinian institutions.
Palestinian society is also capable of
rationalizing modernization when
needed, as evidenced in the first
Palestinian Intifada (1987), when
traditional and modern institutions
cooperated in a manner that enabled
the uprising to continue for five
consecutive years. Cooperation
between these institutions at that time
preserved and reinforced the
Palestinian social fabric, ensuring the
provision of basic services and
signif icantly advancing the
political cause.
However, in the years that followed, a
hybrid state of genuine and artificial
modernization within society took hold,
which lead to a gradual abandonment
of the task of modernizing traditional
institutions and widespread
rationalization of the poor performance
of the modern ones.  This process
eventually resulted in both disruption and
distortion of a legitimate modernization
process, and all the while the Israeli
occupation continued to implement its
destructive policies against
Palestinian society.3
4-1-4 Activities of Civil
Society Institutions:
Charitable organizations form the largest
sector of Palestinian civil society. Some
political movements and parties sponsor
development organizations that wield
influence in the social domain, such as
emergency relief groups affiliated with
nationalist and leftist parties and Islamic
institutions.  Benevolent associations,
such as clubs, familial/clan/tribal councils
(diwans), are also active in social service
and relief work in response to needs
within the local community.
Some development-oriented NGOs
were established to address the
everyday problems of life resulting
from the Israeli occupation in 1967.
These NGOs created different
directions for themselves than those
of charitable societies—going beyond
the provision of direct and immediate
relief, seeking instead to develop
society‘s internal ability to create an
alternative, parallel system to the
Israeli occupation ≠ one capable of
resisting it.
Each civil society institution oriented
towards development operates in its
own domain and occasionally within
joint domains as well. Their activities
intertwine with efforts of official
inst i tut ions in preserving the
Palestinian social fabric and in the
fields of health, education, culture,
and social welfare. In addition, they
interact with the surrounding
environment, reacting to roles played
by neighboring countries and roles
played by the Israeli occupation with
its different manifestat ions and
dynamics. They also interact with the
wider environment as they work to
secure external funding sources,
advocacy and support linkages from
United Nations agencies and other
international institutions.
Activities sponsored through
Palestinian civil society institutions and
organizations have a significant impact
on the community. As result, they hold
a large degree of responsibility for both
the positive and negative outcomes of
their programs.  But not all institutions
and organizations operate effective,
well-managed programs, so the
Some development-oriented
NGOs were established to
address the everyday
problems of life— going
beyond the provision of direct
and immediate relief, seeking
instead to develop society’s
internal ability to create an
alternative, parallel system to
the Israeli occupation.
3 For more discussion about modernization, refer to: Salah Abdul-Atti, The Palestinian Society between Tradition and
Modernity ≠ Potential and Determinants of a Palestine Constitution and Adel Samarah, Analysis of the Palestinian
Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Modern Genuineness in the Era of Globalization, Said, Nader et. al. (2004), The
Palestinian Constitution and Human Development Requirements (Research Papers). Birzeit University Development
Studies Programme.
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Points of Light 37-39: Palestinian NGOs and Youth Empowerment Programs
Point of Light 37: Sharek Youth Forum
Sharek Youth Forum organizes a series of daily and weekly activities for youth and adolescents and promotes youth
involvement in all aspects of legal, social and cultural life. The Forum encourages youth groups to perform volunteer
work. Between January 2002 and August 2004, the Forum partnered with various youth organizations throughout
Palestine to fund and implement 98 youth programs.
In addition, the Forum established 20 centers to promote the dual principles of partnership and participation.
The centers provide an environment in which youth can give expression to their hopes and their unique needs.
The centers offer expanded level as well as remedial educational curricula, health, cultural and sports
programs.  They build playgrounds, sponsor sports teams and provide them with the needed equipment. In
addition, training, rehabilitative and developmental programs were organized and a number of youth
institutions, centers, clubs and associations were supported in the implementation of capacity-building
programs for the youth. The number of participants and beneficiaries of the Forum‘s programs are estimated at
193,000 children and young people, both males and females.
Point of Light 38: The Youth Achievement Initiative
This is a national youth initiative promoting the power of youth work and working to spread the basic principles
of democracy and the responsible practice of citizenship — its rights and responsibilities. The initiative was
launched in early 2003 by Quakers in order to promote the involvement of young people in society through
partnerships with Palestinian youth institutions. The project enjoyed wide levels of participation in 46 separate
youth teams distributed through a number of Palestinian towns and communities.
The initiative educates young people about democracy, civil society and citizenship, encouraging them to identify
and solve community problems in the spirit of teamwork and in partnership with national institutions.   It equips
them with the required skills to take initiative and to participate in decision-making through active involvement in
volunteer work. The Youth Initiative provides training and skills development in teamwork, communications, and
time and crisis management skills.  Teams of school children, in cooperation with youth clubs and institutions,
work to identify community problems and prepare and implement plans to address them.
Point of Light 39: Arab Studies Society/Youth Development Department
The Department was established in mid-2000 as an initiative by the late Faisal Husseini (then the manager of
Jerusalem affairs in the PLO) in order to promote and protect Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem by creating
programs that cater to young people and assist them in planning for their future. To this end, the Association provides
administrative (institution-building), financial (fundraising), and technical (training and consultation) support to
institutions operating in the Jerusalem District to develop the youth sector. The program encourages school
dropouts to return to school or receive appropriate vocational training, providing guidance to youth in setting realistic
plans and goals, administers aptitude and ability tests to determine areas of strength and potential, and coordinates
a variety of youth activity programs.
individual impact of civil society groups
varies widely from organization to
organization.  Similarly, community
response to civil society programs
varies in accordance with how well the
programs serve the needs of its
target groups.
Professional associations and the
Palestinian private sector play a large
role in society as well. Professional and
trade associations serve to regulate
industry activity, set rules of professional
conduct, organize relationships between
trade associations and members, settle
intra-industry conflicts, and promote their
members’ financial interests.
The private sector attempts to respond
to the growing needs of Palestinian
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Sector-specific associations
defend the interests of groups
they represent and coordinate
the work of their members.
society. It seeks to upgrade its own
performance levels by establishing
relationships with funding agencies
and maintains constant communication
with industry counterparts abroad. The
private sector encourages input and
advice from external economic
institutions and makes every effort to
keep abreast of changes in the
dynamic economic environment.
The Palestinian private sector absorbed
the economic shock of 1967 and
managed to hold itself together, in spite
of the flight abroad of both economic
leadership and investment capital.   The
Israeli occupation resulted in the
drying up of available credit, a huge
reduction in market size, marked
decline in the agricultural sector and
major shifts in labor demographics.
Nevertheless, the private sector
continued to serve as a primary source
of employment and resisted efforts from
the Israeli market to completely
swallow the Palestinian market,
especially in the time period from 1994
until the second Intifada.  At this time,
the private sector faced another
onslaught, and many private
enterprises were forced to close. Those
that survived did so through
substantive reduction to production
capacity and internal
restructuring of operations.
The work of Palestinian professional
associations is an important component
of civil society. Industry-specific
associations defend the interests of
groups they represent and coordinate the
work of their members.  These activities
generally result in higher levels of
efficiency and production within the
industry or profession and raise visibility
for their members within Palestinian
society. For example, several
professional associations in the West
Bank are formally affiliated with sister
associations in Jordan4 and network with
other similar associations in Palestine and
throughout the Arab world.  Professional
associations in the West Bank also
participate in a voluntary forum, which
coordinates their affairs.
In Gaza, however, the situation is
somewhat different.  Professionals
belong to societies rather than
associations, as dictated by the laws
established in Gaza prior to 1994.
After 1994, many professional societies
were permitted to reorganize as
associations, and to follow the laws
governing similar groups in the
West Bank.
In practice, the priorities of professional
associations in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip differ and as result, relations
between the associations in the two
geographic areas were not harmonized
in terms of structure or performance.
Hampered communications, especially
during the past three years, also
contributed to a general lack of
coordination between the two areas.
Members of professional associations
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
represent a significant percentage of
Palestinian social and political elite
groups. Professional associations in the
West Bank, both individually and
through their common forum, have
played prominent roles in the
Palestinian society since 1967 on both
the social and political level.
Another example of professional
coordination serving the common welfare
is the Palestinian NGO network, created
to promote cooperation and synergy of
effort among its members and to
strengthen their collective social and
political contributions. In addition, a
number of industrial unions and
chambers of commerce (in the important
economic sectors of stone, food products
4 Many Palestinian professional organizations were originally formed as affiliates of associations created in Jordan. They
functioned primarily as branches of the Jordanian groups post-1967, even after the change of the law in Jordan. Following
the year 1994, many Palestinian associations began to function independently, although financial relationships (dues struc-
tures) remained in place between the Jordanian headquarters and the Palestinian chapters in the West Bank.
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Points of Light 40-43: The Private Sector‘s Role in the Community
Point of Light 40: Palestine Telecommunications Company - PALTEL
PALTEL has adopted the concepts of corporate social responsibility by creating community partnerships with
local institutions to promote creativity and excellence. Activities include funding the Young Scientists Club;
establishing three new centers in Nablus, Hebron and Gaza and renovating two older centers in Ramallah and
Khan Yunis. PALTEL provided 200 scholarships to university students and purchased olive oil from farmers in
cooperation with the Agricultural Relief Committees and Nablus Zakat Committee. PALTEL also provided
financial relief to needy students and their families, used videoconferencing technology to simultaneously
broadcast Birzeit University graduation ceremonies for parents in Gaza during the closures, covered costs of
medical treatment for afflicted needy individuals, and sponsored many youth sport programs.5
Point of Light 41: The Arab Bank
Since its establishment, the Arab Bank has sponsored activities and programs which serve large sectors of
Palestinian society, especially in the fields of culture and education. The bank offers material and in-kind
assistance to educational institutions and provides financial aid to thousands of Palestinian university students.
Point of Light 42: National Beverage Company (NBC)
In mid-2004, the NBC funded a children’s library in a government-sponsored hospital located in Jenin, as well
as another in Ramallah.  NBC also sponsors the donation of large quantities of school supplies to
schoolchildren throughout Palestine annually.
Point of Light 43: Jawwal (Cellular Telecommunications)
Jawwal utilized its extensive mobile telecommunications network to organize a campaign for national unity and
stability following the death of President Yasser Arafat. Jawwal also uses its publications and advertising media
to promote the major landmarks and historical sites of Palestine.
and pharmaceuticals), agricultural
associations (olive, agricultural
marketing), and literature and arts forums
have been formed.
4-1-5 Legal status:
Some traditional institutions within
Palestinian society were created
voluntarily in accordance with the needs
and the wishes of the local community,
whereas others were established by fiat
or by force over a long period of
historical development. Some of these
older institutions were founded during
the Ottoman period and eventually
gained popular acceptance during the
period of the British mandate.  They
were subsequently absorbed into the
Jordanian system and later into
the PNA.6
In contrast, modern NGOs are
established and operate within the
Palestinian legal framework, as well as
within the framework of Israeli laws and
military orders that are the legacy of the
continued occupation of the Palestinian
territories7  Certain provisions of the May
1994 Cairo Agreement between the PLO
and the state of Israel also serve to
direct NGO activities within Palestine.
5 PALTEL: Concerns and Directions ≠ Annual Report 2003. pp. 13-14.
6 See on this issue: Mohammed Fahd Mohammed Al-Araj, Brief of Tribal Judiciary. Jerusalem, 2003. (As indicated on
its cover, the book was issued by Presidential Decree No. 4557 on 16 February 1997)
7 The PNA Chairman issued Decree No. 1 of 1994 that provides for continuing “the effect of laws and orders that were
in effect in the Palestinian Territories prior to 5 June 1967". He also issued Decree No. 5, where Article 1 stipulates: “All
powers stated in legislations, laws, decrees and orders in effect in the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 19 May 1994
shall be entrusted to the PNA“. See Palestinian Proceedings, the PNA official gazette, Issues No. 1 and 4.
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After the establishment of PNA, legal
restructuring was needed. However, the
legislative framework in existence did not
adequately support or provide guidance
to the required reorganization within the
government.  Some examples of
deficiencies in the current body of
Palestinian legislation with regard to the
organization of  governance follow:
1)  The Law of Political Parties is as yet
unratified. Political parties are temporarily
managed according to the provisions of
the Draft Law of Political   Parties of 1995,
which has a number of shortcomings.
Some legal institutions and Palestinian
human rights organizations have criticized
the complications and inconsistencies
inherent in the Draft Law.  Some of these
include unnecessarily complex
procedures for party organization;
restrictions placed party activities; and
relationships with the media, as well as
other areas of concern.8  The draft law is
also criticized for its adherence to the
Israeli laws and military orders dating back
to 1994 and earlier, as well as PNA’s need
to obtain Israel’s approval for any new
Palestinian legislation in accordance with
the terms of the 1994 Cairo agreement.
Article 2 of the Charitable Organizations
and Community Associations Law No. 1
of 2000 defines the activities of
charitable societies and
non-governmental bodies as “any
voluntary social, economic, cultural,
developmental service or other activity
which improves the status of society’s
citizens in social, health, professional,
material, spiritual, artistic, cultural, sports,
or educational terms“. The law excludes
Box 4-2: Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO)
The Palestinian NGO Network is an independent civil and democratic entity created to support and strengthen the
principles of democracy, social justice, sustainable development and respect for human rights within Palestinian
society.  PNGO does not discriminate on the basis of religion, gender or race.  The organization was established
in September 1993, after the signing of the Oslo Accords, to enhance coordination, consultation, cooperation and
networking among different sectors of civil society. Its membership is comprised of 92 Palestinian NGOs working
across a broad spectrum of humanitarian, social and developmental fields. PNGO forms integral linkages within
Palestinian civil society, coordinating the NGO sector at local, regional and international levels.
Vision: PNGO seeks to contribute to the establishment of an independent and democratic Palestinian state
based on the rule of law, social justice, principles of democracy and the respect for human rights. To this end,
PNGO strives to: contribute to the national resistance to the Israeli occupation, strengthen democratic values
and culture within the Palestinian society, strengthen coordination, cooperation, networking and consultation
within the civil society, and strengthen the NGO sector‘s institutional capacity.
Overall goal: to reinforce the role played by NGOs through contributing to the empowerment of the Palestinian
civil society within a viable independent Palestinian state based on the principles of democracy, social justice
and respect for human rights.
Objectives: influencing the overall policies of decision-makers in general and PNA institutions in particular;
supporting the formulation, analysis and dissemination of relevant policies, legislation and laws; enhancing the
managerial and institutional capacity of civil society institutions in general and PNGO’s members in particular;
strengthening coordination, cooperation, networking and consultation among the different Palestinian NGOs at the
local, regional and international levels; influencing international public opinion and promoting international solidarity
with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and promoting democratic and civil values and the principles of
freedom, social justice and equality among the Palestinian public.
8 Palestinian Center for Human Rights, A Critical Reading in the Draft Law of Political Parties of 1995, issued by PNA, Gaza, Studies Series (2), 1995.
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Palestinian political parties
and political movements are
powerful influences within
Palestinian society.  They
serve as catalysts for action
at the political and social level.
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political parties and the private sector
from this definition. Universities and col-
leges are defined under Palestinian law
as charitable organizations, in spite of the
fact that academic institutions clearly
cannot be described as such if the terms
of the definition provided in Article 2 of
the law are applied.
The Palestinian Labor Law No. 7 of
2000, Article 1, defines a professional
association as “any professional
organization that is formed in
accordance with the (Palestinian labor)
law“, and defines a worker as “any
ordinary person that carries out a job
for an employer for a wage and
performs the work under the latter’s
management and supervision“. The
definitions for a professional
association and a worker apply equally
to both professional and labor unions.
9 There are several chambers of commerce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip operating under different names.  Each
chamber essentially performs a similar function; however, they do not coordinate efforts due to internal conflicts and
traditional territorial disputes. The situation in Jerusalem is different than that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In
Jerusalem, the Israeli trade unions (Histadrut) play the primary role, whereas the Palestinian trade unions are inactive.
10 Pierre Shelstrom, Report on the Palestinian Draft Law of Political Parties. Ramallah and Gaza: The Palestinian Independent
Commission for Human Rights, 1999, pp. 49-51.
Box 4-3: The Political Parties Law as a Model of
Self-Imposed Restraints on the Empowerment
Process
Palestinian political parties and political movements are powerful influences
within Palestinian society. As with other civil society organizations, they serve
as catalysts for action at the political and social level.  And although they are
political in nature, functionally they also fill in gaps in the provision of social
services resulting from the cumulative effects of Israeli occupation and the
PNA’s failure to function as an efficient provider of basic public services.
Political parties and political movements fall under the jurisdiction of the Draft
Law of Political Parties of 1995. This draft law has a number of
shortcomings, including:
 Complex procedures associated with the establishment of parties and
operational restrictions which limit interaction with the public.
 Restriction of publication rights and media access with no legal justification.
 Inherent favoritism for the dominant or ruling party, granting the party in
power special privileges and wider freedoms within Palestinian society.
 The Draft Law in Article 1 creates a legal link between the Palestinian Basic
Law and the political system of the PLO, and in Article 3 the law declares all
parties organized under the umbrella of the PLO to be registered political
parties, thus exempting them from conditions required for establishing political
parties.9  Although the desire to protect and preserve the PNA by emphasizing
its linkage with the PLO is understandable, the insertion of the PLO into the law
without legal justification raises a number of legal concerns.  The Oslo Accords
of 1993 specify the PNA as the governing body of the Palestinian territories for a
certain interim period only.  Attempts to prolong the ruling mandate of the PNA
beyond the specified interim period by legislative caveat are not consistent with
the functions of a free democratic state.10
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Box 4-4: Relations between the Ministry of Interior
and Civil Society Organizations.
 Since its establishment, relations between the PNA and civil society
organizations have been characterized by reciprocal competition and
mutual suspicion. The PNA has repeatedly engaged in attempts to limit and
control the activity of these organizations.
After the Al-Aqsa Intifada, however, a new type of relationship slowly began
to emerge.   In early 2004, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) adopted measures
designed to bridge gaps in relationships between governmental institutions
and civil society organizations, most importantly:
 Holding periodic (monthly) meetings between MOI and civil society organizations.
 Forming a civi l society coordinating committee consisting of
representatives from nine civi l  society organizations and their
network institutions.
 Simplifying and facilitating procedures for the registration and licensing of
civil society organizations.
 Banning security apparatuses from entering the physical premises or
intervening in the affairs of civil society organizations without authorization
from the Minister of Interior. MOI also issued instructions to civil society
organizations not to respond to any intelligence agency seeking information,
as only the MOI is permitted informational access to civil society affairs.  This
new directive mitigates the problems arising from multiple security
apparatuses operating under the perception that they are responsible for
monitoring the operations of NGOs.
 Negotiating the terms of the “terrorism certificate” and conditional funding
imposed by donors in order to reach a common position within the NGO
community.
 Seeking to achieve synergies in the work of civil society organizations
with ministries specialized in the same field.
However, issuance of a special
Palestinian law to organize professional
associations is still pending. A draft law
was submitted to the PLC but it has not
yet been ratified. The draft law defines a
professional association as “a voluntary
professional organization that
represents the interests and aspirations
of its members and seeks to improve
their conditions and meet their needs”
(Article 1). In Article 7, the draft law
differentiates between professional
11 For more opinions, see: Arab Thought Forum, Political Parties Law ≠ Proceedings of the Special Seminar held 11
November 1997, Jerusalem, 1998.
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unions and others, considering that the
“practice of [certain professions] requires
a license issued by the [relevant]
association and abidance by the
provisions of laws     related to these
professions“. The draft law allows
professional associations to join or
participate in any Arab, regional or
international union (Article 4) and allows
associations to form internal unions from
among their members.11
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Both traditional and modern social
institutions play significant roles in
preserving Palestinian society.
Traditional institutions have
consistently proven that they, as
social agents, do provide acceptable
solutions for some of the difficulties
faced by society. Society reinforces the
role and legitimacy of traditional
institutions by continuing to rely on
their structures, norms and
methodologies.  Traditional institutions
have also successfully maintained
critical communications and cultural
linkages among different sectors of
Palestinian society within the occupied
areas.  They provide social solidarity,
tribal justice, assistance to the needy
and organize volunteer and charitable
activities, in the absence of the rule of
law and a modern governmental
substitute for these functions. The
existence of traditional institutions also
slows the processes of geographic
fragmentation and social disintegration
brought on by the Israeli occupation.
In spite of the quantitative and
qualitative contribution of the traditional
institution, many still fear its potential
to negatively influence society’s
potential for advancement and ability to
gain independence.   For example, the
tribal judiciary system is an alternative
to a governmental judicial authority in
a conflict resolution capacity, but it
simultaneously serves to undermine the
legitimacy of the judicial authority.
Large sectors of Palestinian society
believe that any problem, no matter how
complex or serious, can be solved
through the tribal councils in a cost
effective manner. In addition, tribal
councils do not always ensure justice
for marginalized social groups (such as
women, children and the poor). In
addition, they rarely address the core
factors that create social problems.
Tribal councils provide, in essence,
“band-aid” justice, providing temporary
relief but no real cure.   Tribal
institutions cannot contribute to
sustainable development unless their
activities are regulated and monitored
by an appropriate national authority
in cooperation with civil
society institutions.
Modern institutions enjoy varying
degrees of social acceptance for a
number of different reasons.  For
example, it is virtually impossible to
distinguish among the various
Palestinian political movements and
political parties simply on the basis of
their stated political goals.  Often, their
proposed social programs are too
generalized, as well as idealistic and
utopian, and will never be realized or
implemented under the prevailing
conditions.   In other words, their stated
goals were not crafted with a realistic
view of or in response to existing
political, social and cultural challenges
of Palestinian society today.
In spite of the similarities in their
platforms, Palestinian political parties
continue to compete and to conflict with
one another unnecessarily over ideology
and the distribution of roles.
Palestinian society must question the
rationale supporting the fragmentation
of its political parties, especially in view
of the shared goals of independence and
sustainable development.  When the
desired outcome is to bring an end to
the disintegration of the Palestinian
social fabric, how is a group of
fragmented and conflicted political
parties going to contribute to the
process of sustainable development?
How can Palestinian society entrust
them with their hopes and dreams for a
social harmony and stability when they
cannot even achieve these ideals within
their own small groups?
Section Two:  The Roles of Traditional and Modern
Social Institutions in Preserving Society
Traditional institutions do not
always ensure justice for
marginalized social groups
such as women, children and
the poor and they rarely
address the core factors that
create social problems.
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Points of Light 44-45: NGOs and Volunteer Work with
Marginalized Groups
Point of Light 44: A Summer Camp for Children
The Muneef Barghouti Center created a summer camp for children based on
the tenets of volunteerism and involves the children themselves in the
management of the camp and all its activities.   This initiative is unique in that
it provides opportunities for marginalized and poor children to participate in
the camp without burdening the families with the cost of tuition, materials
and equipment. The camp combines the traditional summer activities of arts
and sports with other activities that promote initiative and creativity among
the participants and enable them to enjoy full self-expression and the
exploration of their individual abilities.
Point of Light 45: Al-Lod Charitable Society (Working with
People with Special Needs ≠ Sawa/Sawa Program)
Through a voluntary community initiative, Al-Lod Society members conduct
home visits to children and young people with disabilities in order to
encourage participation in the broader community, encourage their hobbies
and creativeness and to establish an exhibit of their work.
Civil society organizations
greatly advanced the
processes of modernization
and development and
unceasingly worked to
establish a functional system
of civil services to oppose the
Israeli system.
Neighboring Arab countries have
played an important role in the
maintenance of the status quo within
Palestinian society.  Some Arab
countries use the Palestinian internal
conditions to their own benefit as they
seek to implement their regional
political strategies.  In addition,
traditional biases (tribal, sectarian and
patriarchal) play a role in maintaining
the prevailing condition of internal
fragmentation.
These factors partially explain the
failure of Palestinian movements and
parties to fulfill their expected roles in
the internal and external political
struggle. Some political groups have
begun to promote anti-democratic
platforms under the pretext of
resistance to the occupation. As result,
the entire democratic decision-making
process, including the need to
guarantee that decisions taken are
actually implemented, is being
increasingly abandoned and the
required periodic rotation of authority is
postponed or overlooked.
Palestinian political parties have also
failed to adapt internally in order to
effectively address and respond to new
challenges.   This failure was apparent
during the events of July 2004, which
included abductions and targeted
shootings.  Some groups began to
discriminate against and harass citizens
who refused to affiliate with their party.
Such harassment usually occurs in the
work place, where workers reluctant to
affiliate with a certain political group
begin to experience job stagnation
and fail to achieve promotions, no
matter what their levels of
experience or competence.
Post 1967, the number of Palestinian
NGOs and their role in society notably
increased. That role became even more
critical following Israeli incursions into
the Palestinian territories and the
intensified attempts to destroy the PNA
since 2000. Civil society organizations
greatly advanced the processes of
modernization and development in this
period, and unceasingly worked to
establish a functional system of civil
services to oppose the Israeli system.
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Palestinian NGOs have worked to meet
community needs since 1967.  They
strive to remain abreast of a host of
newly emerging responsibilities, in the
absence of a functioning PNA and in the
presence of hostile occupation forces.
After 1994, they also operated in the
absence of any supportive network of
government regulations or policy.
Donor funding played an important role
in the development of the Palestinian
NGO infrastructure.  Since 1967, donor
assistance created a reliable revenue
Box 4-5: Poor Coordination and Subjective
Prioritization
Poor coordination between the various sectors of civil society stems largely
from the need to compete against one another for social recognition and for
donor funding.  NGOs are generally defined by areas of specialization, by
political affiliation and by geographic location.   The need to compete plays a
major role in defining the behavioral patterns of the individual groups.
NGOs within the same sector and with similar goals can vary widely in terms of
performance, due to differences in institutional hierarchies, the extent of donor
influence and the internal agenda of each organization.  This situation embodies
the inappropriate coupling of traditional behavioral patterns and modernization
and the resulting fragmentation of the role played by civil society organizations
in sustainable development.
stream, built internal capacity and
transferred technical know-how and
development experience to NGOs in all
sectors of Palestinian society.   NGOs in
turn utilized its relationships within the
donor community to promote
understanding of the Palestinian political
cause and to resist the occupational
authority‘s attempt to hide the harsh
realities of Palestinian daily life from the
eyes of the world.
However, the relationship of Palestinian
NGOs and the donor community is not
without negative aspects.  Donor aid is
often accompanied by specific, and
sometimes conflicting, political agendas.
Lack of internal organization and clearly
established sets of priorities within the
NGO community forced many civil
society associations to accept without
challenge the will of donor groups.   The
heightened state of dependency
weakened the ability of Palestinian NGOs
move decisively in the direction of
sustainable development, and resulted in
the wasting of financial resources,
duplication of projects, diminished quality
of services, and a subjugation of the
NGO leadership and vision to the
donor community.12
In addition, donors unintentionally
pitted NGOs against one another in an
unhealthy competition for funding.
NGOs tailored their programs to align
with the stated objectives of donor
initiatives in order to secure resources.
Many NGO programs overemphasized
short-term emergency relief work,
usually at the expense of their
longer-term programs designed to
promote sustainable development.
To a large degree, NGOs have
individually succeeded in developing
modern organizational structures,
established standards for performance
and effective service delivery systems
for program beneficiaries.  The NGO
12 Salah Abdul-Atti, The Palestinian Society between the Tradition and Modernity ≠ Potentials and Determinants of a
Democratic Developmental Constitution, op. cit. pp. 78-80.
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community has failed, however, in
creating a central infrastructure to
harmonize and coordinate the work of
individual civil society organizations
under the umbrella of a strategic vision
for sustainable development and the
collective empowerment of society.
Section Three: Civil Society Organization’s Impact
on the Social Fabric from the Citizen’s Perspectives
The level of public trust in
NGOs and charitable socie-
ties is 44 percent in the West
Bank and 52 percent in the
Gaza Strip.
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The social and political situation in the
West Bank is significantly different than
that in Gaza Strip. These differences
affect public response toward the
performance of civil society
organizations in each of the two
regions. However, even more signifi-
cant variations in public response are
noted between citizens of the West
Bank and Gaza and the residents of
East Jerusalem.  Therefore, it is
difficult to accurately measure the level
of trust among Jerusalemites in
institutions operating in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, as well as to clarify how
Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip view the performance of
Jerusalem institutions. The situations
are different, as well as the impact of
institutions in each region. The lack of
accurate data renders the
task of comparable performance
measurement almost impossible.
Activities by civil society organizations
have a varying impact between
Jerusalem and the rest of PNA
territories, as well as between the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Variations
between both regions have been
reinforced by the construction of the
Separation Wall in 2004. Data available
on Jerusalem and the rest of the
Palestinian territories are not sufficiently
accurate or descriptive to allow
objective analysis of the public
response to the activities of civil
society organization in the
various geographic areas.
Therefore, the PHDR utilized the results
of public opinion polls previously
conducted by several Palestinian
institutions and initiated three regional
opinion surveys specifically for the
purposes of the PHDR. The PHDR also
incorporates information published in
the media and other formal research
studies. Specifically, the following
presentation is largely based on
opinion polls conducted by the Birzeit
University DSP and on three workshops
conducted in Ramallah and one in
Gaza specifically for the
purposes of this chapter.
Results of polls conducted periodically
by the Birzeit University DSP indicate
a variation in the level of public
confidence in civil society organizations
as well as differences in the
assessment of organizational
performance.13 For example, the
opinion poll issued published by the
Programme on 01 June 2004 indicated
a significant geographic discrepancy in
the levels of public confidence in Zakat
Committees (54 percent in the
West Bank, increasing to 61
percent in Gaza Strip).
The percentage of the public with trust in
the work of foreign NGOs reached 31
percent in the West Bank and increased
to 46 percent in Gaza Strip. The same
approximate percentages apply to trade
unions (31 percent in the West Bank
compared to 44 percent in Gaza Strip),
NGOs and charitable societies
13 Due to the frequency of closure on Jerusalem, the Palestinian communities residing in the urban areas of East
Jerusalem can no longer be measured by the same criteria applied to the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Views of official Palestinian institutions differ considerably between Jerusalemites and residents of the occupied terri-
tories.   Jerusalemites also display lower levels of trust in Palestinian trade unions, certain foreign funding agencies
(particularly those refusing to support the population of Jerusalem) and other institutions based on the same criteria
prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Therefore, the results of opinion polls conducted by Development Studies
Programme in the occupied territories cannot be extrapolated to the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem.
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(44 percent in the West Bank and 52
percent in Gaza Strip). Despite a small
variance in the level of public trust in the
judicial system between the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (40 percent compared to
46 percent), people in both regions still
have more confidence in the effectiveness
(by about 10 points) of tribal reconcilia-
tion committees than in official judiciary
bodies (53 percent in the West Bank
compared to 63 percent in Gaza Strip).
4-3-1 Performance of Civil
Society Organizations and
Public Opinion:
Palestinian public opinion polls in the
occupied territories were conducted to
measure the level of people’s
acceptance or rejection of the
performance of Palestinian civil society
organizations. Two polls conducted in
June 2002 and June 200414 revealed
that the level  of  t rust  in the
Palestinian civil society organizations
has varied. Comparisons between
the respective results of the two polls
indicate that the level of trust in most
inst i tut ions has dropped. The
following table illustrates the results
of both polls:
Government institutional
performance reinforces rather
than addresses the problems
imposed by the Israeli
occupation on the
Palestinians, including the
geographic fragmentation
and continuing social
disintegration within
Palestinian society.
Some people doubt that it is
possible to achieve an active
Palestinian civil society in the
absence of Palestinian
sovereignty.  Activation of
community  potential, which is
a prerequisite of  empowerment,
is impossible without
democracy.
14 Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, Public Opinion Poll No. 7, June 2002 and No. 17, June 2004.
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Table 4-1
Level of Trust in Palestinian Civil Organizations
Institution
Universities
Zakat Committees
Tribal reconciliation committees
Local press
NGOs and charitable societies
Formal judicial system
Trade unions
Palestinian opposition
Political Movements/parties
2000
80%
67%
--
42%
53%
44%
39%
29%
29%
2000
62%
58%
57%
50%
47%
43%
36%
36%
27%
4-3-2 Major Issues for
Workshop Participants:
Three discussion workshops were
conducted in Ramallah with trade
unions, NGOs and political movements
in the West Bank and a fourth one was
conducted in Gaza City. Participants’
views in these workshops indicate
diverging opinions in some cases and
similarity in others. Workshop
discussions focused on 7 main topics:
government institutions; development
and empowerment; traditional and
modern civil society organizations;
participation in decision-making;
donors‘ role; public trust in civil society
organizations; and the Palestinian
developmental perspective.
 Government institutions: Workshop
participants in both the West Bank and
Gaza Strip consistently defined
government institutional performance
as negative, discouraging, existing in a
perpetual state of crisis, and a factor
which reinforces rather than addresses
the problems imposed by the Israeli
occupation on the Palestinians,
including geographic fragmentation
Points of Light 46-49: Palestinian NGO Media Achievements
Point of Light 46: Ramattan Studios (Satellite Broadcasting)
Ramattan Studios was established in the Gaza Strip in 1999 and expanded its operations to include the West
Bank and Jerusalem. The company started with limited capital from partners‘ contributions and with no external
funding. Ramattan was the first company of its kind to break the Israeli satellite broadcasting monopoly in the
Palestinian territories when Ramattan secured its satellite broadcast rights.   Ramattan also has trained 100
young people and provided jobs to 50 of them in the technical and administrative fields. This media initiative
helped establish the first Arab TV news agency to broadcast from Palestine free of charge for two hours a day.
Point of Light 47: PYALARA ≠ Alli Soutak TV Program and Palestinian Youth Times Newspaper
The Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation (PYALARA) launched two media
initiatives designed to provide an appropriate forum in which young people might articulate both their
perspectives and their aspirations to society, but to the decision-making leadership in particular.  The first
initiative is a youth TV program titled “Alli Soutak“ (“Raise Your Voice“) aired for two hours weekly on the satellite
Palestine TV channel. Youth teams are formed to create the program and present it to the audience by
themselves, voicing issues of concern to them and activating youth to defend their rights and promote their causes.
The second initiative is creation of the newspaper Palestinian Youth Times, which is the first publication of its
kind in Palestine targeting youth aged 14-25 years. The Youth Times reporters are all from the same age
group. A major objective of this newspaper is to empower young people and promote their role in society by
providing a venue to express their views of life in a widely distributed media publication.
Point of Light 48: Palestinian Women’s Media Office
The women‘s media office strives to focus the attention of Palestinian society on women‘s and children’s
issues.   The Office attempts to shed light on the different forms of suffering endured by women and children in
Palestinian society.  Its objective is to bring about constructive social action to create effective development
policies that concentrate on the empowerment of individuals, especially the marginalized and oppressed.   The
Office hopes to achieve full mobilization of community resources to advocate their causes.
Point of Light 49: This Week in Palestine
This weekly cultural information publication highlights activities taking place in the different areas of Palestine.
It targets the staff of international agencies, visitors and tourists.  It is highly stylized and very professionally
produced English-language publication.
and continuing social disintegration
within the Palestinian society. The
crisis is exacerbated due to the
overlapping tasks of national
liberation and nation-building taking
place in an environment characterized
by lack of institutional organization
and effectiveness, democracy and
accountabi l i ty, and amid public
distrust of PNA governing bodies and
the NGO community.
Participants in all four workshops
believed the work of public institutions
to be nonprofessional and to have
resulted in a host of internal and
external difficulties. The situation is
further intensified by the political chasm
that exists between mainstream
Palestinian political institutions and the
growth of the Islamic movement as a
formidable political force. Workshop
participants noted the absence of an
empowering national leadership, and
the vague regulatory framework which
governs the interaction of the PNA with
civil society organizations.  The
negative performance of the
government institutions are reinforced
by declining economic and social
conditions, as reflected in increasing
poverty and unemployment rates and
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the declining l iving standards.
Participants from the West Bank also
commented on the fragil ity of
developmental and democratic visions
and the vulnerabil ity of the
Palestinian political system.
 Development and empowerment:
Workshop discussions clearly indicated
that the relationship between
development and empowerment is a
dialectic one and that empowerment has
two faces: empowerment of civil society
and empowerment of national
institutions. However, a question was
raised in the discussion on the challenge
of development and institution-building
while under occupation. The same
question was also raised when
government institutional performance
was addressed. Some participants
doubted the possibility to achieve
development in the Palestinian context
as long as efforts focus on relief work,
although acknowledging that limited
developmental breakthroughs have
been achieved. This view is further
reinforced in view of poor NGO
coordination among different sectors,
within districts and with the PNA.
 Traditional and modern civil
society organizations: Some
participants doubted it was possible to
achieve an active Palestinian civil
society in the absence of Palestinian
sovereignty. The consensus opinion held
that a limited level of effectiveness
exists among civil society organizations,
while also acknowledging that a
traditional social culture prevails among
both traditional and modern institutions.
Participants from Gaza stressed that
tribal reconciliation committees are a
strong presence in the community and
in the lives of people. Others added that
Islamic societies and mosques, also a
component of civil society, wield heavy
influence (both positive and negative)
within the community, both culturally and
socially. The discussion used the
example of the Zakat Committees and
their power within Gaza society.
Questions were raised, however, as to
whether or not tribal reconciliation
committees are in keeping with the
notions of civil society in terms of
preserving and strengthening the social
fabric.  Is it possible for these types of
institutions to provide a real alternative
to modern development institutions?
Participants debated the relative
effectiveness of a system of laws and
an active judiciary as compared to the
reconciliation committees.  The debate
highlighted the conflicting public
perceptions and valuation of traditional
versus modern institutions in
Palestinian society.
 Participation in decision-making:
Consensus exists with regard to
dominance of autocracy and the
absence of democracy in official PNA
institutions and civil society
organizations. According to one
workshop participant, it is impossible to
fully activate community potential, a
prerequisite for empowerment, without
democracy. Additionally, the ambiguous
regulatory and political relationships
between the PNA and civil society
organizations further retard
empowerment. For example, civil
society organizations do not actively
influence the creation of government
policies and are not permitted to
effectively advocate for the interests of
social groups they represent or to
defend their right to participate in the
decision-making process.
 Funding and donors: One of the
workshop participants described external
aid as a conspiracy against the
Palestinian people. In his opinion,
external aid has turned Palestinian
institutions into beggar institutions,
weakened the work of Palestinian NGOs
and transformed their staffs from effective
social advocates into employees.   In a
similar vein, some donors were accused
of contributing to widespread institutional
corruption by ignoring illegal practices
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within certain institutions and allowing the
emergence of an “NGO elite”, people who
enrich themselves personally through
NGO activities. Some donor practices,
such as the requirement of one donor for
all NGOs receiving its funds to sign a
“terrorism certificate“ have resulted in
internal conflicts within the NGO
community as well as bred hostility
between NGOs and the communities they
serve. These criticisms were balanced by
recognition among workshop participants
of the valuable impact donors have made
on the managerial and technical
operations of most NGOs.
 Trust in civil society organizations:
In general, a negative perception exists
toward institutions with political origins,
whose numbers are on the rise within
Palestinian civil society.   Others believe
that the large number of civil society
organizations connected to government
activity is a positive indicator, although
limited in scope. Autocratic
organizational systems, lack of
leadership rotation, accountability and
transparency in others, and deference
to donors in some cases and to the PNA
in others, are all factors which erode the
public trust. Severe criticism was
directed at the politicization of civil
society organizations and at the
practice of the PNA‘s employment of civil
society leaders in official positions. Some
participants also noted the lack of
coordination between civil society
organizations and the PNA;
governmental ineffectiveness and its
failure to discharge its responsibilities;
and the prevailing security anarchy,
which have all contributed to the
malfunctioning of civil society
organizations and diminished public
confidence. Another frequent
observation was made as to the
declining role of civil society
organizations under the PNA compared
to the role they assumed in society prior
to the government’s founding.
Criticism of PNA operations is linked to
criticism of the activities of political
movements and parties. Political
parties acknowledge that they are all
experiencing different degrees of crisis.
Points of Light 50-51: Partnership of Civil Society Organizations, PNA
Institutions and the Private   Sector for Poverty Reduction15
Point of Light 50: National Commission for Poverty Alleviation
The Commission‘s membership consists of representatives of Palestinian civil society, different ministries, the
private sector, UNRWA, Zakat Committees and some donor representatives under the coordination and
management of the Ministry of Planning. The Commission published the first Palestinian poverty report with
support from UNDP. Then, it conducted extensive research on poverty in Palestine using the Participatory Poverty
Assessment approach with support from the United Kingdom. The publication of the poverty report initiated
high-level discussion among stakeholders in the development process on major issues related to poverty. Most
importantly, this process helped formulate a relevant Palestinian antipoverty strategy agreed upon by the majority
of stakeholders.
Point of Light 51: The Human Development Report
The publication of this report is supervised by the Birzeit University DSP in cooperation with two committees: one
advisory and the other inter-ministerial.  The two committees represent stakeholders in the development process
from the NGO sector, the PNA and the private sector in cooperation with the Ministry of Planning and with support
from UNDP. The regular publication of this report, as well as the preparatory work required for its publication
represent a significant contribution to the strengthening of relationships among different stakeholders groups and in
identifying primary strategies for human development and poverty eradication.
15 Izzat Abdul-Hadi, A Broader Vision of the Role of Palestinian NGOs in the Development Process: A Concept Paper.
Ramallah: Bisan Center for Research and Development, April 2004.
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In response to public criticism, political
parties claim to have been the catalysts
for the development of civil society prior
to the establishment of a functioning
government.  Therefore, they consider
themselves to be the groups most
capable of addressing the ongoing
issue of social fragmentation.
In support of this view, those holding it
add that the unified central leaderships
of governmental and NGO structures
represent a broad spectrum of political
groups, unions, associations and NGOs,
which provides an effective
organizational base from which to
transform political positions into
practical measures.  However, political
parties criticize civil society
organizations for competing with
them in the political realm.
Some participants also expressed the
hope that modern civil society
organizations will play a more effective
role in the empowerment and
development processes. Trust in
modern civil society organizations,
as reflected by workshop participants,
ranged from moderate to severe criticism.
Participants differentiate  between trust
in developmental institutions and trust in
those who provide direct emergency
relief. In this context, it was observed that
some institutions have shifted their focus
from development and empowerment to
relief, as demanded by
increasing levels of poverty with in
Palestinian society.
Box 4-6: Civil Society Organizations and
Public Opinion
Results of the June 2004 poll by the DSP indicate that 38 percent of those polled
believe that civil society organizations fulfill their role as participants in the
development process in Palestine. In addition, 34 percent believe that political
movements and parties actually provide solutions to social and political
problems. The poll indicates that the majority of respondents appreciates the
role of civil society organizations, and at the same time expresses a low level
of trust in official institutions. On the other hand, 62 percent of the respondents
believe that the private sector does not work adequately to solve the economic
problems of the country and 61 percent believe that it discriminates
among workers.
It is appropriate to utilize
time-tested methods of action
effectively utilized by the
Palestinians during past
decades and to learn from the
rich body of human
experience in order to
formulate a sustainable vision
for the future of
Palestinian society.
Geographic fragmentation and
disintegration of the Palestinian
social fabric -human and
cultural - represent some of the
most serious challenges facing
Palestinian society at present.
Workshop participants attribute the
problems discussed to several factors,
including: low level of public awareness,
lack of realistic assessment of the
characteristics and composition of
Palestinian society, and failure of many
civil society organizations to adequately
address the issue of sustainability,
instead focusing on the management
of projects with a short time horizon.
Organizations have failed to carry out
their role in increasing public
awareness of Palestinian realities and
the specificity of the Palestinian
context. Some additional factors cited
were that organizations were
established to serve certain purposes,
including political agendas, which
serves to diminish the public trust.
Other institutions ≠ as the case in Gaza
≠ have a too-limited focus; and some
pay lip service to care for marginalized
groups, but     their resources are
channeled to serve other purposes.
 A developmental vision: Workshop
participants largely shared the view that
the absence of a shared developmental
vision stems from the lack of coordination
between the PNA and civil society
organizations. They believe the absence
of vision allows donors to impose their
cultural, political and social agendas on
Palestinian society. A consensus exists on
the need to build a Palestinian
developmental perspective based on
cooperation between PNA and civil
society organizations.
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Conclusion:
Geographic fragmentation and
disintegration of the Palestinian social
fabric ≠ human and cultural16 ≠
represent some of the most serious
challenges facing the Palestinian
society at the strategic level at present.
Civil society organizations operate
within an environment fraught with
polit ical, economic and social
complexity. They have tried to adapt
to that complex environment in order
to respond to their community
responsibilities and meet their goals.
Some of the most important issues
facing Palestinian society include:
establishing mechanisms to manage
the modernization of the society, the
role of civil society organizations in this
context, and their problems with
government institutions. At the
structural and behavioral level, civil
society organizations (including
parties, associations and
organizations) face several
challenges, mainly: the problem of
increasing internal corruption; and the
problem of deference to donor
priorit ies, with some serving as
contractors for the implementation of
donor’s social and political agendas.
In addition, civil society organizations
suffer from the growth of the “shop“17
phenomenon. The ongoing debate in
the Palestinian society represents the
struggle between rational
modernization and traditionalism and the
need for a dialectic relationship between
traditional and modern structures in
order to ensure delivery of a better set
of social services.
In addition, the international arena has
not been reliable in terms of ridding
Palestine of the occupation. This
complex situation requires
unconventional solutions, mainly the
engagement of all Palestinian society’s
institutions and capacities and the
elimination of internal conflicts in order
to focus on ending the occupation.
Certainly, this purpose can not be
achieved through traditional
development methodologies and a
fragmented empowerment process.
Therefore, it is appropriate utilize
time-tested methods of action effectively
utilized by the Palestinians during the past
decades and to learn from the rich body
of human development experience in
order to formulate a sustainable vision for
the future of the Palestinian society.
Chapter 6 of this report will address
such a vision.
16 See, for example, Jamil Helal, Al-Aqsa Intifada: Direct Goals and Maintenance Factors, Palestinian Studies
Journal, 44, Autumn 2000, and The National Program‘s Dimensions and Stalemate after Oslo, Palestinian Studies
Journal, 36, Autumn 1998.
17 The term “shops“ evolved in the early 1980s to reflect the abuse of the concept of development for making profits.
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The Role of International Funding in Society Building and
Empowerment of the Palestinian People
This chapter of the Human Development Report deals with the role of international funding in the process
of development and empowerment in Palestine. It acknowledges the important role this funding plays in the
development of Palestinian infrastructure and a functioning relief network while at the same time
recognizing the limitations concerning the consolidation of a systematic national framework for
development and construction.  Moreover, a substantial portion of this funding is tied to the peace process.
Thus, the role of international assistance in the development of Palestinian society and in strengthening its
internal capabilities in the face of chronic and acute challenges has been limited.
Chapter Five

Introduction
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords
(the Declaration of Principles) between
the PLO and the Israeli government in
September 1993, in October of that same
year the donor countries held a
conference in which 42 nations and
institutions took part. The purpose of the
conference was to adopt a specific
strategy for providing financial and
technical assistance to the new
Palestinian National Authority, which was
established within the framework of the
Oslo Accords. This donor conference
sought to empower the PNA to
administer the Palestinian areas,
implement projects for restoring
infrastructure, establish facilities and
institutions, and to manage the funding
of the comprehensive development
process. The speed with which the
international community took action
bestowed significant economic
credibility on the Oslo Accords among
Palestinian citizens, who were at first
hesitant to support the agreement’s
political and security arrangements. The
international community‘s action was
based on the premise that it was
imperative to garner all financial
resources needed to make the
agreement successful, and with a full
understanding that in order for the
Accords to stand in the face of daily
challenges on the ground, ordinary
Palestinians needed to perceive positive
change in their lives.
This initial financial initiative was
subsequently developed even further,
and came to be referred to as the “peace
dividend“ in the literature of  supporters
of a peaceful settlement to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and regional
coexistence. And, in fact, contribution
commitments totaled $2.4 billion only
three months after the conference that
created the “peace dividend“ — the
five-year funding plan for reconstructing
and developing the Palestinian economy
and infrastructure. Thereafter,
international assistance for the
Palestinian people began pouring in from
multiple sources and through numerous
channels. Financial pledges took various
forms, came with substantial conditions,
and were funneled in to the PNA in a
disorganized manner. Assistance funds
totaled more than $6 billion at the end of
the first half of 2004, resulting in an
average annual per capita assistance
level of $310 per person, considered one
of the highest levels of aid in the world.
These large amounts of foreign
assistance played an important role in
upgrading Palestinian infrastructure
facilities and reducing the destructive
impact of the Israeli policies and
practices during the ten years
following the Oslo Accords.  However,
this assistance was not made part of a
systematic national plan for
development and reconstruction.
A substantial portion of it has gone
toward covering the fees of foreign
advisers and experts. Further, much of
the assistance is hostage to the
advance of the peace process, and a
large portion of it has been directed
toward preventing this process from
collapse. These factors have limited the
role of international assistance in the
development of Palestinian society and
the strengthening of its internal
capacities in the face of chronic and
acute challenges. In addition, there
have been numerous doubts and
questions raised by local and
international observers regarding the
efficacy of this assistance in promoting
the Palestinian economy’s opportunities
for emancipation from severe
dependency on its Israeli counterpart
and in empowering Palestinian society
to achieve comprehensive, sustainable
development.1
The large amounts of foreign
assistance played an
important role, but it was not
made part of a systematic
national plan for development
and reconstruction.
1 The data and figures contained in this chapter rely primarily on reports issued by the Ministry of Planning and on
information provided by the Ministry of Finance.
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Section One: General Background on Current
Economic Conditions
There is no doubt that the present
economic situation and indicators in the
Palestinian territories are the joint,
interconnected responsibility of all
parties that impact the development
process and manage the course of
Palestinian’s daily life (albeit to varying
degrees). The economic situation may
be discussed in terms of three factors:
the internal factor, the Israeli factor, and
the international aid factor. Israeli
actions in the Palestinian territories,
especially since the beginning of the
Al-Aqsa Intifada, have caused
extensive disruption to the Palestinian
economic infrastructure. These
measures not only doomed Palestinian
attempts to rehabilitate their economy
and correct the structural deficiencies
plaguing it from the time of Israeli
occupation, but also reduced public and
private production levels, investment in
the Palestinian territories and created
distortions in the Palestinian labor
market. This new economic reality is
plagued by numerous gaps and
imbalances, which can be summarized
The Palestinian trade deficit
gap reached approximately
$2,081 million in 2003.
The unemployment rate in the
Palestinian territories rose to
more than 40 percent in 2002.
in terms of three main gaps.
The financial resources gap: The PNA
suffers most heavily from this gap as a
result of a substantial decline in its
financial resources during the past three
years. Financial revenue was lost in three
areas:   a decline in tax revenue accruing
from economic activities in the
Palestinian region; a decline in returns from
customs duties due to a decrease in trade
with Israel; and the Israeli seizure of a large
portion of tax and duties revenues as a
punitive measure against the Palestinians.
The continuing Palestinian trade
deficit gap: This gap is particularly
significant vis-à-vis Israel. The data show
that this deficit reached approximately
$2,081 million during 2003. And despite
the trade deficit’s decline immediately
prior to the outbreak of the intifada, what
is disturbing is that the decline was the
result of a complete reversal in imports
and exports at an almost equal rate. This
volatility demonstrates the sensitivity of
Palestinian exports to external factors.
Box 5-1: The Decrease in Domestic Product and Rise in Prices
Accompanying the aforementioned gaps are new economic statistics, which may be summed up as follows:
 GDP during 2003 was approximately $4,143.3 million, 10.3 percent less than in 2000. Moreover, GDP per
capita declined by approximately 24.4   percent during the same period.
 Economic indicators for Palestinian productive sectors showed a reversal in general. For the majority of these
sectors, the contribution to domestic product declined. Moreover, their employment capacity declined, and
these sectors also suffered direct material losses.
 The general consumer price index has risen steeply in recent years. Prices have increased more than 37.7 percent
as compared to the year 1996.  Steadily rising prices have affected the living standards of many Palestinian families.
 Compounding the problem, unemployment levels in the Palestinian territories have also increased during the
present period, even as the disposable income of most Palestinian families has declined. Among these        families,
72.3 percent depend on earned income to cover expenses.
 These factors have led to the spread of poverty among Palestinians; the data show that 67.7 percent of Palestinian
families (62.6 percent in the West Bank and 77.5 percent in the Gaza Strip) were living under the poverty line (as
defined by income) in 2003. The median poverty line for families composed of six members was approximately
1,800 NIS in 2003, or about $395 per month.
Sixty-seven percent of
Palestinian families were
living under the poverty line in
2003.
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This portion of the chapter examines the
various sources of international funding,
distribution of this funding by sector, and
the manner of distribution. The period
during which assistance was provided
to Palestinians will be divided into three
main stages. The first stage,
extending from 1994 until the end of
1997, was characterized by continuous
reversal in most economic indicators,
along with rising unemployment and
poverty rates as a result of the Israeli
authority’s closure policy at that time.
The second stage, from 1998 through
2000, was, in contrast to the previous
stage, characterized by tangible
improvement in a number of economic
and social indicators in the Palestinian
territories, as seen in a rise in
Palestinian GDP and declining rates of
unemployment and poverty among
Palestinians. The third stage, which
began with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa
Intifada, with the accompanying Israeli
policies, inflicted excessive damages on
the infrastructure and superstructure of
all sectors within the Palestinian
territories. The impact of these
measures became readily apparent in
early 2001 and continued to escalate
through the time of writing this report.
However, the data on which this report
relies cover only through the end of 2003
and parts of 2004.
5-2-1 The Nations and
Institutions that Provide
Assistance
At their first meeting in Washington, DC,
in October 1993, the donor parties
(nations and institutions) pledged to
provide approximately $2.4 billion to the
Palestinians over the course of the next
five years. This sum continued to increase
regularly during subsequent years as a
result of the faltering peace process and
accompanying instability in conditions
prevailing in the Palestinian territories,
along with the increase in needs and
consequent increase in the assistance
necessary for Palestinians to survive. The
value of pledges had risen to
approximately $3,420 million as of the end
of October 1997, and by mid-2003 total
pledges since 1994 had reached $7,365
million. During this period, the share of the
United States was the largest among the
donors and amounted to approximately
$1,450 million, or 19.7 percent of total
pledges. This was followed by the
European Union, with 13.1 percent of
total pledges. The Arab countries2 pledged
approximately $911.7 million during that
period.  The pledge of the United Arab
Emirates (amounting to $310 million)
comprised the largest share of total
pledges by Arab countries, followed by
Saudi Arabia (which pledged $300 million).
Notwithstanding the importance of
donorsß pledges of assistance, these
parties did not disclose whether they
intended to provide monetary or in-kind
assistance, and they specified the value
of this assistance without providing any
official commitment or delving into
details related to the mechanism of
assistance provision or end objectives.
The analysis will thus be limited to the
two stages subsequent to the donor
parties’ pledges; the commitment stage
and the actual disbursement stage.
Section Two: The Main Characteristics of
International Funding
2 This does not include assistance provided through the Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Funds managed by the Islamic
Development Bank, or assistance provided specifically to support the budget of the PNA.
The employment gap: Israeli siege
and closure have cut off more than
125,000 Palestinian workers from jobs
inside the Green Line, causing the
unemployment rate in the Palestinian
territories to rise to more than 40
percent during 2002. This rate fell to
approximately 25 percent in 2003.
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Between 1994 and mid-2003,
donor parties‘ total
commitments amounted to
approximately $6,703 million.
During the commitment stage, a
commitment to provide assistance was
made through an agreement or
memorandum of understanding
specifying the amount, the objective,
and the provision mechanism. This
stage is regarded as an important
advance step that precedes the actual
transfer of assistance funding. If the
assistance that the donor parties
committed to provide was transferred,
this meant moving on to the third and
final stage—the disbursement stage.
International institutions operating in the
Palestinian territories, especially the
World Bank, oversaw this stage, and
occasionally some countries preferred
to provide assistance directly, by
opening special accounts in banks from
which withdrawals were made for
expenditure on agreed upon projects.
PNA Ministry of Planning data indicate
that between 1994 and mid-2003,
donor parties ß total commitments
amounted to approximately $6,708
million3, at an annual rate of
approximately $670 million. These
commitments comprised approximately
91 percent of total pledges made
during the previous period, and these
parties had actually provided
approximately $6,552.6 million in
assistance as of the end of 2003 (at an
annual rate of approximately $655.3
million), or 97.6 percent of total
commitments and 89 percent of total
pledges. The year 2001 saw the
highest amount of assistance
disbursement, amounting to
approximately $1,045.8 million,
whereas the lowest amount was in
1998 (i.e., the beginning of the second
stage), a year when the value of
actual assistance did not
exceed $420.1 million.
Returning to distribution of assistance
according to the time-based stages,
total commitments during the first stage
amounted to $2,858.9 million, as
compared to $2,269.2 and $1,580.2
million in the second and third stages,
respectively. As for actual
disbursement, it amounted to
approximately $2,029.3 million
(71 percent of commitments) during the
first stage, as compared to $1,465.9
million disbursed during the second
stage (64.6 percent of commitments).
The highest amount of assistance was
disbursed during the third stage (i.e.,
the stage of the Al-Aqsa Intifada), when
approximately $3,057.4 million  was
disbursed as a result of the difficult
conditions in the Palestinian territories
during that time, in addition to a change
in the forms and sources of assistance
(to be dealt with subsequently
in this chapter).
With regards to the entities that have
provided assistance, here, for the sake
of analysis, they are categorized into
seven groups: the Arab nations, the
European Union, the United States,
Japan, international institutions,
European countries, and other nations.
The data indicate that the European
countries were the largest contributor,
both in terms of commitments and
actual disbursement. During that period,
they committed to provide approximately
$1,107.6 million, of which approximately
$810.9 million, or 73.2 percent, was
disbursed. If what was provided by the
European Union is included, then total
assistance provided by the European
continent to the Palestinians exceeded
$1 billion, or more than 50 percent of
total aid provided during the first stage.
The problem with the European Union,
however, is failure to honor agreed upon
commitments; no more than 42.1
percent of total commitments have
been disbursed, and this percentage is
extremely low compared to the overall
average disbursement percentage for
the first stage, which was 71 percent.
With regard to the Arab nations, they
ranked third in terms of commitments
The data indicate that the
European countries were
the largest contributor of
foreign assistance to the
Palestinians.
3 There is not an exact figure for the total of these commitments.
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and fifth in terms of actual
disbursement. Saudi Arabia’s
contribution was the largest throughout
the stage. The extent to which Japan
has honored its commitments is worth
noting, in that its actual disbursements
have exceeded its commitments (103
percent); this brings Japan’s total
actual assistance to approximately
$308.3 million, making it second after
the European nations in this regard. It
is joined in this by the United States,
which ranked fifth in terms of
commitments and third in terms of
disbursement, providing more than
$285 million during the first stage, or
97 percent of its total commitments.
The second stage, from 1998 through
2000, saw a decline in all assistance
indicators. Total commitments fell by
approximately 20 percent compared with
the previous stage, amounting to
approximately $2,269.2 million.
Likewise, the percentage of disbursal of
commitments fell to 64.6 percent. This
means that actual assistance in the
second stage declined approximately
27.8 percent compared with the
previous stage; it amounted to $1,465.9
million with an annual average of
approximately $488.6 million
(as compared to $507.3 million in the
first stage), taking into account that there
were three years in this stage and four
years in the first stage.
Of the nations that provided assistance,
there was a rise in the amount and
percentage of assistance committed by
the United States out of total
commitments during this stage; it rose
to approximately 35.5 percent,
occupying third place after the
European nations and the European
Union. However, the United States
surpassed the European Union in terms
of actual disbursement, as the
percentage of actual disbursement by
the European Union remained
low (approximately 46.3
percent of its total commitments).
The Arab nations’ contribution fell
substantially during this stage, both on
the level of commitments and on the level
of actual disbursement; these indicators
fell by 67.5 percent and 45.4 percent,
respectively. Nonetheless, there was im-
provement in the percentage of actual
disbursement of Arab assistance, which
exceeded 104 percent. This is primarily
attributed to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa
Intifada and the Arab nationsß provision
of $30 million during its first year,
following the Arab summit held in
Cairo in October 2000.
Indicators for Japanese assistance fell
as well, with its commitments declining
by approximately 44 percent and its
actual assistance declining by
approximately 57 percent. There was
also a change in Japan’s disbursement
percentage, which dropped to 79
percent (after having been 103 percent
during the first stage). As for
international institutions, they began to
play a bigger role in the international
funding process, coming to occupy
fourth place in terms of commitments
and actual disbursement. This is in spite
of the decline in the absolute value of
these institutionsß total commitments. A
number of factors contributed to this
development, including the drop in
total commitments during this stage and
the setting of these institutionsß actual
assistance at around $140 million
(nearly equal to their contribution
during the previous stage), which
elevated disbursement to 78 percent.
The third stage, reflecting developments
in international assistance during the
present Intifada, saw numerous changes
in the structure, forms, objectives, and
even sources of assistance. A new factor
came into play, which was the nature of
assistance provided by the Arab nations
and the allocation of the largest portion of
that assistance to emergency relief
programs and job creation programs, in
addition to support for the PNA’s
current budget.
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There will not be a comparison between
all of the figures and indicators related to
commitments during the third stage and
those of the previous stages, because the
data on total commitments during this
stage are limited to two and one-half
years. Thus, comparison will be limited
to indicators related to the size of actual
assistance and the ranking of donor
parties in terms of actual disbursement.
There was a large increase in total
actual assistance provided by the Arab
nations, whereby these nations decided
at the Arab summit held in Cairo in 2000
to establish the Jerusalem Fund, with
$200 million in capital, and the Al-Aqsa
Fund, with $800 million in capital. Each
Arab country’s contribution to these two
funds was delineated, and some Arab
nations—such as Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait—
honored their commitments, whereas
others—such as Libya—did not pay off
their commitments. The outcome was
that together the Arab nations provided
more than $890 million during the third
stage, whether directly or through the
funds they established. This in and of
itself multiplied the amount of actual
assistance during the stage as a whole
(approximately 108.5 percent) as
The Arab nations provided
more than $890 million
during the years 22000-2003.
compared with the previous stage, as
actual assistance during the third stage
totaled approximately $3,057.4 million.
This also affected donor rankings in
terms of actual assistance provided,
whereby the Arab group, in providing
more than $903.4 million, ranked first
among the donors. The amount of
assistance provided by the European
Union increased, especially that
supporting the PNA’s current budget
and employee salaries. The total
amount provided by the European
Union reached more than $787.3
million, bringing it to second place
among the donors. The United States
came in fourth, behind the European
nations, despite the increase in the
absolute value of its assistance as
compared to the previous stage; it
provided $482.3 million  (as compared
to $260.4 million  in the previous stage),
but its share of total actual
assistance dropped from 17.8 percent
to 15.8 percent.
Distribution of Assistance
by Sector
In the interest of following the course
of international assistance in an attempt
Table 5-1: Donor Contributions to International Assistance
(1994-2003), in millions of USD$ 4
4 Table data based on information provided by the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance.
Donor party
Arab Nations
European Union
United States
Japan
International Institutions
European Nations
Other Nations
Total
1994-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 Total
Commitments
312.3
520.2
292.9
298.9
225.5
1107.6
101.5
2858.9
Disbursement
193.8
219.1
285.3
308.3
139.3
810.9
72.6
2029.3
Commitments
101.5
507.2
396.8
167.5
180.5
858.6
57.2
2269.2
Disbursement
105.9
235.2
260.4
132.4
140.7
533.4
57.9
1465.9
Commitments
5.2
187.3
759.5
37.5
54.5
519.3
16.7
1580.2
Disbursement
903.4
787.3
482.3
41.3
154.7
669.5
18.9
3057.4
Commitments
418.9
1214.6
1449.2
504
460.4
2485.6
175.4
67083
Disbursement
1203.1
1241.6
1028
482
434.7
2013.8
149.4
6552.5
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to identify its various directions and its
distribution by sector, the Palestinian
Ministry of Planning’s distribution
diagram was employed. This
distribution diagram categorizes
assistance in terms of five main usage
areas: infrastructure, productive
sectors, social sectors, institution
building, and miscellaneous sectors.
The reports issued by the Ministry of
Planning5 point to the social sectors as
having absorbed the largest portion of
actual assistance to Palestinians
during the last ten years, whereby their
share was approximately 31 percent of
total assistance. The social sectors
encompass numerous branch sectors,
including education, health, youth,
children, women, and humanitarian
assistance. Despite the importance of
these sectors to the Palestinians, they
are not ranked first in terms of
Palestinian priorities and needs or the
extent of their impact on Palestinians’
economic and social well-being.
The social sectors are followed by the
infrastructure sector, which
encompasses energy, housing, hard
currency, communications,
transportation, and others. This sector
ranked second, accounting for
approximately 30 percent of assistance
disbursed. The infrastructure sector is
considered vital to the Palestinian
economy. Growth in the infrastructure
sector can instigate growth in numerous
other economic and social areas, such
as job creation and thereby mitigate
problems of unemployment and poverty.
It can also help jumpstart the
Palestinian economy due to its forward
and backward linkages with various
sectors—in addition to the role played
by a healthy infrastructure in attracting
local and foreign investment by
reducing investorsß overall investment
costs. This sector had ranked first
among commitments, but a decrease in
the percentage of disbursements to it,
which did not exceed 53 percent, made
it second.
Institution-building occupied third
place, with expenditures accounting for
27 percent of actual assistance. There
was a clear decline in the share of the
productive sectors in total assistance,
as it did not exceed 11 percent of total
commitments, and that dropped to 9
percent of total disbursement.
Moreover, there was a decrease in the
percentage of disbursement for these
sectors in a manner similar to that in
the infrastructure sector, as this
percentage did not exceed 53 percent.
The miscellaneous sectors, or those
falling outside of the previous
categories, ranked last, accounting for
no more than 3 percent of total
commitments and disbursement alike.
These groups encompass numerous
sectors that cannot be categorized
within the previous groups due to their
multiplicity and the differences between
them, or because they came into being
in response to the emergency
conditions during the previous stage.
With regards to distribution by sector
during the three stages discussed in the
introduction to this part of the chapter,
the three main sectors (infrastructure,
the social sectors, and institution
building) benefited equally from actual
assistance during the first stage, with
each accounting for 30 percent. This is
in spite of the disparity between these
sectors in terms of commitments (35
percent, 28.5 percent, and 24.4 percent,
respectively). This highlights the
differences in the percentage
of  disbursement vis-à-vis  commitment
for these sectors.
As for the second stage, it was shaken
by shifts in distribution of assistance by
sector. The infrastructure sector came
to account for 37.6 percent of total
actual assistance, followed at
considerable distance by the social
The social sectors absorbed
the largest portion of actual
assistance to the Palestinians
during the last ten years ≠
approximately 31 percent of
total assistance.
Twenty-eight percent of
assistance was allocated to
technical investments and
experts.
5 The data contained in these reports cover from 1994 through mid-2003 and do not include assistance provided by
the donors to support the PNA’s current budget.
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sectors, at 29.2 percent. The decline in
the social sectorsß share is attributed to
the relative easing up in the political
negotiation process during this stage
and thus the severity of Israeli closures,
which meant a decrease in the amount
of relief and emergency assistance and
job creation programs, which fall within
the purview of the social sectors. The
productive sectors ranked fourth at 13.1
percent; that percentage continued to be
low and still failed to reflect Palestinian
development priorities and requirements
despite its increase over the
previous stage.
In looking at total assistance to the
Palestinians since the outbreak of the
present Intifada, or during the third stage,
the social sectors accounted for 68.5
percent. This is attributed to the swelling
of emergency humanitarian and relief
assistance, which falls within the social
sectors. The PNA’s diminished capacity
to collect returns also contributed, as did
the deterioration of general conditions in
the Palestinian territories due to the
Israeli policy of repeated closures and the
prevention of Palestinian workers from
reaching their workplaces in Israel. All of
this encouraged donors to support the
PNA budget in order to prevent the
collapse of the PNA—and the entire
political process as a result.
As for the infrastructure sector, its share
of total assistance declined in this stage
to approximately 10 percent (as compared
to 37.6 percent in the previous stage). This
is in spite of the extensive destruction
wrought on infrastructure and public
facilities as a result of Israeli escalation of
hostilities against the Palestinians during
this period6, and in spite of the consequent
pressing need for reconstruction and
restoration of that which had been de-
stroyed. As for the share of the productive
sectors, it did not exceed $98.5 million, or
less than 3.2 percent of actual assistance,
despite the importance of these sectors
in strengthening the Palestinians and
promoting their capacity for perseverance.
With regards to distribution of assistance
according to its various uses, Ministry of
Planning data indicate that public
investment accounted for 32 percent of
total actual assistance during the
previous years, whereby approximately
$1,393 million was disbursed for this
purpose.7 Twenty-eight percent of
assistance was allocated to technical
investments and experts; the donor
parties relied heavily on these
investments to ensure that assistance
was disbursed in a competent manner
and directed toward the necessary goals.
Notwithstanding the importance of this
type of assistance, its exaggeration is
often at the expense of the value of real
assistance to recipient countries,
consequently affecting the effectiveness
and capacity of international assistance
to achieve the desired goals.
The main uses for assistance include
supporting the PNA’s general budget8,
especially the development budget,
whose share of actual assistance was
approximately 12 percent. If the grants
for supporting the current budget are
added, contributions earmarked for
development increase substantially;
since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa
Intifada, the donor parties have
provided more than $1,300 million for
this use. As for in-kind assistance
provided to the Palestinians in the
form of equipment, it comprised
approximately 8 percent of total actual
assistance, and approximately 5
percent of assistance was disbursed
through job creation programs for the
unemployed. Only 3 percent was
disbursed to support the
private sector.
6 The World Bank estimated that infrastructure damages resulting from Israeli escalation during the present Intifada
totaled approximately $251 million.
7 Based on total actual assistance in the amount of $4,447.6 million, as stated in the Ministry of Planning’s report.
8 These figures are limited to the data provided by the Ministry of Planning, which covers 1994 through June 2003.
Moreover, they do not include assistance that nations have provided to support the PNA budget since the beginning of
the present Intifada.
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Forms of Assistance
Ministry of Planning data indicate that
the international assistance donors
committed to provide during the
previous period was not all in the form
of grants and donations. More than 14
percent of this assistance was in the
form of loans, the largest portion of
which comprised liberal loans with
extended repayment periods. However,
some loans provided to the PNA have
trade conditions, and the conditions go
up to an interest rate of 15 percent upon
actual repayment of that assistance. It
should be pointed out that most
assistance provided by the United
States and Japan during the previous
period was in the form of grants and
donations. During the first stage
(1994-1997), loans comprised
approximately 6.8 percent of total
assistance. In terms of the donor
parties, most actual assistance
provided by the European Union and
Arab nations was in the form of grants
and donations. International institutions
provided only 23.5 percent of their
assistance in the form of grants and
donations, while the remainder was in
the form of loans. The percentage of
loans provided by the European nations
was only approximately 3.7 percent of
their total assistance.
During the second stage, there was a
significant shift in the forms of
assistance provided, whereby the
percentage of loans increased to
approximately 19 percent of total
actual assistance. That increase
resulted from a policy shift on the part
of the European Union and the Arab
nations in favor of lending at the
expense of grant provision.   The
percentage of loans out of the
assistance they provided thus reached
24.6 percent and 37 percent,
respectively. This also was reflected in
the amount of loans taken by the PNA,
wherein loans doubled during the
second stage as compared to the first
stage, rising from $138.6 million to
$278.4 million.
With regards to the third stage, the
data in Table 3 show a rise in the
percentage of loans out of total actual
assistance during that stage, reaching
approximately 18.8 percent. This is
primarily ascribed to the loan provided
by the Arab nations through the Islamic
Development Bank in the amount of
$480 million. This increase occurred
in spite of the substantial deterioration
of conditions in the Palestinian
territories during that period—at a time
when, in view of those conditions,
along with a drop in the PNA’s
Table 5-2: Distribution of International Assistance by Sector
(1994-2003), in millions of USD$ 9
Fourteen percent of the
assistance to the Palestinians
was in the form of loans.
9 Table data based on information provided by the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance.
Sector
Infrastructure
Productive Sectors
Social Sectors
Institution Building
Miscellaneous Sectors
Total
1994-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 Total
Commitments
999.3
270.5
815.2
697
76.9
2858.9
Disbursement
606
137.3
599
604.5
82.5
2029.3
Commitments
1025.5
348.9
439.1
406.1
49.5
2269.2
Disbursement
550.5
192.5
427.4
241.7
53.8
1465.9
Commitments
500
143.9
516
333.2
87.1
1580.2
Disbursement
307
98.5
2094.7
346.8
210.2
3057.4
Commitments
2524.8
763.2
1770.3
1436.2
213.8
6708.3
Disbursement
1463.5
428.3
3121.1
1193
346.5
6552.5
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revenues and consequent decline in
its capacity to meet Palestinian needs,
the donor parties should not have
placed additional burdens on the
Palestinians. What is notable in that
stage is the increase in the
percentage of loans granted by the
Arab nations out of the total assistance
they provided, even as the percentage
of loans provided by the European
Union and European nations fell to less
than 2 percent and 1.7 percent of their
total assistance, respectively—as was
apt given the PNA’s financial resources
gap and the difficult conditions in the
Palestinian territories. It would have
been fitting for the Arab nations to act in
this manner rather than the European
Union and the European nations.
Distribution of Assistance
According to Recipient Parties
Distribution of assistance among
different recipient parties can be
divided into three main classes: the
first class was provided to the
various agencies of the PNA; the
second class was directed to NGOs;
and the third class was provided
through UNRWA. In total,
international donors have provided
more than $6,552.6 million during the
last ten years.
If the emergency assistance provided
through UNRWA from the outbreak of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada through the end
of 2003 is added (amounting to
approximately $324 million), the total
amount of assistance increases to
more than $6,876.6 million. Ministry of
Planning data indicate that the various
executive agencies of the PNA
(including ministries, authorities, and
public institutions) received 87 percent
of total assistance provided to the
Palestinians during this period,
whereas NGOs received 8 percent.
The percentage of actual
disbursement of assistance to NGOs,
at approximately 80 percent, was
higher than that for assistance to the
PNA, which did not exceed 65 percent.
With regards to actual assistance provided
through UNRWA, there is substantial
variation in the amount reported due to
discrepancies among data sources and
methodological differences in calculating
that amount. Ministry of Planning data
indicate that assistance provided through
UNRWA amounted to approximately
$337.2 million since 1994 (with an annual
average of 33.7 million), comprising about
5 percent of total assistance. This sum is
relatively small compared to the data
issued by UNRWA itself, which indicate
that funds disbursed by UNRWA during
one year alone (2003) totaled
approximately $259 million.
This discrepancy between the two
sources is attributed primarily to the fact
that the ministry only factors in funds
that UNRWA disburses for regular
development projects and budgets,
excluding the emergency and relief
assistance that UNRWA began
providing after the outbreak of the
present Intifada. This latter type of
assistance comprised the largest
portion of UNRWA’s total expenditures
in the Palestinian territories from 2001
through preparation of this report,
totaling $324 million. When this sum is
added to the regular assistance,
UNRWA’s share of total assistance in-
creases to more than 9.6 percent (an
amount that seems more logical and
representative of the extent of services
provided through UNRWA), and the
share of the PNA as a recipient party
falls to approximately 77.4 percent of
total assistance. That percentage is in
accord with the World Bank’s estimates
in its report related to assessment of
the economic effects of unilateral Israeli
disengagement from the Palestinian
territories, prepared in June 2004.
The PNA received 87 percent
of the total assistance
provided to the Palestinians,
whereas NGOs received 8
percent.
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This section of the report will identify
the impact of international funding on
Palestinian development efforts in
general and on the empowerment of
Palestinian individuals and society in
particular.  A general background
summary of the prevailing economic
and social conditions for individuals and
society in the Palestinian territories will
be presented.  It will be followed by an
examination of the most important
outcomes of international funding at the
level of individuals and the role of
assistance in empowering Palestinian
individuals and promoting the
ingredients for perseverance. It will also
examine the ability of international
funding to empower and strengthen
Palestinian society and to promote its
capacity for emancipation from
dependency on external factors, and
will attempt to measure the scope of the
impact of this funding in that regard.
5-3-1: The Ability of the PNA
to Manage International
Assistance
Any funding process involves two main
components: the funding party and the
environment into which assistance is
channeled. The role of the system or
apparatus that manages the assistance
is central to this process. This is highly
applicable to the international funding
situation in the Palestinian territories. The
ability of the Palestinian economic and
social system to manage international
assistance and respond to developments
in international funding patterns is a
central element governing the efficacy of
that assistance and its ability to achieve
the desired goals. As indicated previously
in this chapter, more than 87 percent of
international assistance to the
Palestinians passes through the PNA and
its various institutions. Since the PNA’s
establishment, the Palestinian Economic
Council for Development and
Reconstruction (PECDAR), the Ministry
Section Three: Impact of International Funding
The ability of the Palestinian
economic and social system
to manage international
assistance and respond to
developments in international
funding patterns is a central
element governing the
efficacy of that assistance and
its ability to achieve the
desired goals.
of Finance, and the Ministry of Planning
have managed international assistance
to the PNA. The largest portion of this
assistance is absorbed by a limited
number of ministries (such as the
Ministries of Education and Higher
Education, Health, and Local Government).
The procedures these ministries follow
in implementing projects funded through
international assistance pass through
several stages. Each ministry on its own
conducts the necessary studies to
determine the needs of the sector it
represents and then submits these needs
to the Palestinian parties responsible for
coordinating with the donor parties so as
to obtain the funding required to fulfill
those needs. Those needs are then put
before the donor parties, who dispatch a
delegation to affirm them, and the first
stage ends with funding approval by the
donor party. Upon conclusion of the first
stage, the second stage—connected to
technical-engineering project design—
commences, usually involving the
committee that made the presentations
to the representative of the concerned
ministry. The third stage is the process of
selecting the establishment that will
implement the funded projects. As
regards the process through which the
funding party dispenses funds and fees
to the implementing establishment, this
is usually carried out without
intermediaries, whereby payments are
transferred directly to the establishment’s
accounts in Palestine.
It is likely that the PNA’s limited track
record in managing donor funds, along
with oft-repeated accusations of
widespread financial, administrative
and political corruption in PNA
institutions contribute to the declining
levels of public trust in the PNA’s ability
to manage international assistance.
The results of an opinion poll conducted
by Birzeit University’s DSP show that
only 24 percent of those polled said
international funding should be directed
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Box 5-2: Outcomes of a Workshop on International
Funding
The DSP held specialized focus groups to discuss the issues concerning
international funding that were raised by this report. Attendees concluded
that despite some progress in the coordination of international funding through
the Ministry of Planning, the various PNA ministries were still working        sepa-
rately from one another. The oversight and management of financial assist-
ance that passes through the PNA is poorly coordinated. This                  per-
ception was reinforced during a discussion seminar held by the DSP, at which
Palestinian parties concerned with the international funding process met.
Participants at this meeting were in nearly unanimous agreement as to the
low levels of coordination between the central authority responsible for plan-
ning and coordinating assistance, the ministries, and representatives of or-
ganizations from different Palestinian sectors. In most cases, the central au-
thority was not party to agreements signed between ministries and donor
agencies, with the exception of those agreements which entailed a financial
obligation.  In those instances, the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of
Planning did become involved.
Some of the discussion group attendees pointed out that the Palestinian private
sector was also excluded from the processes of strategic planning and           de-
cision-making during the creation of development plans prepared by the PNA.
Although public/private sector coordinating bodies were established, their       par-
ticipation in the decision-making process was nominal and infrequent.
Another important conclusion reached was that the Palestinian public and   private
sectors possess the capacity to absorb large sums of international assistance,
even in excess of the present amount. Most production facilities in the private
sector are working at less than full capacity for reasons too numerous to mention
here. Added to this, there are large reserves of unutilized human capital, due to
high unemployment rates in the Palestinian territories. As for the public sector, a
case study of one of the projects funded by outside assistance demonstrated that
PNA institutions and their administrative staff are fully prepared to absorb any
anticipated expansion in the activities of the donor parties in the Palestinian
territories. Perhaps one significant indicator of this untapped potential is the list of
projects prepared previously by various PNA ministries and the readiness to
implement them pending provision of the necessary funding. This list contains the
most pressing needs within the sectors these ministries represent, but the lack of
financial resources provided through international assistance is slowing the pace
of implementation.
to PNA institutions, whereas 56 percent
believed that this funding should be
directed to the private sector.
5-3-2 The Role of
International Funding in
Building Palestinian Insti-
tutions and Strengthening
their Capacity
The term “Palestinian institutions“ as used
in this section refers to both official
government institutions and NGOs.
Approximately 60 institutions and
ministries fall within the category of official
institutions.  These can be divided into two
main groups based on the services they
provide: institutions that provide social
services (such as education, health,
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The PNA has been trying to
reintroduce planning through
preparation of a medium-term
development plan.
housing and relief programs) and
institutions that provide security services
(such as the police and various branches
of the armed forces).
The World Bank estimates that the
Palestinian NGO community includes
approximately 1,200 Palestinian
institutions and approximately 200
international institutions working in the
Palestinian territories. The activities of
these institutions are usually
categorized into three groups
according to the type of activity
they perform.
The first group engages in charitable
and social welfare activities designed
to serve needy segments of the
population. The second group engages
in development activities that build
individual and group capacity through
education, training, and organizational
consulting, such as developing
marketing skills. The third group works
to prepare individuals and groups to
assume positive decision-making roles
in local, national, and international
institutions.  This group usually
engages directly in the political
activity of the state and local
governmental bodies.
The donor countries play a central role
in building institutional capacity within
the government.  They support these
institutions with material and in-kind
assistance as long as the institutions
successfully fulfill their mandated tasks
and provide basic levels of service to
the citizenry. During the past three
years, the role of donor countries
providing funding in this area increased
substantially, as the PNA progressively
weakened and failed to carry out its
responsibilities.  Huge sums of
international assistance (approximately
$1,225 million) were given to shore up
the PNA budget.   However, World Bank
estimates indicate that the level of
services provided by the PNA have
continually declined, specifically
evidenced by the lack of environmental
protection and preventive health
services provided by the PNA in the
Palestinian territories.  As result, all
international funding to these two
areas was cut off.
In connection to activating the role of
international funding, the PHDR finds the
majority of government institutions
suffer from numerous problems
(covered in detail in Chapter Three). The
first problem is the absence of
well-developed management structures
and employee job descriptions,
resulting in the staffing redundancies that
plague most of these institutions. The
second problem is the need for a
central body to coordinate among these
institutions and to prevent duplication of
work across institutions resulting in
squandered efforts and money. The
central coordinating body is also needed
to ensure standards of transparency and
accountability are adhered to within
these institutions. The third problem is
the absence of a strategic vision or
clearly defined development plan for
work of the PNA.
The government‘s planning process
has passed through four main phases.
The first phase (1994-1997) had no
development plan to speak of, but the
second phase (1998-2000) was
characterized by existence of a partial
plan. Planning again ceased with the
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada through
last year, which comprised the third
phase. And, during the fourth and
current phase, the PNA has been
trying to reintroduce planning through
preparation of a medium-term
development plan. Certainly, a
government with little or no strategic
development planning activity  limits the
role that assistance is able to play, since
in receiving external assistance PNA
institutions depend—for the most
part—on the disparate efforts of
individual ministries.
International assistance has also
played an important role with NGOs in
World Bank estimates indi-
cate that approximately 60
percent of primary health care
services for Palestinians are
provided through NGOs.
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the Palestinian territories, as it provides
them with necessary funding and
in-kind technical support which helps
the NGOs comply with the inflexible,
complicated financial and administrative
requirements imposed by donors on the
management and implementation of
NGO programs. World Bank estimates
indicate that approximately 60 percent
of primary health care services for
Palestinians are provided through
NGOs.  NGOs also play significant roles
in the areas of education, agriculture,
provision of support and assistance to
persons with special needs, housing
programs for limited income families,
and lending programs for small-scale
projects. As with official PNA institutions,
however, among these NGOs there is a
lack of a strategic vision and a tendency
Box 5-3: Assessment of the Benefit of International
Funding
A public opinion poll conducted by Birzeit University’s DSP in June 2004
indicated that 78 percent of respondentsß families did not benefit directly from
international support, whereas 49 percent of them felt that international
assistance alleviated Palestiniansß suffering. Among respondents, 48 percent
suggested focusing international support on job creation, whereas 65
percent suggested directing the support toward civil society organizations.
Opinions differed as to the degree to which international support contributes to
Palestinian development. In the same context, and on the political level, 55
percent of respondents believe that international support reinforces Israel’s
hold on the Palestinian territories.
to diverge from their goals, as well as
poor coordination with the PNA. The
NGOs are limited in their capacity to
negotiate with donor agencies to
identify the definitive areas of support
that best serve Palestinians and meet
their basic needs. Finally, the
restrictions imposed by the Israeli
occupation further complicate a lengthy
set of operational obstacles.
5-3-3 The Extent to Which
International Funding
Reflects Palestinian
Priorities
The extent to which international
funding reflects Palestinian priorities is
regarded as one of the most important
criteria used to measure the impact of
international assistance in empowering
Palestinian society and to determine
whether or not that assistance has
achieved its desired goals.  The impact
of international assistance on
empowerment is judged by the extent
to which the assistance is effectively
allocated across sectors in order to
address the maximum number of
development priorities and to meet the
needs of the Palestinian people.
Measuring the benefits of donor
funding is extremely challenging, as it
is not delivered through one central
body with a harmonized set of goals,
objectives and priorities via a single set
of processes.
As shown previously in this chapter, the
social sectors absorbed approximately
47.6 percent of assistance to
Palestinians from 1994 through the end
of 2003. This percentage was not
steady throughout the period; it did not
exceed 30 percent until 2000, yet it has
exceeded 68 percent since the
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. As also
seen previously, the rise in the social
sectorsß share of funding was due to an
increase in the amount of emergency
Direct financial assistance in
the social sectors provides
relief for many Palestinian
families.  However, it does
not incorporate any
development priorities and it
is not linked to a strategic
plan or central vision.
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humanitarian and relief assistance and
the grants provided to support the
current budget, which fall within this
area. This type of assistance provides
relief for many Palestinian families and
creates jobs for a large number of
unemployed10—in addition to its role in
preventing the collapse of the PNA by
supporting its current budget and
payment of its employees.  However, it
does not incorporate any development
priorities and is not linked to a strategic
plan or central vision; rather, its role is
limited to relief aid. In addition to
emergency assistance, the social
sectors also received assistance for
democracy-strengthening initiatives,
rehabilitation programs for persons with
disabilities, the environment, human
rights, and other areas. These sectors
are among the most important
priorities of the donor countries. Yet
despite their importance, they are less
capable than other productive
sectors of achieving economic and
social well-being that is long-term
and sustainable.11
The infrastructure sector ranked second
among donors ß priorities, as these
countries directed 22.3 percent of their
total assistance for projects to
rehabilitate and develop infrastructure in
Palestine. The past three years have
seen a perceptible reversal in the
amount of assistance directed toward
this sector, where the funds it was
allocated did not exceed $307 million,
or 10 percent of total assistance
provided during this period. This is in
spite of the extensive destruction inflicted
on Palestinian infrastructure facilities as
a result of repeated Israeli assaults,
which called for greater focus on this
sector than was given. The donors, in
their expenditures, relied on World Bank
estimates for the costs of rehabilitating
infrastructure, and these were far less
than the Palestinian estimates.
This sector is considered one of the
priorities on the Palestinian agenda due
to its forward and backward linkages
within the Palestinian economy, in
addition to its role in employing
workers and encouraging local
and foreign investment in the
Palestinian territories.
The third-ranking sector among donors’
priorities was institutional capacity
building. It was natural for the donors
to focus on this sector, especially
during the beginning of the transitional
stage and after the establishment of the
PNA and its institutions. The donor
nations spend approximately $1,193
million, or 18.2 percent, of assistance
on this sector. Once again, in providing
assistance the donor parties are failing
to align with Palestinian society’s
priorities and needs. The results of one
poll12 showed that building societal
institutions is not considered a priority
area among Palestinians, as this
sector earned only 7.2 percent on the
ranking of respondentsß priorities.
5-3-4 The Contribution of
International Funding to
Emancipation of Palestinian
Society
A number of internal and external
factors influence the basic
characteristics of economic and social
conditions in the Palestinian territories.
These influences helped shape the
Palestinian economic profile during the
previous stage, since the Palestinian
economy depended on its Israeli
counterpart and there were multiple
forms and channels of inter-linkage
between them in the areas of labor,
trade relations, and tax revenues.
In terms of labor, the Israeli economy
absorbed surplus Palestinian labor;
statistics indicate that more than
Most of the Palestinian NGOs
refused to accept conditional
donor funding.
10 Among those polled, 54 percent of beneficiaries of external assistance said they benefited in the areas of social welfare
and emergency relief, whereas 21 percent benefited from job creation programs.
11 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Programme, Public Opinion Poll No. 17, June 4-6, 2004.
12 Birzeit University ≠ Development Studies Programme, Public Opinion Poll No. 17, June 4-6, 2004.
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145,000 Palestinian workers were
employed in Israel just before the
present Intifada began. In terms of
Palestinian-Israeli trade relations, trade
with Israel comprised 77 percent of
Palestinian foreign trade. And in terms
of tax revenue, the PNA depends on
customs returns and duties on trade
with Israel in funding its treasury, as
together these duties comprise
approximately 60 percent of total
public revenue in the Palestinian
budget. The danger of this inter-linkage
between the two economies lies in the
Israeli side’s systematic continuation of
its current policy, which is based on
thwarting any Palestinian attempt at
emancipation and liberation from Israeli
domination and on countering
Palestinian attempts to revive
their economy and govern their
natural resources.
The second indicator is external
assistance, which covers more than 80
percent of funds needed for the overall
investment program in the Palestinian
territories, in addition to its role in
funding the PNA current budget.
However, there are a number of
questions surrounding the continuity of
this assistance during the forthcoming
period14, which in turn significantly
increases the level of risk and
vulnerability to external factors. These
questions surround a number of factors
related to this assistance, such as the
link between assistance and
developments in the political process,
inconsistency in the level of
compatibility with Palestinian priorities,
and changes taking place during the
past three years, as more than 83
percent of this assistance was directed
toward humanitarian relief programs,
13 The donor parties sometimes recover 50 percent of the aid they provide through technical assistance and sales of materials and equipment to the aid recipient.
14 Those meeting at the Rome Conference on the Palestinian Economy in October 2003 pointed out that lack of clarity in terms of the political horizons will make it
difficult to speak about higher and continual levels of assistance in the Palestinian territories.
Box 5-4: Conditional funding
United States government agencies provide examples of conditional donor funding. Throughout the previous
period, US funding required approval by the Foreign Aid Appropriations Committee of the US Congress. The
funding approvals of this committee rest on fulfillment of sets of political and security requirements by the party
receiving assistance. In the Palestinian context, these requirements include a Palestinian commitment to
safeguard and protect Israel’s security, as well as a commitment to implement the Palestinian obligations under
various agreements signed with Israel. In addition, there are certain provisions related to fairness, transparency,
accountability, and other related criteria. Further, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
recently added a new condition for aid recipients, as a component of what the American administration calls the
“war against terrorism.” Under this condition, recipients must sign a document pledging to combat terrorism and
not to use any portion of US funds to support terrorism.
In addition to these conditions, the majority of donor nations also impose conditions on Palestinians relating to
the mechanisms used for disbursing assistance provided. This is done through tying provision of assistance to
the condition that the raw materials and equipment necessary for the funded projects—in addition to the
implementing party, experts, and advisers—come from the same funding source.13 The US example assumes
added importance due to the relatively large amount of US funding assistance to Palestinians. As for the other
donor nations, their conditions are limited to the requirement that the aid recipient comply with the legal
frameworks and administrative procedures applied through their financial and legislative regulations. The
European nations and Japan serve as relatively moderate examples in terms of their conditions. It is
noteworthy that the majority of Palestinian NGOs, through the coordination of the Palestinian NGO Network,
refused to sign the American USAID document, regarding it as imposition of ambiguous conditions with regards
to the issues posed. This creates questions for the “new generation” of NGOs accepting conditional funding.
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funding the PNA treasury, and
repairing damages resulting from Israeli
incursions.  More than 87 percent of
assistance passes through PNA
institutions and approximately 8 percent
passes through NGOs, as shown
previously in this chapter.
The period during which the
international funding process began
coincided with Israeli policies of closure
and siege. These policies inflicted
immense damages on the Palestinians
and also affected the international
funding process, since they limited the
freedom of movement of employees
and representatives of local and
international institutions overseeing and
implementing the funded programs.
Moreover, they obstructed the arrival of
the raw materials and equipment
necessary to implement these
programs and projects, and the Israeli
authorities deliberately placed
obstacles and difficulties before
implementation of funded projects in the
Palestinian population centers located
in Area B. Israeli influence continued
to be the main determinant of
Palestinian economic and social conditions.
Since the launching of the peace process
and the signing of the Oslo Accords, the
Israeli government has continued its
policies, measures, and practices in a
systematic, uninterrupted fashion, which
thwarted Palestinian and international
efforts aimed at reviving the Palestinian
economy. Nor did the matter stop there;
Israel succeeded in transforming the West
Bank and Gaza Strip into a consumer
market for Israeli goods and services,
however corrupted, and a source of cheap
labor. These policies have created
structural distortions in the local economy,
where service-based and marginal
activities have expanded at the expense
of    development-oriented and productive
activities. This has weakened the
Palestinian economy’s productive
capacity and hindered its natural growth.
Despite obstacles posed by the Israeli
authorities, international assistance has
been successful in several fields and
has made significant achievements in
some areas. Here, it will suffice to
mention some of them, as they will be
addressed in detail in the discussion on
the impact of assistance in providing the
Palestinian development process with
ingredients of success.
A report issued by the World Bank15, in
discussing the achievements of
international assistance in the
Palestinian territories, pointed out that
such assistance has helped improve
health services by building and
improving a number of hospitals and
health centers. Between 1994 and 1998,
approximately 7.7 percent of total
assistance was provided to this sector,
as reflected in the increase in the number
of health care centers from 207 in 1994
to 369 in 1998. This also affected the
number of center beds and the quantity
and quality of health services provided
to Palestinians during that period.
Likewise, assistance brought important
achievements in the education sector.
During the first year alone, six schools
were constructed and furnished with the
necessary materials in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. And during the next five
years, more than 76 schools were
improved and renovated through
PECDAR alone, thereby increasing the
number of classrooms to approximately
2,068. Further, approximately $1,156.5
million, or 33 percent of total assistance
between 1994 and 2000, was spent on
infrastructure. More than 112 water and
sewage projects were implemented, and
hundreds of kilometers of main and side
roads were paved, which contributed
significantly to the development of
infrastructure services in the Palestinian
territories. Added to this is international
assistance’s contribution—however
limited—in supporting the Palestinian
During the past three years,
more than 83 percent of
assistance was directed
towards humanitarian relief
programs, funding the PNA
treasury and repairing
damages resulting from Israeli
incursions.
More than 76 schools were
renovated by PECDAR alone.
15 The World Bank, Donor Investment in Palestinian Development (1994-1998), The Promise, the Challenges, and the
Achievements, 1999.
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economic sectors. Within the industrial
sector, the donor entities realized the
importance of coherent export strategies
and their impact on increasing
employment in the Palestinian territories
and in growth of the domestic product.
Toward this ends, the donors worked to
establish a number of industrial areas,
perhaps the most important of which is
the industrial area in the Gaza Strip. In
addition, donor assistance played a role
in the Palestinian banking sector through
training programs prepared for the
banks. And it has funded numerous
lending programs for small-scale
projects, thereby expanding the lending
base of the Palestinian banking system.
Point of Light 52: CARE’s Initiative to Evaluate
its Work
Like many international institutions, CARE exerts substantial efforts toward
reevaluating its vision, programs, and modes of operation so that it can
overcome new and difficult conditions in the Palestinian territories and  respond
to local community needs. Beginning in 2001, it has provided emergency
assistance in addition to its development programs. The institution has faced
three main challenges in carrying out its work: first, the deteriorating security
situation and the siege to which the Palestinian areas have been subjected (which
has frequently obstructed assistance from reaching those areas); second, the
decline in donor support for development efforts in Palestine; and finally, the
state of ever-increasing poverty in the Palestinian territories. CARE has
confronted these challenges in a number of ways, including:
 Partnership with NGOs and local authorities.
 Strategic planning in the following areas:
 Evaluating the institution’s work and tasks in the Palestinian territories in
order to reformulate its programs and priorities.
 Revamping the institution’s performance standards and activating its branch
offices in order to reach the various Palestinian areas.
 Initiating coordination with other institutions working in the same field, in
order to exchange information and expertise.
5-3-5 The Contribution of
International Funding to
Providing Ingredients of
Success for the Palestinian
Development Process
It is relatively complicated to assess
international assistance in terms of its
direct impact on the development
process in the Palestinian territories, as
the lifespan of this assistance thus far is
relatively short, not exceeding ten years.
Therefore, it is difficult to build an
economic model for measuring this
impact. Furthermore, no definitive
relationship can be found between
international assistance and changes
taking place in the development
indicators in Palestine. The PHDR
therefore examines the indirect
implications of international funding and
its linkage with the macroeconomic and
social indicators in the Palestinian
territories. These conclusions, while not
definitive, may offer some indications
and evidence as to the importance of
this assistance and its role in bringing
about economic and social development
and in empowering Palestinian society.
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These indicators can be of benefit in
activating the role of assistance and
reinforcing its positive aspects, at the
same time exposing the mistakes
and negative aspects that marred
the funding process during  the
previous stage.
Observers of the international funding
process and its implementation in
Palestine are able to note changes in
the macro indicators. It is possible to
track several of these indicators during
the duration of the funding process
along the following lines:
 Domestic product: Reports indicate
that the gross national product (GNP)
for the Palestinian territories has grown
at negative rates of 3.5 percent, 10.1
percent, and 2.9 percent in the years
1993, 1995, and 1996, respectively.16
Positive GNP growth rates were
recorded in 1998 and 1999, reaching
18 percent and 8.2 percent,
respectively.17 The growth rate then
dropped in subsequent years,
especially since the outbreak of the
Al-Aqsa Intifada and the accompanying
Israeli measures.  During the first year
of the Intifada, GNP declined
approximately 11.2 percent. Moreover,
consecutive declines in gross
domestic product have been   recorded
since 2001, and the growth rates were
negative during the last three years at
9.4 percent, 3.6 percent, and 1 percent,
consecutively.18
 Unemployment rates: The
unemployment rate increased to more
than 30 percent after 1993, compared
to only 5 percent prior to that year.19
There has been variation in these rates,
which have risen and fallen under the
influence of Israeli policies in the
Palestinian territories, reaching their
highest level in 2002, at 31.3 percent.
 Living standards: There was a
significant decline in Palestinian living
standards after 1993, as the per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) dropped
by 14.2 percent between 1993 and
1995.20 Poverty rates have reached
record levels since September 2000, with
reports indicating that more than 60
percent of Palestinians have suffered
from poverty during recent years. The
overall level of prices rose by more
than 37.7 percent in comparison
with prices in 1996.
Box 5-5: World Bank Report
While pointing to international assistance’s difficulty during the previous period
in achieving the desired goals and empowering Palestinian society, a report
issued by the World Bank notes an increase in the amount of international as-
sistance at $500 million  per year between 2004 and 2006 (thus reaching $1,500
million  annually) will bring about some improvement in the per capita income
rate, while unemployment rates will fall to the prevailing pre-Intifada level of 14
percent—but only if Israel removes barriers and ends internal and border
closures blocking the movement of people and goods. However, the disturbing
matter lies in the continuation of high poverty rates among Palestinians during
the forthcoming period, despite an increase in assistance. If economic and
social conditions are expected to be as indicated above even with extensive
assistance totaling $1,500 million, it is difficult to imagine what conditions would
prevail in the absence of such assistance.
16 Muhammad Ishtiyah, The Palestinian Economy during the Transitional Phase, PECDAR, 2003.
17 The Economic Observer, No. 1, March 1997.
18 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts, various years.
19 Muhammad Ishtiyah, The Palestinian Economy during the Transitional Phase, PECDAR, 2003.
20 The Economic Observer, No. 1, March 1997.
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International assistance has
contributed to the promotion
of the principle of participation
to a certain extent.
 Community participation: International
assistance has contributed to the
promotion of the principle of  participation
to a certain extent.  However, it has not
fully integrated this concept into the
projects it supports in order for the
beneficiaries to become full partners in
formulating and taking decisions related
to their communities. A case study of a
Palestinian village was conducted for the
purposes of this report.   A meeting held
between a number of representatives of
institutions and activities from the women
and youth sectors reveals the existence
of some effective mechanisms and means
for strengthening the principle of
community participation.
The first of these mechanisms is the
use of town meetings held by NGOs
wherein individuals can take part in
determining how assistance is spent by
expressing their opinions and needs.
The second mechanism is the regular
meetings that the village municipal
council has held with different groups
in the village (educators, influencers,
youth, women, and others), combining
their views and identifying their
demands and needs. These meetings
usually succeed in forming a specific
conceptualization of the directions of
these groups, which are of benefit
during negotiations with funding parties
regarding village needs and priorities.
Further, a unique, groundbreaking
instance of citizen involvement in
determining needs and priorities was
seen in the preparation of a survey
through cooperation between the
municipal council and the donor party.
This case involved the Palestinian
Hydrologists Group and the World Food
program.  The survey had one part
related to services provided in the
village and another for determining
village needs based on priorities.
However, most of these experiences
were not generalized among
residential areas or recipients of
international assistance. Thus,
community participation (on the level of
individuals and groups) in deciding how
international assistance was spent
remained weak and below the
level required.
 The relief role: Results of an opinion
poll conducted by the DSP showed that
56 percent of respondents answered
“yes” to the question of whether
international funding has helped alleviate
Palestiniansß humanitarian suffering,
while 30.3 percent answered “to
some extent.” This is an indication
of the perceived benefit from
assistance in this field.
 The development role: When
respondents were asked about the
contribution of international assistance
to the development of Palestinian
society, the percentage of responses
were 43.6 percent (“yes”) and 35.9
percent (“yes to some extent”),
respectively. It is also important to point
out the role of this assistance in
supporting democratic processes and
Palestinian institution-building. Of total
assistance, 18.2 percent has been
spent in this field. This percentage
reached its height during the first, or
construction, stage, when it totaled
approximately 30 percent. This
assistance has funded payments within
a number of PNA ministries and the
Legislative Council, and it has also
played a role in funding activities of the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Moreover, in the field of building in
stitutions and activating their role in
Palestinian society, the donors have
greatly supported the local authorities
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
5-3-6 The Role of
International Funding in
Strengtheningand
Empowering Marginalized
Groups
The definitions dealing with the subject
of empowerment vary in the literature,
but most definitions encompass a set
of essential elements. These may be
Seventeen percent of
Palestinian families are
almost fully dependent on
external assistance.
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summarized as freedom of access to
information, guaranteed opportunities
to participate in decision-making, and
the ability to question officials within the
authority and at official sites. These
elements may be considered one of the
fundamental bases through which the
strength and empowerment of society
can be measured. Despite society’s
need in its entirety (individuals and
groups) for empowerment with its
various political, economic, and social
facets, there are specific social groups
and sectors that need more than
others to be provided with the
ingredients for empowerment in order
to expand their options and develop
their abilities. These groups include
women, the poor, workers, and youth.
This section will touch on the role of
international funding in empowering
marginalized groups and helping them
to integrate within Palestinian society.
The Palestinian territories suffer from
high poverty rates. As shown
previously, 67.7 percent of Palestinian
families were suffering from poverty
according to their income in 2003
(broken down as 62.6 percent in the
West Bank and 77.5 percent in the
Gaza Strip). International assistance
helps provide support to this segment
21 Khalil El-Naqa, The Impact of Microcredit, Case Study, UNRWA’s Microcredit Programme, WBG, 2004, Master’s thesis, Islamic University of Gaza.
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Box 5-6: The Contribution of International Funding
Despite all of the controversy surrounding assessment of the role of  international funding, there have been
achievements and contributions carried out through the funding of donor nations, including the Arab
countries.  Most important among them:
 Building schools and hospitals.
 Paving roads and restoring infrastructure, especially the sewage system in numerous residential areas.
 Training thousands of PNA and NGO employees.
 Employing the unemployed.
 Covering the costs of voter registration and the Palestinian elections.
 Organizing psychological support programs for children and women.
 Covering the salaries of PNA and NGO employees
of society through numerous institutions
working in the Palestinian territories.
Estimates of the United Nations Office
of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) indicate that about 17 percent
of Palestinians are almost fully
dependent on external assistance.
Institutions providing loans for
small-scale projects are among the
major institutions offering support and
a major income source for Palestinians.
However, the relative importance of
these institutions has declined since
1993 in favor of the banks. Assistance
through micro lending programs has
made some achievements. The results
of a study on the effects of programs
offering loans to small-scale projects
implemented by UNRWA in the
Palestinian territories indicate that these
programs have contributed to
increasing the income of their
beneficiaries, in addition to increasing
community participation on the part of
program users, improving their ability
to manage in the future and to
negotiate with other parties, and
increasing their well-being. In addition,
these programs have helped to
increase beneficiarie’s control over their
income sources and to raise their level
of self-confidence.21
Box 5-7: Micro Credit and the Empowerment of
Women
As shown previously, social indicators reveal a higher percentage of poverty
among women than men in Palestine. One study related to Palestinian women22
found that an important resource lacking among women in several economic
fields is provision of a lending network and financial network, and that women
could benefit greatly from increased sources of credit. The study also found
women’s marginalization and alienation from trade and agricultural unions
played a significant role in limiting their access to sources of information and
material support. Further, the lending programs and institutions working in this
field were incapable of delivering their services to wide sectors of women; the
percentage of women ranged between 2 and 5 percent for institutions that
lend to men and women, while the number of women borrowers receiving
loans from institutions specializing in loans to women ranged between 150
and 200. The study attributed this to reasons related to the inability of these
institutions to design lending programs and services suitable for the needs
and conditions of these women.23
Further, a qualitative study of micro credit to Palestinian refugee women in
Lebanon indicates that micro credit can often help raise a family’s income level
and improve the family’s ability to meet basic needs. However, the same study
points out that the majority of these loans neglect stereotypical social
relationships and roles, and rather than help to raise the level of women, they
place additional burdens on them. At the same time, it is possible that women
will withdraw from public and community life, and it is uncertain whether they will
have control over project income or the properties related to project work. And
most of these projects do not work toward changing men’s mores and
conventions or work to gain their approval for altering stereotypical roles,
leading to a doubling of the financial and psychological burden on women in the
family. Moreover, not all micro credit programs take into account training needs
in the fields of marketing and project management, and they have not sought to
change market mechanisms or laws governing women and men’s work or the
discrimination against Palestinians in general within the Lebanese market.24
Moreover, a report issued by the World
Bank indicates that the assistance
provided through the Community
Development Project (CDP)
(as an example of institutions that
support local authorities and small
villages) has helped to develop the
economic and social infrastructure of
the targeted population centers in a
tangible way, through implementation
of more than 200 projects in these
centers. Some achievements have also
been made in the area of rehabilitating
freed prisoners, which is to some
extent a groundbreaking, successful
undertaking. The deputy of the
Ministry of Prisonersß Affairs, during a
meeting that included various parties
connected to international funding,
pointed out the importance and role of
internationally-funded programs for
rehabilitating freed prisoners in training
International assistance has
failed to ensure the active
participation of marginalized
group in making decisions
related to them.
22 Rema Hammami, Palestinian Women: The Current Situation, Economy, and Work, Women’s Studies Programme,
Birzeit University, 1997.
23 Fatin, Loans in Palestine and Poor Women with Micro Projects: A Case Study.
24 Munira Khalil and Sana‘ Hussein, Micro Loans to Palestinian Women Refuges in Lebanon, Case Studies, Social Aid
Institute, 2004.
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and rehabilitating this segment of
Palestinian society, thereby enabling
them to reintegrate within their
communities. The European Union,
Switzerland, and the Italians have
funded most of these programs,
whereas the United States has
rejected numerous proposals to
fund such programs.
International assistance (along with
Palestinian institutions themselves) has
also failed to ensure the active
participation of marginalized groups in
making decisions related to them.
Perhaps the best example of this is seen
in the PNA’s general budget, which is
supposed to meet the needs of all
segments and groups within Palestinian
society. The manner in which the public
budget is prepared,  approved,
implemented, and monitored precludes
involvement by these groups. What is
disturbing in this regard is the failure of
the donor parties to ensure active
participation of these groups   during the
various budget stages through their
support for Palestinian official institutions
and NGOs. Donor  institutions have not
played a tangible role in heightening
marginalized groups’ awareness of their
rights and of the importance of the
budget in affecting their conditions. PNA
budgets have not been published except
in 2003 and 2004, and that was only
after substantial foreign pressure was
exerted on the PNA to take steps toward
reform. It is also worth noting an
example highlighting inadequate NGO
concern with the budget: One NGO in
Palestine held a workshop in late 2001
to discuss the general budget after the
Legislative Council had approved the
budget in the beginning of that year.
Conclusion
It may be said that international
assistance over the past ten years did
not lead to achievement of Palestinian
aspirations or fulfillment of Palestinian
needs.25  Doing so would have meant
empowering Palestinian society to attain
independence and self-determination
and laying the foundations for
sustainable human development. It
appears that the source of this
weakness in performance stems from
the main goals for providing assistance,
which are supporting the
Palestinian-Israeli political process and
giving it the required thrust by
bolstering the Palestinian economy,
eliminating tensions and violence in the
region and containing their causes, and
spreading democratic principles and
human rights among Palestinians.
These objectives have been pursued
at the expense of bringing about the real
development sought by Palestinians.
Indeed, this assistance may have
unintentionally exempted Israeli
authorities from assuming economic
and service-related burdens upon
reoccupation of most Palestinian areas
for most of the past three years, since
the assistance has enabled the PNA
institutions and agencies and
NGOs to continue providing basic
services to citizens.
At the same time, just because
provision of international assistance
has coincided with negative changes in
a number of economic and social
indicators in the Palestinian territories
does not mean that the assistance is
the direct cause for these changes
However, it may be ascertained from
the previous information that this
assistance has not provided a lasting
solution to the crises and negative
developments afflicting the Palestinian
territories during the past ten years. And
although international assistance has
brought some achievements, especially
25 Among those polled, 62 percent believe that the donor nations and funding institutions operate according to their own
political agendas, not within the framework of the needs and priorities of Palestinian society.
26 One World Bank report indicates that total assistance spent in the Palestinian territories between 1994 and 1996 amounted
to approximately $1.49 billion , whereas the extent of losses stemming from the Israeli closure policy during that same period
was approximately $2.8 billion.
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International assistance did
not lead to the achievement
of Palestinian aspirations or
fulfillment of Palestinian
needs.  Doing so would have
meant empowering
Palestinian society to attain
independence and
self-determination.
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in developing infrastructure, providing
basic social services, and helping to
strengthen marginalized groups, these
achievements were unable to bring
about actual empowerment of these
groups, as was seen with women.
Moreover, they did not utilize all means
at their disposal to help promote the
principle of community involvement for
marginalized groups in the general
budget and the Palestinian
development plan.
The above notwithstanding, the
effectiveness and impact of
international assistance did not fully
meet Palestinian aspirations  and
expectations. It did not develop the
Palestinian economy nor reduce its
vulnerability to and dependence on
external factors, as this assistance did
not limit the negative affects of the
Israeli occupation. Throughout the
course of the previous years, the
assistance failed to compensate for the
losses and damages inflicted on
Palestinian society and individuals by
Israeli practices and policies.26 Further,
this assistance did not succeed in
reducing Palestinian dependency on a
second external factor—the assistance
itself. Perhaps the best example of that
is the continuing reliance of the PNA’s
general budget in funding its
development expenditures with
external assistance, as has been the
case from the establishment of the PNA
through the present. Likewise,
numerous Palestinian ministries and
institutions depend on donor parties to
fund their activities, as exemplified by
the Legislative Council and the
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Conclusions and Recommendations ≠ Toward Empowering
Development
The 2004 Human Development Report analyzes the daily Palestinian reality and the roles of various
external and internal factors in influencing (negatively and positively) the Palestinian political and
development situation.  This concluding chapter attempts to offer a realistic and practical vision—through a
set of general and sector-specific recommendations—for what must be done in Palestine in order to emerge
from the current state to achieve the goals of Palestinian society. These goals include freedom from all
forms of tyranny and oppression by realizing the historical quest for independence and bringing
about empowering development to rebuild society and enable the Palestinian people to take part in
human civilization.
Chapter Six

The fragmented, disjointed
geographical reality which Israel
imposed on the Palestinian territories
and then reinforced by building the
Separation Wall has impacted
Palestinian society at many levels.  The
lack of geographical contiguity has left
its mark by weakening internal
Palestinian affairs as well as
Palestinian interaction with the outside
world. It has also negatively affected the
Palestinian social fabric of values,
culture, and modes of conduct, which
are not only linked to each other but also
with collective Arab values and culture
and the global human culture as well.
Internal and external causes precipitated
these outcomes, together with structural
flaws within institutions and
uncoordinated development at all levels.
The internal causes consist of three
main elements:
 Lack of a holistic development
vision: There is a lack of clearly
established and articulated Palestinian
priorities within a comprehensive
Palestinian development vision.
Similarly, no effective coordination
mechanism between the PNA and civil
society organizations exists. The
resulting administrative vacuum
strengthened the donorsß development
agenda and political influence, and
increased the dependence of civil
society organizations on donor funding
and expertise. The absence of the rule
of law, procedural transparency, and
democratic systems, as well as in the
absence of a culture supporting
rotation of power within PNA institutions
and civil society organizations
contributed to the degradation and
dependence of civil society.
 The concept of development
leadership has not taken root: The
PNA took a relatively negative view of
civil society organizations in the early
years of their governance. Most civil
Introduction society organizations wanted to
establish an integrated and democratic
relationship with the PNA and to
strengthen the bridges of trust between
them. However, centralized control
systems did not allow for full
cooperation between the two sides.
Further, the PNA’s vacillations in its
position towards the protection of civil
society organizations and their
involvement in decision-making reduced
performance levels on both sides.
 Mixed performance levels from civil
society organizations: Much of the
NGO community has an unhealthy level
of dependence on foreign donors for
development and service project
funding and in general, has failed to
place financial self-reliance on their list
of organizational priorities.  Neglect of
the concepts of self-sufficiency and
sustainability has resulted in a loss of
political independence and allowed
donors to take control of the direction
of Palestinian development.  Poor
coordination and cooperation at every
level of civil society, the lack of a
strategic development vision from the
PNA, and a general disregard of the
need for civil society organizations to
regularly and objectively critique their
own activities ≠ all these factors
contribute to mediocre performance
levels across the board within
this sector.
The external causes also consist of
three main elements:
 Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian territories: The
occupation is the single most important
factor for wasted empowerment
opportunities within Palestinian society.
It prevents any carefully structured and
purposeful development of society’s
potential, and inhibits any chance to
freely formulate a meaningful list of
national priorities.
 The role of the donors: The donor
nations, or any agencies that provide
The lack of geographical
contiguity has left its mark on
the performance of
Palestinian society.
Much of the NGO community
has an unhealthy level of
dependence on foreign
donors for development and
service project funding and in
general, has failed to place
financial self-reliance on their
list of organizational priorities.
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the Palestinians with in-kind assistance,
training, and other types of aid have
played opposing roles—one positive
and one negative. The positive role is
one in which they provide funding for
Palestinian projects, especially in the
areas of skill development and
capacity building. The negative role
shows in the poor coordination between
donor development programs and
policies at the macro level, in the
limited sensitivity they display toward
Palestinian priorities and political
aspirations, and in attempts by some
donors to impose their political agenda
through funding. As a result, the
relationship between Palestinian
society and the donor community is
totally out of balance, and the
Palestinians are in the weaker position.
The Palestinians are all but forced to
accept unfair political conditions as a
Box 6-1: The Empowerment Approach:  Awareness
and Active Practice (Praxis)
Many institutions have adopted the concept of empowerment as a basis for
their programs.  However, in most cases, they focus too heavily on
empowerment of the individual, and lose sight of the need to create a
comprehensive and inclusive vision of empowerment in order to truly
develop the society as a whole.
Empowerment is a concept with both individual and collective dimensions,
which not only involves community awareness and education, but also the
development of the social, economic, cultural, and political structures rooted
in the surrounding environment. Empowerment can only be achieved in the
context of a full merger between awareness and practice within an
environment conducive to growth. All development programs and projects—
whether they are at the stage of planning, implementation, or evaluation must
adhere to this fundamental truth ≠ awareness alone is not sufficient. All
awareness-raising programs must emphasize that the end result of the
empowerment process is the actual transformation of social structures  (the
market, international institutions, the law, the family) in order to enable
individuals to practice what they have been made aware of or been trained
in. Palestinian civic education programs are criticized for lack of an in-depth
understanding of the nature of the surrounding conditions and of the need to
create priorities and practical mechanisms for development, and
thus for having spent millions of dollars without achieving any tangible
benefit for society.
prerequisite for development support.  In
short, the lack of parity in the current
relationship between the Palestinian and
the donors has the potential to
negate any positive achievements
of  the development program over the
long-term.
 The United Nations Relief and
Works Agency: UNRWA plays an
important role in empowering the
Palestinians, especially refugees. Since
its establishment, it has provided
important services at the quantitative
level in the fields of education, health,
life skills development and vocational
training. However, its actions at the
qualitative level have more or less
fostered a culture of dependency. In
addition, UNRWA’s own reliance on
donations increases the vulnerability of
Palestinian society. If donors fall short
of their commitments to UNRWA’s
budget, UNRWA will become
paralyzed. Given the weakness of the
PNA and the inability of civil society to
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Some donors have attempted
to impose their political
agendas on Palestine
through funding.
Box 6-2: The Role of UNRWA for Palestinian Refugees: Aid or Empowerment?
UNRWA provides three main types of services to more than 4.1 million Palestinian refugees, 38 percent of
whom live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These services are: educational programs (comprising 58
percent of UNRWA’s budget and 72 percent of UNRWA employees), health programs (comprising 18
percent of the budget and 15 percent of employees), and relief and social services programs (comprising
9 percent of the budget and which benefit only 6 percent of all of the refugees). Some secondary programs
exist as well, such as provision of loans and rehabilitation of camp infrastructure.
Many questions and conflicting positions have arisen regarding UNRWA and its role and means of
operation. Every involved party attempts to depict UNRWA and its role in empowering and
rehabilitating refugees from the vantage point of its own agenda. The most important perspectives are
summarized as follows:
The refugees: The refugees view UNRWA as being of utmost importance from two angles: first, it brings
international recognition to the chronic nature of the refugee problem and the many stateless Palestinians
in refuge, and, second, because of the assistance it provides them in the fields of health, education, social
services, and rehabilitation.
The refugees are highly sensitive to any attempt to reduce UNRWA services or abolish UNRWA’s role,
which they see as a move to bring an end to the refugee issue and negate the right of return, eventually
paving the way for them to be forced to assimilate into their host countries. Empowering the refugees and
improving their living conditions is an issue that usually carries negative connotations among most
refugees, who see it as a guise to force them to give up the right of return in exchange for assimilation and
financial compensation.
Israel: Israel has two conflicting perspectives of UNRWA. On one hand, it views UNRWA as a stabilizing
force and thinks the agency can facilitate assimilation of refugees into their host communities by creating
career and housing opportunities for them.  On the other hand, Israel accuses UNRWA of inciting the
Palestinian refugees to hostile behavior against Israeli forces and claims that UNRWA actually encourages
Palestinian resistance efforts.
The Israelis also maintain that hatred of Israel is taught in UNRWA-funded schools, and that UNRWA
school administrators do not require that the concepts of tolerance and understanding are made part of the
curriculum.   Israel would like to see UNRWA function as an institution created by the international
community to serve its own interests; to abolish the refugees‘ dreams of return by making them
comfortable and content within the host countries.
The host nations: UNRWA is in the good graces of all of the nations hosting the refugees. These nations
see the presence of UNRWA as a reflection of international recognition that the refugee problem is
ongoing. They demand that UNRWA’s work continue until the refugee issues are resolved. Further, UNRWA
bears the burden of providing basic services to the Palestinian refugees in these nations.
The international position: Most nations believe that UNRWA helps ensure stability in the Middle East
region, especially given its role in the absence of a political resolution to the refugee issue. These nations
see UNRWA’s work with the refugees as diffusing potentially explosive social and political crises. UNRWA’s
prestige in this capacity correlates directly to the size of the donations that these nations give the agency
annually. These nations believe that UNRWA is service-oriented and apolitical, even though the agency’s
funding is nothing more than a reflection of international will, tied at its core to political considerations.
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This report calls on all of
society‘s institutions to be
guided by the empowerment
approach as they develop
future programs and to
integrate their work within the
community to deepen the
collective impact of their work.
perform UNRWA’s tasks, Palestinian
society’s vulnerability to humanitarian
or political disaster is dangerously
heightened.
The Palestinian people strive
to rid themselves of
occupation, to strengthen
their national fabric, and to
firmly establish their presence
on Palestinian land.
Section One: Empowerment, From Reaction to Action
To bring the comprehensive
concept of empowerment to
fruition requires vision, a wise
and legitimate leadership,
well-guided institutions, and
determination.
Section Two: Empowerment in Government
Institutions - Summary and Recommendations
6-2-1 The Empowerment
Assets of  Government
Institutions
Much of the data, reports, and
practical experience point to the
critical importance of the role of
institutions in many of the complex
functions of society ≠ especially those
tied to the processes of development,
empowerment, emancipation, and
liberation.  The importance of
government institutions (i.e., PNA
institutions in the Palestinian case) in
terms of empowerment stems from their
control over a number of material and
moral empowering assets that are not
controlled by other institutions in the
society. These include:
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The Palestinian people strive to rid
themselves of occupation, to strengthen
their national fabric, and to firmly
establish their presence on Palestinian
land, rebuilding the Palestinian nation
and society on sound, humanitarian
foundations. Within this context,
empowerment means strengthening the
internal abilities of Palestinian society to
regain its sovereignty over Palestinian
land and to function as a  developing,
cohesive community with a distinct
national identity, set of values and culture.
In addition, empowerment means prepar-
ing for viable and sustained interaction
between the Palestinian people and their
geographical surrounds, as well as
activating and developing all of the
energies and resources stored in the
heart of society—with its individuals,
institutions, and positive values—in the
interest of accomplishing its historical
quest for self-determination and building
an independent state.
To achieve this, empowerment must be
transformed from a defensive activity
to a proactive means of sustaining the
collective Palestinian will, to promote
continued internal capacity building and
to finally end the occupation of
Palestine.   In this framework, the tasks
of development of society and its
institutions and above all else the
Palestinian people are the central tasks
of empowerment. In summary, the
conditions of the occupation,
geographical division, and cultural and
social fragmentation make
empowerment a critical matter in the
present Palestinian situation as well as
in the future.
To bring the comprehensive concept of
empowerment to fruition requires
vision, a wise and legitimate leadership,
well-guided institutions, and
determination. Toward this end, the
report offers a number of
interconnected recommendations,
which consolidate the findings
presented in its chapters. The
recommendations all reflect the  guiding
theme of the report - empowerment. It
must be perfectly clear at this stage that
virtually every sector of Palestinian
society will benefit from further
discussions and elaboration of the
findings and conclusions offered in the
PHDR. This report calls on all of
society‘s institutions to be guided by the
empowerment approach as they
develop future programs and to
integrate their work within the
community to deepen the collective
impact of their work.
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Point of Light 53: The Experience of the Al-Aqsa Intifada Emergency
Committee in the Nablus Governorate
In contrast to the weak empowerment performance of most official institutions in confronting the difficult
circumstances besetting the Palestinian territories, there is an important example that offers crucial
empowerment lessons and experience: the experience of the Al-Aqsa Intifada Emergency Committee in the
Nablus governorate. The Committee pioneered new methods to confront occupation practices.  Its work
highlights the power of joint efforts and coordination of community activities, and it succeeded in raising general
readiness levels within society to combat challenges imposed by the occupation. This experience is summarized
as follows:
 In response to a call from a host of social, economic, and political bodies, the Emergency Committee was
formed in October 2000. It brought together representatives of 17 institutions operating in the city, taking care to
include national, NGO, and private sector institutions and not governmental ministries—in an attempt to avoid the
imposition of bureaucracy and centralized decision-making on the committee‘s work.
 The impetus for forming this committee, other than the escalation of aggressive Israeli action, was the citizen’s
belief that existing community support mechanisms were inadequate and ineffective.  Lack of funds, failure to
objectively identify the needs of citizens and needy families and a collection of groups simultaneously trying to
assume responsibility for the tasks of support and assistance resulted in a general state of confusion and
redundancy of work.
 The Community Action Center was formed, from which a group of task committees emerged, including: the
Committee on Children, the Committee on Women, the Committee for Boycotting Israeli Goods, the Media
Committee, and the Grassroots (or Neighborhood) Committees. These committees provided support and
compensation to affected citizens, bridged the gap in health care services, set up employment projects, and
coordinated with the rest of the governorates to ensure integration and to set down priorities with regards to support.
 To achieve these goals, eight specialized branch committees were formed, including: the Emergency
Committee for Relief and Assistance Provision, the Emergency Health Committee, the Committee on Buildings
and Damage Assessment, the Emergency Committee for Employing and Supporting Workers, the Agricultural
Committee, the Road and Street Committee, the Committee on Projects and Resource Development, the
Financial Committee, and the Media Committee. All of these committees were formed so that membership
included national, NGO, and private sector institutions relevant to the committee’s work. The committees
operated with professional management structures and under the principle of dividing work according to area
of specialty and expertise.
 In general, the Intifada Emergency Committee achieved important community-based successes by
supporting citizens and strengthening their resolve, and by mitigating the impact of the Israeli aggression
measures. The Nablus experience was exemplary and carries important lessons for the empowerment
process. The Palestinian people can learn from this model for action to develop mechanisms for confronting
the occupation, standing firmly, and act directly and effectively in response to citizen’s needs.
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The most important lesson
learned from analysis of the
initiatives incorporated within
this report (in addition to
others that were not included)
is that they form the core of
the development process.
 Resources: Government institutions
control all types of material, human, and
symbolic resources needed for
formulating and implementing the
desired empowerment policies.
 Legitimacy: As part of the existing
political, economic, and social
establishment—given expression
through the PNA—they enjoy the
political and moral legitimacy that is
derived from the electoral process and
public mandate. In this way, they are
distinguished from NGO organizations
and private institutions.
 Power: The fact that government
organizations possess both resources
and legitimacy embodies them with
power:  the power to create and amend
laws which establish the choices
available to society and influence their
systems of values and culture.  This
power can be used to include or exclude
social groups in the processes of
development, as well as to marginalize
or discriminate.  Government institutions
also have wide latitude in their role to
enhance the quality of governance, to
promote participation and creativity, and
Box 6-3: 101 Points of Light (Lessons Learnt)
By highlighting individual and group initiatives, the report team accomplished
the following interrelated goals:
 To encourage the leaders of initiatives to continue their creative,
innovative, and determined efforts by praising the initiatives and publishing
their stories in the PHDR.
 To re-galvanize society, including community members possessing initiative,
by creating a sense of optimism and ending the isolation among those taking
initiative, who, over recent years, came to feel that they were alone in their
struggle to change conditions and take positive action on behalf of society.
 To affirm that the Palestinian people are a living, proactive, creative people,
who will not stand paralyzed before tragedy, but rather will become active
and proactive, creating and innovating in spite of hardships. By doing so, we
affirm the universality of Palestinian society, and its central goal of ending
the occupation.  We recognize the humanitarian process of resistance, boldly
undertaken by this society and its concern for the preservation of social,
institutional and cultural life.
 The most important lesson learned from analysis of the initiatives
incorporated within this report (in addition to others that were not included) is
that they form the core of the development process. If the structural factors
limiting their capacity to become integrated, community-based,
independent, and interactive efforts were removed, Palestinians would have
a real opportunity to build a modern, developed society. Bringing these
initiatives together to form a collective effort requires a human development
vision and new institutional mechanisms to aggregate and coordinate efforts
toward realizing the goals of Palestinian society.
 Decision-makers and planners can greatly benefit from these individual
and group initiatives in all corners of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Close
examination of these initiatives affirms that the expertise of local society—its
individuals and groups—is a rich, time-tested resource for the realization of
our national objectives.
Close examination of these
initiatives affirms that the
expertise of local society its
individuals and groups is a
rich, time-tested resource for
the realization of our national
objectives.
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to encourage the practices of
transparency and accountability in
society as a whole.
 Role in liberation and
state-       building: The processes of
comprehensive and sustained
empowerment in Palestine are difficult
and complex and, given that the tasks
of liberation and state-building are
intertwined, all resources must be
mobilized to achieve the goals of
ending the occupation and building the
Palestinian state.
 The importance of the principles of
democracy: Linking the empowerment
process to government institutions is an
early investment in the creation of a
democratic state. This linkage brings
the institutions themselves in touch with
social reality, thereby enabling them to
become more effective agents of
change. This, in turn, bolsters their
legitimacy and permits them to
safeguard the process of the
democratic transformation of society
into the future.
6-2-1 Conclusions and
Recommendations
 Contextual factors associated with the
role and performance of PNA
institutions, whether related to the
internal environment (such as the
political system, socio-economic status,
and prevailing culture) or the external
environment (such as Israel’s influence,
international political developments,
and donor funding), significantly affect
the ability of Palestinian institutions
empower society.  Internal
environmental factors that significantly
impact the empowerment process and
that should be seriously addressed
include: the interconnectedness of the
task of national liberation and
community development and, the
related challenge of identifying
appropriate goals and mechanisms that
serve both ends. Several negative
aspects in the Palestinian institutional
arena must also be addressed, such as
the centralized approach to
decision-making and initiative-taking,
poor planning, weak systems of
transparency and accountability,
situational application of the law,
individualism at the expense of
institutionalization, an emphasis on
personal gains at the expense of the
public interest, and discouragement
of professionalism in Palestinian
institutions.
 Major external elements include the
near total vulnerability to Israel
(especially economically) and the
climate of the international community
turning against the Palestinian
liberation struggle, as well as increased
reliance on external assistance,
resulting in dependency and lost ability
to carry out independent, purposeful,
and resolute planning in response to the
people’s desires and right to
independence and a decent life.
 Undoubtedly, the course of the past
four years has exposed many
weaknesses, flaws, and internal
shortcomings within PNA institutions.
Conditions have laid bare the
weaknesses inherent in the structures,
performance, visions, goals, and
strategies of a number of these
institutions.   These weaknesses are
reflected negatively in their policies,
plans, programs, initiatives, modes of
interaction with the public, and ability to
actively respond to challenges. They
greatly limit empowerment potential at
the national and community levels. Of
course, the impact of the occupation
makes it impossible for any institution,
sector, or group to work alone.
Therefore, mechanisms to harmonize
the efforts of governmental sectors and
grassroots initiatives must be created in
order to integrate efforts to
strengthen the collective ability to
endure and to resist.
The fact that government
organizations possess both
resources and legitimacy
embodies them with power.
Linking the empowerment
process to government
institutions is an early
investment in the creation of
a democratic state.
The impact of the occupation
makes it impossible for any
institution, sector, or group to
work alone.
The private sector possesses
many types of skills and
expertise that could be of
benefit in managing many of
the economic projects and
activities currently managed
by the PNA.
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 The nature of relations between the
PNA and its institutions must be
examined, as well as the way in which
it interacts with the private sector and
NGO community. The role of these
sectors must be reinforced and optimal
use made of their capacities, potentials,
and resources. Building a new relation-
ship based on partnership and balance
between these parties would spare the
PNA and its institutions from having to
provide some services that NGOs can
provide, perhaps more effectively and
at lower cost. Among these, for
example, are health services (first aid
services) provided by organizations in
the health field. Moreover, the private
sector possesses many types of skills
and expertise that could be of benefit
in managing many of the economic
projects and activities currently man-
aged by the PNA.
 The work of institutions must be
coordinated at the sector level, so as
to prevent repetition and redundancy in
projects and activities. It is also
necessary to strengthen regional
coordination, especially between the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, while
attending to the contextual specifics of
each region with the goal of
encouraging local initiative.
 Although political institutions have been
able to preserve their existence
(in national and symbolic terms), they
not adequately and effectively met the
challenges posed to them at the program
and policy level.  They offer no vision or
strategy to manage the many aspects
of resistance to Israeli occupation, nor
have they provided guidance on how to
build communities from within in an
effective and productive manner. Rather
than assume the initiative, they often
merely react to developments, especially
those developments connected to the
Intifada and its local and external
consequences, causing the public to
lose trust in them. The lack of a clear
relationship between the presidency, the
prime ministership, and the security
agencies, and between all of these
institutions and the Legislative Council
has reduced the public’s trust in all of
them. Thus, they struggle with a reduced
capacity to develop and manage
empowering policies, initiatives, and
legislation needed to strengthen
people’s steadfastness on the land in the
face of Israeli occupation policies while
at the same time responding effectively
to various community needs.
 Service delivery institutions, especially
in the fields of health care, education,
social affairs, and labor, have
demonstrated greater success than
others in terms of sustaining their
services under the present
circumstances. However, work is still
needed to increase the number and
types of services and to expand their
coverage (horizontally and vertically) in
order to reach all areas, social groups,
fields, and levels.
 In the health care field, the number of
centers, clinics, and specialized health
units must be increased, and the
quality of their services improved, with
a focus on rural areas. More medical
specialists in all fields are required,
especially in those areas in which
expertise is completely lacking.  Primary
and preventive health care services are
also in need of attention.
 Educational institutions must be
revamped, especially in terms of the
quality of the knowledge provided, the
skill level of its labor force, and the way
in which subject matter is presented and
taught, with an emphasis on the unique
nature of the Palestinian context.
Moreover, there is a need for qualitative
transformation in the curricula and
educational bureaucracy, and the prob-
lem of violence in schools must be
addressed.
 The Ministry of Labor and the
Ministry of Social Affairs bear the
largest burden of responsibility to
Educational institutions must
be revamped, especially in
terms of the quality of the
knowledge provided and the
skill level of its labor force,
Results-oriented strategies
include: developing
employment offices and
creating and activating
training programs.
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prepare society to confront the
challenges of unemployment and
poverty and the host of social problems
that stem from these issues.
A comprehensive national strategy
must be created to combat
unemployment, poverty and the
resulting decline in the quality of life for
all Palestinian citizens.   The decline in
the quality of life shows in decreased
levels of health and education services,
the chaos and disorder that result from
a drop in security levels, and a growing
sense of futility and alienation among
wide sectors of people who have been
marginalized for years. In order to
achieve results on the ground, precise,
regular, and comprehensive data must
be provided with regard to areas of high
unemployment and economic sectors
that have high job creation potential in
order to effectively allocate resources.
Some results-oriented strategies
include: developing employment
offices; creating and activating training
programs; promulgating and imple-
menting the Palestinian Employment
Fund Draft Law ; and refocusing
attention on the agricultural sector
through land reform and improved
agricultural services, as well as
activating the role of agricultural
lending institutions and banks in
providing support to farmers.
 The Ministry of Social Affairs, in
particular, must give more attention to
development institutions engaged in
long-term, sustainable initiatives—and
not merely by providing relief and
temporary services. It must pay more
attention to the weaker segments of the
population, especially children, women,
and the elderly, by responding to their
needs, supporting them, and
protecting them emotionally, socially, and
legally. It is critical that the initiatives
adopted be inclusive, balanced, and
long-term, so as to make it more likely that
they will truly mitigate the occupation’s
negative effects on Palestinians’ lives at
present and in the future.
 Local councils must be supported and
strengthened in order to help them to
reinforce the public’s resolve and
confidence at the local and national
levels and to better serve their
constituents within the community.
Supportive measures for the local
councils include: continuing to hold free
and fair elections and ending the policy
of political appointment of their
leadership, bringing a halt to unjustified
interference by the central authority in
their affairs, expanding the powers and
mandates of local councils, and
providing the financial and technical
support necessary for local
development and progress.
 Coordination and cooperation between
local councils and other relevant
institutions is crucial, as it makes it
possible for the local councils to provide
their services in a beneficial and
effective manner (in terms of quality,
expenditure, and modes of delivery).
Although instances of coordination and
cooperation can be found in between
some local councils, it is generally absent
or limited to delivery of certain services,
and fails to address general goals, plans,
strategies, or financial and administrative
considerations. Cooperation and
coordination at the local level is especially
important for Palestinians if they are to
conserve their resources and
successfully counter the destructive
measures of the Israeli occupation.
Finally, it is clear that the empowerment
process will remain moribund unless
political institutions conduct a
comprehensive reassessment and
review of the Intifada’s consequences
and implications for the future.  The
second Intifada brought one era (i.e.,
the Oslo era) entirely to an end and has
advanced the Palestinians into a new
era. This new era requires understand-
ing and creative management as
Palestinians work to learn political
lessons, increase their level of
self-reliance, reduce dependency on
Development initiatives must
pay more attention to the
weaker segments of the
population, especially
children, women, and
the elderly.
Palestinian government must
continue to hold free and fair
elections and end the policy
of political appointment.
The Palestinian people must
restore and rebuild their
society from within on rational
and participatory bases.
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Israel and reliance on the donor
countries, and restore and rebuild their
society from within on rational and
participatory bases, focusing on the
legal and institutional aspects as well
as social and economic issues.
Section Three: Empowerment and Civil Society Summary
and Recommendations
The current level of
performance of the vast
majority of both modern and
traditional institutions remains
below the necessary and
expected level.
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Although Palestinian civil society
organizations have made great progress
in terms of experience, activities, and
delivery of various services, they still
have work to do in order to become fully
empowered themselves, and to facilitate
the empowerment of Palestinian
society.  At present, the extent to which
they rely on donor funding suggests that
this is a situation they will not be able to
extricate themselves from any time
soon.  In fact, the concern is that the
level of dependence will actually grow if
action is not taken.  In this regard, civil
society organizations face two types of
problems: contextual problems that
prevent them from delivering services to
their constituents, and problems related
to their inability to critique their own
performance levels and the failure to
work together on joint actions for the
common good.
Therefore, emphasis must be placed on
the practices of democracy and
development. As two major
mechanisms of empowerment,
democracy and development are
issues of utmost concern within
Palestinian society.  Democracy and
development bring with them collective
and individual empowerment through
increased involvement in decision-mak-
ing and monitoring decision
implementation, and accountability.
According to this criterion, the current
level of performance of the vast
majority of both modern and traditional
institutions remains below the
necessary and expected level.
The main recommendations
in this regard are:
 Return attention to and reactivate
Palestinian Liberation Organization
institutions, and build a national
leadership capable of strengthening
communication between the
Palestinian people, reinforcing the
fabric of society, and ending the
current fragmentation.
 Create advocacy groups composed
of public interest groups, trade unions,
chambers of commerce and social
services providers to improve the
general performance of government,
especially in the interest of
strengthening the independence
of the judiciary and adherence to
the rule of law.
 Guide and reinforce plurality; expand
the frameworks of democracy,
accountability, and transparency; and
involve civil society organizations in the
decision-making process.
 Encourage political movements and
parties to improve their performance and
ground that performance in firm
democratic practice, doing away with
power centered on the individual and
internal conflicts so as to transcend
politics and rebuild and modernize society.
 Lobby the PNA to cooperate with civil
society organizations and to assume
the role of organizer in the
modernization process.
 Promote, enhance, and create
linkages in the relationships between
different social institutions on two
levels. The first level is the relationship
between traditional community
institutions and modern civil society
organizations, where links between
them should take the direction of
dialectic interaction leading to soundly
guided modernization. The second level
relates to promoting networking and
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coordination among civil society
organizations themselves on sector,
inter-sector, and geographic bases in
order to promote their role in
development and empowerment.
 Foster a smooth transition from the
ways of the past to modernization
without disrupting the functions of
society. This requires formulating a
suitable transition policy based on
coordinating the roles of the PNA and
civil society organizations in
accordance with a development
perspective created and monitored by
official and civil society organizations.
 Intensify training geared toward
building the capacity of PNA institutions
and civil society organizations at
three levels:
- First, equip civil society organizations
Section Four:  Empowerment and International
Funding ≠ Summary and Recommendations
with advanced capabilities in modern
management such as identifying vision;
determining general goals; developing
strategies, programs, and budgets;
monitoring and conducting impact
assessment; promoting the use of
feedback in reviewing strategies and
programs; reporting; decision making;
accountability; and transparency.
- Second, encourage participation in
crafting and updating a flexible
development vision (officially and by
NGOs) and lobbying to direct the
funding from various sources in favor
of the development vision and
development activities that support
perseverance as an issue of survival
and political necessity.
- Third, lobby donors to obtain their
recognition and firm support of the
Palestinian development vision.
Create advocacy groups
composed of public interest
groups, trade unions,
chambers of commerce and
social services providers to
improve the general
performance of government.
Implementation of the PHDR
recommendations would
maximize the Palestinian
people’s potential to benefit
from this assistance as they
continue their efforts to
achieve comprehensive,
sustainable human
development.
The lack of planning and co-
ordination in managing the
assistance has given the do-
nors a wide margin and sig-
nificant flexibility in setting
expenditure priorities.
International assistance has
achieved a degree of success
in empowering some poor
and marginalized groups.
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In view of the information presented in
this report, it is possible to derive a
number of conclusions on the degree to
which international assistance helps to
hasten the Palestinian development
process in general, and to empower
Palestinian individuals and society as a
whole. In order to mobilize assistance
for empowerment of the individual and
development of Palestinian society, a set
of recommendations was formulated,
which, if implemented, would maximize
the Palestinian people’s potential to
benefit from this assistance as they
continue their efforts to achieve
comprehensive, sustainable human
development.
 Available data on international
assistance indicate that it has been
largely influenced, in terms of quantity
and quality, by the extent of progress
made in the peace process. The main
objective of the donor community is to
fund the peace process and create the
conditions for its success. This concept
was recently confirmed by a 2004 World
Bank report assessing the economic
implications of the Israeli disengagement
plan from Gaza. The questions remain:
What if the peace process, based on the
assumption of the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state in
accordance with United Nations
resolutions, is ended? What options are
available to the donors and the
Palestinians in this case?
 Despite the relatively large size of
international assistance to the
Palestinian people, poor coordination
of the planning, management and
implementation of the programs and
projects funded by this assistance has
weakened their impact on beneficiaries.
Systems established by the PNA
institutions responsible for fiscal
oversight and program management of
donor funds are haphazard and
overlapping and lack clear priorities and
conditions for the disbursement of
funds.  These institutions are also put
in the position of having to compete with
the NGO community for donor funding,
despite the dissimilarities between their
respective missions and mandates.
These conditions have resulted in the
squandering of large amounts of donor
resources, as projects with similar goals
and target groups are undertaken
simultaneously by more than one
organization with the funds of separate
donors, with clear examples of
redundancy to be found in the fields of
human rights, women‘s empowerment,
democracy and reform.  Ample
capacity and need exists within civil
society organizations and PNA
institutions at all levels for donor
projects in hundreds of areas, with
makes the duplication of effort and
redundancy of project types all the more
regrettable. The weakly managed
donor programs also absorb a good
percentage of already scarce
Palestinian resources, in terms of
human and financial capital, thus
diverting those resources from
domestic development initiatives. In
fact, coordination between donor
agencies is little better than
coordination within the Palestinian
establishment.
 The lack of planning and coordination
in managing the assistance, along with
the intense competition for funding
among most official institutions and
NGOs, has given the donors a wide
margin and significant flexibility in setting
expenditure priorities to best fit their
political, economic, and social agendas
(rather than the agendas of Palestinian
institutions). In this regard, the
pursuit of self-interest is as
prevalent among the donors as it is
among  Palestinian institutions.
 In spite of some achievements,
particularly in the development of
infrastructure and provision of basic
social services made possible through
international assistance, such
assistance has not mitigated the
negative effects of the political and
security situation. Moreover, the
international assistance has not
improved levels of self-reliance within
Palestinian society, nor has it
significantly increased opportunities for
self-development. For no matter how
much aid money is given, or how well
the Palestinians succeed in managing
that money, it will never achieve its true
goals of individual and collective
empowerment until the root cause of
social distress is removed permanently
— the Israeli occupation.
 In spite of some instances of
expanded community participation in
the management of some assistance
programs and projects, the number of
these examples remains limited and
must be considered the exception
rather than the rule.
 International assistance has achieved
a degree of success in empowering
some poor and marginalized groups, as
evidenced in the microfinance programs
targeting women and limited income
families, the emergency relief programs,
and job creation projects. Unfortunately,
however, the needs of these groups
have still not been fully met, as the vast
majority remains mired in the cycles of
unemployment and poverty.   In
addition, these programs are criticized
for failing to establish links between
immediate relief efforts and longer-term
development programs that contribute
to sustainable empowerment.
The main recommendations
to strengthen the impact of
international funding are:
 Institutionalize the coordination of
donor aid management among official
PNA institutions and civil society
organizations. A permanent coordination
council governed by a clear development
strategy and headed by the Ministry of
Planning would be a significant first step.
It membership would be drawn from other
ministries directly involved with foreign
A permanent coordination
council for international aid
must be established.
Suitable mechanisms must
be created to insure
incorporation of the proposed
coordination council’s
development plans within the
PNA‘s annual general
budget.
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Community participation
m u s t  b e  p r o m o t e d  i n
formulating policies and
prepar ing development
and emergency plans.
donors, the private sector and the NGO
community.   The task of this council
would be to develop regular and
emergency plans for the effective
implementation of programs funded by
international aid and to construct a
database of all the projects and programs
underway or under consideration to
prevent duplication and to achieve
economies of scale.
 The Ministry of Finance and Ministry
of Planning need to create suitable
mechanisms to ensure incorporation of
the proposed coordination council’s
development plans within the PNA’s
annual general budget in order to
transform these plans into concrete
action synchronized with the PNA’s
general financial policies and
development directions.
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Box 6-4: Success Factors for Community Initiatives (Lessons Learnt)
Careful examination of the successful initiatives presented in this report, as well as others that were studied,
demonstrates that there are success factors behind these pioneering experiences, especially the group
initiatives among them. The most important of these factors include:
 There is a collective effort, a unified purpose, distance from individual and special interest agendas and
independence from centralized control of the project and its funding. These characteristics serve to combine
energies and to create a situation wherein the public embraces the initiative.
 All involved institutions are committed to participation and cooperation.
 There is coordination and integration between the various bodies active on the governorate level, thereby
preventing duplication of effort or funding and facilitating the fundraising process.
 Partisan political representation is avoided, and the focus is on bringing the various sectors together, thereby
contributing to greater public acceptance of the initiative and its activities.
 There is continuous follow-up and assessment of the projects and programs that are implemented, helping to
correct mistakes and reinforce the positive aspects of the experience.
 Those carrying out the initiatives have credibility as well as the social, economic, and political backing to
enable them to perform as effective leaders.
 All project activities are documented and archived, in order to create a body of institutional experience and to
create professional systems of organization and management.
 Local funding is available to complement foreign aid, in order to invest the local community more completely
in the project.
Among the most important lessons learned through these experiences are:
 The importance of coordination between the various sectors (official, NGO, public, and private);
 The importance of balance between institutionalized responsibility and grassroots initiative, achieved by
utilizing available community resources and expanding public involvement;
 The importance of working in the context of decentralized mechanisms and procedures, giving those in the
field the authority to adapt their work as conditions require in order to increase the preparedness level and thus
the capacity to better counter occupation measures; and,
 The paramount importance of relying on internal abilities rather than external support so as to improve performance
and increase community readiness to strengthen the resistance and shore up the community-building process.
 In terms of coordination, the donors
must create their own body to
coordinate among them so as to avoid
duplication of funding.  The donor
coordination council will work in tandem
and under the oversight of the
Palestinian national coordination
council to manage the foreign aid program.
 PNA institutions must create strategic
work plans for the implementation of
international assistance that connect
relief to development.  It may be
beneficial in this context to focus on
infrastructure projects and projects
involving investment in education, as
both form the foundations of
Palestinian development over the long
term. It is also recommended to direct
investment toward the agricultural and
handicraft industries that serve the
local markets and which have significant
potential in terms of job creation under
the current political conditions.
 Promote community participation in
formulating policies and preparing
development and emergency plans by
assigning a larger role to the local
councils in the management of
international assistance projects, and
establishing support committees for
local councils to carry out this task. It is
also essential to create the tools
necessary to ensure wider grassroots
and public involvement in developing
the PNA’s draft general budget prior to
its ratification by the Legislative
Council. Civil society organizations may
play a large participatory role in this
regard, in cooperation with the Ministry
of Finance and the Legislative Council.
 There is a need to support the small
and micro loan programs that target
limited income groups and owners of
small businesses who are unable to
secure credit from traditional lending
programs offered through the banks.
Development experts agree that
well-managed microfinance programs
contribute greatly to the long-term
empowerment of the individual and to
The most important proposals
of this report include
reinforcement of the concept
and status of social
movements, which form
linkages between the
individual, the group and the
institution.
the collective development of society,
and not merely to short-term income
improvement.  Microfinance has the
potential to play an important role in the
expanding informal economy in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, particularly
given that the informal economy has the
capacity to  absorb a considerable
amount of surplus labor—and
especially unskilled labor—in the
local market.
 Finally, it should be reiterated that
international assistance comes with no
long-term guarantees:  donors can
reduce or eliminate their contributions at
their own discretion and with little
warning.  For this reason, international
assistance must not be made an integral
component of the Palestinian
development strategy.   Rather, it must
be viewed as a valuable yet unreliable
resource — to be optimized while
available even as Palestinians work to
end their dependence on it.
Report Conclusion:
Conditions and Essential
Components of Empowerment
Confronting problems resulting from Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian territories
means preventing deterioration of the
fabric of the Palestinian society,
preserving its national aspirations, and
ensuring its survival. The Israeli
occupation focuses its efforts on the
fragmentation of Palestinian land
and⁄disintegration of the Palestinian social
and cultural fabric as a means of
controlling Palestiniansß lives.  Therefore,
the confrontation imposed on Palestinians
in terms of their social unity, values, and
behavior is determined by two factors:
Israel’s technical and military supremacy,
and Palestinian resistance in the
comprehensive meaning of the term.
Since parity in terms of power is not
attainable in the foreseeable future, the
Palestinians must draw upon the strength
and potential of their society in order to
force an Israeli withdrawal from
Palestinian land.
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International assistance
comes with no long-term
guarantees.
The Palestinians must draw
upon the strength and
potential of their society in
order to force an Israeli
withdrawal from Palestinian
land.
Professional leadership must
possess the means of
guidance and control and will
be entrusted with the
responsibility for
modernization, planning and
follow-up.
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All of this requires an agreed upon
development perspective that can
guide the performance of all society’s
institutions, as well as a resolute,
persistent, and professional leadership
possessing the means of guidance and
control and which is entrusted with the
responsibility for modernization,
planning, and follow-up. They must act
within a framework of a general national
accord between official institutions and
civil society organizations as well as
within a human and national
development vision that has a clear
purpose and direction and can ensure
effective utilization of all society’s
resources. This may be achieved
through dialogue between the PNA, a
wide network of civil society
organizations, and the private sector
within⁄the context of a strategy of
integrated, complementary action. The
major elements of empowerment, as
well as the most important proposals
of this report, include reinforcement of
the concept and status of “social
movements,” which forms the linkages
between the individual, the group, and
the institution. Social movements must
engage with a shared vision that
embraces political change, with its wide
range of influence, and social change,
stressing the need for participation by
all segments of society on the basis of
equal rights and strengthening of the
capacities of groups such as women,
youth, and children, who are still
subjected to rights discrimination
under the law and within the
prevailing culture.
Due to the changes wrought within
Palestinian institutions by the
consequences of the Intifada, along
with the multiple, interconnected
development priorities these institutions
share, it is not easy to establish a clear
governing framework based on precise
development and empowerment
principles for them to follow. This fact
notwithstanding, an effort must be
made to define a clear institutional
Defining the vision remains a
fundamental prerequisite for
success.
Empowerment has two
parallel dimensions, national
liberation and human growth.
vision of development and
empowerment. For defining the vision
remains a fundamental prerequisite for
its success, along with elaborating its
goals and its strategies. The
comprehensive Palestinian
development vision must reflect the
aspirations of the people and in
corporate internal and external
developments—thereby rendering that
vision sound, legitimate, and
sustainable. This clearly defined vision
(along with its goals and strategies)
would increase the effectiveness of the
work of our national institutions, and
ensure coordination of that work with
Palestinian development priorities,
reducing or eliminating all together the
redundancy, failures and false starts
that have plagued development efforts
for decades.
In order for Palestinian institutions to
embrace an empowerment vision—and
thereby initiate and manage
empowerment processes within the
specifics of the Palestinian context,
taking into consideration both the
national liberation and human
development dimensions—the
following important considerations must
be taken into account:
 Empowerment has two parallel
dimensions, national liberation and
human growth. The first requires
mobilization of resources and
capacities to reinforce people’s
endurance and enable them to stand
firm on their land, to resist
fragmentation policies imposed by the
Israeli occupation, to create effective
means of resistance not viewed as
terrorism by the world community, and
to successfully and effectively manage
political negotiations with Israel. The
second dimension is the human
dimension, which requires mobilization
of resources to create a climate
conducive to the free exercise of
individuals ß potential and skills,
encouraging a spirit of initiative among
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them, and protecting their basic rights
and freedoms. Institutions must be
supported by a broad and
well-organized public base in order to
maximize solidarity and to protect their
achievements in the areas of
empowerment and resistance.
 The empowerment vision should
emanate from recognition of the
negative effects of the Israeli
occupation, while also seriously
addressing our own internal obstacles
and challenges.
 Ensuring the polit ical wil l and
necessary resources to convert
development-empowerment visions
into clear, defined goals.
 Addressing empowerment as both a
concept and a system of processes built
on a professional foundation that does
not tolerate disorganization, confusion,
internal conflicts, factionalism, or
pressure from the donor agencies.
 Ensuring that the development
agenda is compatible with priorities of
Palestinian society by involving society
and all its different sectors, and
especially the private and NGO
sectors—in setting the agenda. The
empowerment process is an effort built
on the common will of everyday
people and reflecting a harmony of
purpose, born of active public dialogue.
This goes along with attending once
more to the development role of
Palestinian individuals, viewing them as
active partners in the empowerment
process—intellectually and
practically—rather than powerless and
visionless recipients of aid.
 The clear and straightforward
communication of development and
empowerment visions should not be
limited to the higher management
levels, but should reach the
intermediate and lower levels as well.
 Empowerment should be seen as a
cumulative and sustainable process
that brings together institutions and
organizations from every sector rather
than as a temporary, separate, and
independent process.
 Palestine and Hope for the Future
Recognizing the importance of the
recommendations above, the real
starting point for empowerment and
development in the Palestinian
territories rests in the Palestinian
people’s realization of self-determination
and the establishment of a sovereign
state. If this supreme goal were
achieved, Palestinian society could
move forward in its embrace and
implementation of the following key
elements of a “development constitution”:
 Palestine is for all Palestinians
everywhere.
 The Palestinians work together in
the interest of the national and
development endeavor, both
individually and through their
institutions.
 Palestine is a state of institutions
that are democratic, effective, and
strive to serve and empower the
Palestinian people, working to
mobilize human energies and initiative
within an environment of inclusion and
open communication.
 Palestine is a state which embraces
the rule of law and its institutions.
 Palestine is a peace-loving state
whose people strive for peaceful
coexistence and work diligently to
achieve peace in the region and world.
 Palestine, as a state and as a society,
respects human rights, strives to
achieve justice and fairness among all
social sectors, and actively endeavors
to achieve equality for women and
other marginalized groups, such as
youth, workers, children, and persons
with disabilities.
Empowerment should be
seen as a cumulative and
sustainable process.
The Palestinian development
vision must give expression to
the concerns and aspirations
of the public.
Palestine is a state of
institutions that are
democratic, effective, and
strive to serve and empower
the Palestinian people.
Palestine strives to achieve
justice and fairness among
all social sectors, and actively
endeavors to achieve
equality for women and other
marginalized groups, such as
youth, workers, children, and
persons with disabilities.
Palestine is a peace-loving
state whose people strive for
peaceful coexistence.
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 Palestine is a state that respects
international conventions, including
those related to peace, armed conflict,
social development, population, the
child, and the elimination of all forms of
discrimination.
 Palestine, as a state and as a
society, respects individual rights
and freedoms, including freedom of
thought, expression, press, and
publication.
 Palestine, as a state and as a
society, respects the environment
and serves as a global model in this
field, preserving the rights of future
generations to enjoy plentiful resources.
 Palestine is a state that recognizes
modernization as the path to
advanced levels of development and
works to use information technology as
a means to achieve development,
social justice, and economic revival.
 Palestine is a holy land for all
religions and the Palestinians work
to serve as a model of inclusiveness
and peaceful human coexistence within
their society.
 Palestine, as a state and as a
society, believes in tolerance and
nonviolence, and it strives to benefit
from historical experience to promote
a culture of nonviolence in all parts of
the world and its educational curricula
reflect this priority.
 Palestine, as a state and as a
society, is concerned with culture, and
it strives to preserve the positive aspects
of the national heritage and to promote a
universal, humanitarian culture by
encouraging the arts, theatre,
and literature.
 Palestine has a strong civil society,
which continues to promote participation,
accountability, and true representation for
the marginalized groups in society.
 Palestine has a private sector that
contributes significantly to
economic and social development
and assumes its national and
development responsibilities.
 The Palestinians have a
well-guided, responsible, and
sincere leadership that inspires all
segments of the population;
strengthens and supports society in all
its endeavors; works with its
constituents on the development of
shared vision, policies, plans, and real
solutions; unifies Palestinians around
national goals; and helps coordinate
existing development efforts as well as
to initiate and encourage new efforts.
The dream of a state and society in
which all citizens may live with dignity,
cooperation, responsibility, love, and
peace is attainable once the obstacles
to achieving it are removed. A serious
look at the human reality affirms that
people’s dreams are shared. All people
strive for justice, happiness, and
security at the personal, family, and
community level. It is necessary to
combine efforts and spread a climate of
optimism based on positive actions on
the ground, so that the Palestinians, in
cooperation with the international
community, can build a state that
serves as a model for development,
justice, and peace.
The dream of a state and a
society in which all citizens
may live with dignity,
cooperation, responsibility,
love and peace is attainable.
The Palestinians have a
well-guided, responsible, and
sincere leadership that
inspires all segments of the
population and strengthens
and supports society in all its
endeavors.
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Appendix One
Human Development Indicators
West Bank & Gaza Strip
List (A) Aggregate Indicators in Palestine:
  1. Human development indicators
  2. Economic indicators
  3. Employment and unemployment indicators
  4. Human poverty Indicators
  5. Education Indicators
  6. Health Indicators
  7. Basic demographic indicators
  8. Gender and human development indicators 2002
  9. Gender and human development indicators 2003
10. Gender and human development indicators 2003
11. Gender and human development indicators 2004
12. Casualties of Israeli violence
13. Selected social indicators
14. Access to information and technology indicators
15. Food security and environmental indicators
List (B) Regional Indicators: The West Bank and Gaza Strip
   1. General development indicators
   2. Employment and income indicators
List (C) Indicators by type of Residence
List (D) Governorate Indicators
   1. Population distrutation.
   2. Students per teacher and students per classroom
   3. Percentage distribution of employed persons by economic activity
   4. Poverty indicators
List (E) Palestinian abroad (Diaspora): general development indicators
List (F): International Funds Indicators:
1. Commitments by donor countries (1994-2003)
2. Regional Distribution of the International donations (1994-2003)
3. Loans from the donor countries (1994-2003)
List (G): Annual Comparative Indicators
1. Health and Domographic indicators
2. General Economic indicators
3. Employment and Unemployment Indicators
Note: Only sources other than PCBS are indicated when used.
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List (A): Aggregate indicators in Palestine
Table (1): Human Development Indicators
(%)
(%)
$
2003
72.3
91.9
73.6
1203.4
2003
72.4
92.4
Life expectancy at birth (year)
Adult literacy rate
Combined first-, second- and third level gross enrolment ratio 2002/2003
Adjusted real per capita GDP
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1 Source of data indicated by  is the Palestinian Monetary Authority. Source of data indicated by  is the Ministry of finance. Source of data indicated by  is the Word
Bank. Source of data indicated by  is MOPIC.
2 Services include wholesale, retail trade, transport, financial intermediation, other services, public administration, and defense.
Total GNP (million $)
Total GDP (million $)
GNP growth annual rate
GDP growth annual rate
Per capita GNP $
Per capita GDP $
Per capita GDP growth annual rate 
Per capita GDP growth annual rate***
Imports of goods & services growth annual rate 
Table (2): Economic indicators
1
Gross capital formation (million $)
Final consumption (million $)
Total liabilities and assets  in the banks (million $ ) 
Public expenditures  (million $) 
Public revenues (million $) 
Governmental consumption (million $) 
Governmental consumption (growth annual rate) 
Proportion of people living on less than two dollars per day 
Exports of goods & services growth annual rate  
Number of closure days per year 
Percentage share of economic sectors in GDP
       Agriculture
       Industry
       Building and construction
       Services
2
Commitments by donor countries (million $) 
Disbursements by donor countries (million $) 
2003
4570.7
4169.3
-5.1
-3.6
1319.3
1203.4
-8.2
-10.0
-19.8
-15.4
210
9.3
15.3
2.7
72.7
582.1
490.2
727.2
5507.2
519.9
1126
798
1222.9
-7.8
40.0
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40.4
12.8
2.5
1.2
15.7
12.5
13.1
58.7
591
68.2
6.2
25.6
38.4
203
3.5
27.8
57.8
11.4
23.0
73.7
4.0
22.2
18.7
13.5
18.6
8.7
14.3
9.8
50.8
31.5
7.9
3 Services include commerce, hotels, restaurants, transportation, storage, communications, services and other branches.
  2003    Q2/2004     2004
40.4
13.4
2.8
1.9
15.2
13.1
10.4
61.3
556
64.0
7.4
28.6
39.2
238
4.4
26.9
57.8
10.9
24.9
73.0
3.9
24.2
18.3
13.8
17.1
8.9
13.8
12.0
48.9
33.3
5.8
40.5
13.5
2.7
1.3
15.9
12.7
11.7
59.7
618
66.9
6.3
26.8
39.8
225
4.1
26.5
58.3
11.1
23.5
74.9
3.8
23.6
18.2
14.2
17.1
8.8
14.3
12.1
49.0
33.2
5.7
 Table (3): Employment & Unemployment Indicators
Proportion of the labor force over the age of 15                          (%)
Proportion of women in the labor force                                       (%)
Proportion of children ( 10-17) year in the labor force                (%)
Proportion of children ( 10-14) year in the labor force                (%)
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity:
       Agriculture
       Industry
       Building and construction
       Services
3
Number of workers in Palestine                                         (thousands)
Full employment rate                                                                   (%)
Underemployment rate                                                                 (%)
Unemployment rate                                                                      (%)
Unemployment rate, ages (15-24)
Number of employment searchers                                              (thousands)
Percentage distribution of employed persons by employment status:
       Employer
       Self employed
       Wage employee
       Unpaid family member
Average monthly work days
Average daily wage (NIS)
Distribution of employed by occupation:                                    (%)
       Legislator, senior officials and managers
       Professionals, technicians and clerks
       Services, shop and market workers
       Skilled agriculture and fishery workers
       Craft and related trade workers
       Plant and machine operators and assemblers
       Elementary occupations
Reasons for remaining outside the labor force:                           (%)
       Old-age / illness
       Housework
       Education or training
       Other reasons
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4 As defined by PCBS. WHO (1993) has estimated that 70 % of Palestinians don’t receive clean water.
Table (4): Human poverty indicators
People not expected to survive to age 40                                     (%)
Adult illiteracy rate                                                                         (%)
Population without access
        to safe water
4
                                                                        (%)
        to sanitation                                                                           (%)
Unemployment rate                                                                       (%)
Poverty rate
Absolute poverty
2003
5.4
8.1
10.5
49.2
25.6
35.5
24.3
2003
5.6
7.6
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2003
91.9
98.7
73.6
4.5
91.9
64.0
27.1
5.3
3.4
8.1
27.3
36.1
30.4
16.93
71
8.1
8.0
19.3
33.6
19.5
4.4
7.1
11.0
5 Source of data indicated by * is the Ministry of education.
Table (5): Education Indicators
Adult literacy                                                                                                                        (%)
Adult literacy ( 15-24)                                                                                                          (%)
Combined first-, second- and third level gross enrolment ratio           2002/2003               (%)
Enrollment in secondary technical education from total secondary education                    (%)
Enrollment in basic education                                                                                              (%)
Enrollment in secondary education                                                                                     (%)
Enrollment in higher education                                                                                            (%)
Enrollment in natural and applied sciences from total enrollment in higher education 2002/2003 (%)
Annual increase in numbers of student (basic and secondary education)
Illiteracy rate
Number of students per teacher in schools 
5
Average number of students per class in basic education 
Average number of students per class in secondary education 
Average number of students per social consultant (counselors) 
Number of students per computer in schools 
Proportion of the Educational status over the age of 15
      Illiterate
      Can read or write
      Elementary
      Preparatory
      Secondary
      Associate Diploma
      Bachelor +
Share of education from international assistance                                                               (%)
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2003
72.3
80-78
6.0
24.2
28.3
0
0
15
14
1.8
1.4
73
93.8
50.8
8.0
41.7
2004
72.4
69.3
73.4
93.8
79.7
83.7
66.4
83.4
96.5
96.3
34.6
4.9
9.9
2.8
0
0
18.0
76.7
Table (6): Health Indicators
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Proportion of coverage of vaccination
Children ( under age of 5)  vaccinated against :
      Measles
      BCG
      HBV
      Polio
      MMR
      DPT
Women who have received some form of health care during pregnancy  (%)
Births under some form of health supervision                                           (%)
Percentage of mothers received tetanus toxoid
Average maternal mortality per 100,000 1995
Fertility rate among women ( 15-19 ) of total 1999                                   (%)
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 1995-1999
Child mortality below the age of 5 per  1000 births 1995-1999
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting weight-for-age
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting height-for-age
Percentage of children under five years of age wasting weight-for-height
Tuberculosis cases per 100,000 people
Malaria cases per 100,000 people
Number of doctors  (per 10000 people)
Number of nurses (per 10000 people)
Persons with disability as a percentage of total population 1997
Hospital beds per 1,000
Number of hospitals
Households connected to public water networks 2002                              (%)
Households connected to public sewage networks                                    (%)
Smokers ( over 12 years of age )                                                               (%)
Percentage of people with health insurance
Share of health from international assistance                                             (%)
Proportion of families unable to reach health centers on time when needed
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2003
3.7
5.9
3.5
0
6.1
97.0
2.1
42.6
39.2
4.2
9
82.9
28.5
15.1
56.4
46.2
26.8
18.6
5.3
3.1
43.9
52.0
0.8
3.5
0.2
2004
3.8
5.9
3.5
0
5.7
95.5
1.86
42.3
38.6
4.1
8.9
50.6
82.9
28.5
15.1
56.4
45.8
27.1
18.8
5.3
3.0
43.9
52.1
0.7
3.1
0.2
2020
4.99
Table (7): Basic Demographic Indicators
Population (million)
 Date population doubles
Population forecast 2010
Total fertility rate                                                                            (%) 1999
Annual natural rate of population growth
Net migration
Average family size
Dependency ratio
Households by tenure of housing unit                                           (%)
Refugees as a proportion of population
Average crude births per 1000
Average crude death per 1000
Females headed household                                                          (%)
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives
Proportion of home owners
Proportion of population by locality:                                              (%)
      Rural
      Refugee camps
      Urban
Percentage distribution of the population according to age          (%)
      0 -14
      15 - 29
      30 - 49
      50 - 64
      65+
Palestinians 12 years and over by marital status:                        (%)
      Never or legally engaged
      Married
      Divorced
      Widowed
      Separated
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Table (8): Gender and Human Development Indicators, 2002
Indicators
Population distribution
Life expectancy at birth years
Average marriage age
Adult literacy ratio                                                                                  (%)
Enrollment rates in the stages of education
          Basic education                                                                           (%)
          Secondary education                                                                   (%)
          Higher education
          Basic and secondary and higher education
Drop out rates of the secondary level 2002
Distribution of labor force from the total labor force over the age of 15 (%)
Distribution of Unemployment  rate
Distribution of workers according to profession                             (%)
Legislators and higher administrative employees
Artisans, specialists, and clerks
Service employees and retailers
Skilled employees in agriculture and fishing
Handicraft employees and others
Machine workers and assemblers
Primary professions
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services
Poverty rate in household headed by 1998
Ministers in the Ministerial Council 2004
 Members in workers union                                                                    (%)
Judges   (number) 2002
Members in PLC
Females         Males
Ratio of
females to
males
1,714,599.00
73.0
19.0
87.4
94.6
66.4
28.1
74.6
4.8
10.4
14.0
2.7
48.4
7.8
28.7
6.3
0.9
5.2
29.9
8.1
0.2
11.9
25.60
2
7.5
7
5
1,757,522.00
69.8
24.2
95.7
93.6
58.6
26.2
72.5
2.6
65.5
30.8
4.8
19.0
21.0
9.5
19.7
10.0
16.0
11.9
13.9
13.0
29.9
19.80
22
92.5
93
83
97.6
104.6
78.5
91.3
101.1
113.3
107.3
102.9
184.7
15.6
45.5
56.3
254.7
37.1
302.1
32.0
9.0
32.5
251.3
58.3
1.5
39.8
129.30
9.1
8.1
7.5
6
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Enrollment rates in the stages of education
Females
1,887,874.00
74.0
19.4
87.4
3.1
4.7
92.4
76.5
12.8
18.6
2.9
40.6
9.9
35.4
5.3
1.5
4.4
36.2
7.3
0.1
56.4
Ratio of
females to
males
97.3
104.4
78.9
90.8
39.8
50
0.99
0.90
18.9
69.1
69.0
234.7
47.4
364.9
24.8
14.9
26.8
296.7
54.1
0.6
96.7
Table (9): Gender and Human Development Indicators, 2003
Males
1,940,040.00
70.9
24.6
96.3
7.8
9.4
91.4
60.7
67.6
26.9
4.2
17.3
20.9
9.7
21.4
10.1
16.4
12.2
13.5
16.0
58.3
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity
Indicators
Population distribution
Life expectancy at birth years   2004
Average marriage age
Adult literacy ratio                                                           (%)
Distribution of those who have BA and Above (1997)     (%)
Distribution of those who have BA and Above (2003)     (%)
Basic education                                                         (%)
Secondary education                                                 (%)
Distribution of labor force from the total labor force over the age of
15  (%)
Distribution of unemployment  rate                                 (%)
Legislators and higher administrative employees
Artisans, specialists, and clerks
Service employees and retailers
Skilled employees in agriculture and fishing
Handicraft employees and others
Machine workers and assemblers
Primary professions
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services
Distribution of workers according to profession (%)
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Indicators (percentage of total)
Labor force from the total labor force over the age of 15    (%)
Unemployment  rate
Legislators and higher administrative employees
Artisans, specialists, and clerks
Service employees and retailers
Skilled employees in agriculture and fishing
Handicraft employees and others
Machine workers and assemblers
Primary professions
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services
Females
17.2
11.4
12.5
32.7
8.9
43.1
4.9
3.0
5.3
38.1
10.1
0.1
16.7
Males
82.8
88.6
87.5
67.3
  91.1
56.1
95.1
97.0
94.7
61.9
89.9
99.9
83.3
Ratio of
females to
males
20.8
12.9
14.3
48.6
9.8
75.7
5.2
3.1
5.6
61.6
11.2
0.1
20.0
Table (10): Gender and Human Development Indicators,2003 (Percentage of Total)
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity
Distribution of workers according to profession                (%)
169Palestine - Human Development Report 2004
Females
18.6
10.9
11.9
34.7
8.4
43.3
5.8
4.7
6.0
40.1
12.1
0.5
17.7
Males
81.4
89.1
88.1
65.3
91.6
56.7
94.2
95.3
94.0
59.9
87.7
99.5
82.3
Ratio of
females to
males
22.9
12.3
13.5
53.1
9.2
76.4
6.1
4.6
6.4
66.9
14.0
0.5
21.6
Table (11): Gender and Human Development Indicators, q2/2004
Indicators (percentage of total)
Distribution of Labor force from the total labor force over the age
 of 15 (%)
Distribution of Unemployment  rate
Legislators and higher administrative employees
Artisans, specialists, and clerks
Service employees and retailers
Skilled employees in agriculture and fishing
Handicraft employees and others
Machine workers and assemblers
Primary professions
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity
Distribution of workers according to profession                  (%)
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Table (12) Casualties of Israeli violence
# of Palestinians killed  30/4/2004
# of children killed  4/4/2004
Permanent disabilities  13/1/2004
# of injured  30/4/2004
# of homes fully destroyed 2003
# of homes partially destroyed 2003
# of uprooted trees  2003
# of businesses fully destroyed 2003
Average economic losses (Billion) till the end of 2002
3084
599
6681
38684
852
2000
83000
412
1.536
Table (13) Selected Social Indicators
Number of Doctors                                                       (per 1000 people)
Number of Teachers                                                      (per 1000 people)
Palestinians abroad                                                        (million )
Population density  person / km2
Divorce rate
Poverty rate
Suicide attempts                                                            (number)
Suicide                                                                           (number of cases)
Number of reported rape cases
Number of reported rape attempts
Political prisoners in Israeli prisons
2003
15
10.2
4.84
606
1.1
35.5
133
11
71
14
8000
2004
10.9
4.98
636
7500
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2003
42.6
66.1
91.9
21.3
6.0
604
529.8
393.4
3234.4
1.9
18.8
105774
2004
40.8
72.8
93.4
26.4
9.2
69.5
Table (14): Access to information and technology indicators
Households with Telephone line                                                              (%)
Households with mobile (owned by any member of household)             (%)
Households with TV sets                                                                         (%)
Households with computers                                                                    (%)
Households with internet services                                                           (%)
Households with satellite                                                                         (%)
Main roads network length                                                                      KM
Regionalism roads network length                                                          KM
Internal roads network length                                                                  KM
# of taxis per 1000 residents
# of private cars per 1000 residents
Grand total of licensed vehicles
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2003
6020
43.5
25.2
2694.6
417
42.9
20.4
20.4
12.2
6.0
47193.1
4.5
0.7
374
1,851,070.00
2004
6020
Percentage of household exposed to different sources of  pollution:
Table (15): Food security and environmental indicators (natural resources)
Total area (West Bank and Gaza Strip  (km2)
Average per capita electricity consumption  (kw/h)
Percentage of household using traditional fuel
Solid waste produced daily by household  (Ton)
Percentage of communities served by solid waste collection
Percentage of household with access to public sewage networks
     Noise
     Smell
     Dust
     Smoke
Amount of water purchased from the Israeli water company  (1000m3)
A mount of solid waste produced daily by household   (kg)
The daily average of solid waste produced by individual (kg)
The total of residential locations exposed to smells (pollution)
Sustainable agriculture land  2002  (km2)
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List (B): Regional indicators
Table (1): General Development Indicators
Indicators
Population distribution                                                            (%)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Sex ratio
Adult literacy ratio
Basic education
Secondary education
Higher education
Basic and secondary and higher education
Natural rate of population growth
Population (million) 2004
Population (million) 2003
0-14
15-29
30-49
Over 50
Refugees as a proportion of the population
Average family size  (persons)  2003
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives, or their husbends   2005
Female headed households 2004
Infant mortality per 1000 live births
Child mortality below the age of 5 per  1000 births
Average crude births per 1000                                               (%)
Average crude death rates per 1000                                      (%)
Total fertility rate     2003                                                        (%)
Proportion of home owners 2004
Households with TV sets 2004                                               (%)
Gaza StripWest Bank Palestine
63.2
72.8
102.9
91.8
88.8
60.8
-
-
3.2
2.42
2.31
44.0
27.1
20.0
8.9
29.4
5.8
54.9
9.9
35.8
4.1
5.1
80.4
94.6
36.8
71.1
102.6
91.9
96.8
96.3
-
-
4.0
1.41
1.33
48.8
26.8
16.9
7.5
65.5
6.8
43.0
7.0
43.4
3.9
6.6
87.8
91.2
100
72.4
102.8
91.9
91.9
94.0
27.1
73.6
3.5
3.83
3.647
45.8
27.1
18.8
8.3
42.6
6.1
50.6
8.9
38.6
4.1
5.6
82.9
93.4
Enrollment rates in the stages of education 2003
Percentage distribution of the population according to age   (%)
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West BankGaza Strip Palestine
1350.3
1430.7
41.9
23.8
14.7
14.9
14.0
14.3
56.8
4.1
29.2
55.3
11.4
944.2
1014.9
37.6
29.2
9.2
17.4
9.2
10.4
63.0
2.2
24.5
61.8
11.5
1203.4
1319.3
40.4
25.6
12.8
15.7
12.5
13.1
58.7
3.5
27.8
57.8
11.4
Distribution of workers according to the economic activity:  (%)
Distribution of workers according to the employment status (%)
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Table (2): Employment and income indicators, 2003
Indicators
Per capita GDP ($) 2002
Per capita GNP  ($)  2002
Participation rate in the labor force (15 and above)
Unemployment rates (%)
Share of women in the labor force (%)
Agriculture and fishing
Mining, stone crushing
Building and construction
Services
Employers
Self employed
Wage employee
Family members without wages
Rural Urban Refugee
28.5
89.7
6.1
54.3
8.0
20.3
24.5
5.64
89.6
90.1
56.4
93.6
6.0
50.0
9.4
23.6
27.7
5.51
77.5
92.9
15.1
91.5
6.6
44.6
9.7
32.5
36.2
6.06
89.9
91.8
List (C): Indicators by type of residence
Indicators (2003)
Population distribution                                                                       (%)
Adult literacy ratio
Average family size  (persons)
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives (2004)
Females headed Households
Infant mortality per 1000 live births  1999-2003
Child mortality below the age of 5 per  1000 births 1999-2003
Total fertility rate  2003                                                                      (%)
Proportion of home owners                                                               (%)
Households with TV sets                                                                   (%)
Appedix One176
Governorate Population, 2004
259683
47543
171520
95752
63300
334050
284940
410193
43065
178104
533337
2421491
267239
294953
203667
273074
167490
1406423
3827914
List (D): Governorate Indicators
Table (1): Population distrutation
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Salfit
Nablus
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Jericho
Bethlehem
Hebron
Total West Bank
North Gaza
Gaza
Deir Al-Balah
Khan-Younis
Rafah
Total Gaza Strip
Grand total
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Table (2) : Students per teacher and students per classroom:
6
Palestinian Territories
West Bank
Jenin
Qabatya
Nablus
Salfit
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Jerusalem Suburbs
Bethlehem
Jericho
Hebron
South Hebron
Gaza Strip
Gaza
North Gaza
Khanyounis
Rafah
Indicator/ Governorate Student per Teacher Student per Classroom
35.5
31.8
33.3
33.2
40.6
19.9
34.4
32.9
36.0
55.3
36.3
40.0
38.0
37.1
33.5
42.7
42.4
42.4
43.1
43.0
23.9
21.4
21.4
22.0
23.2
19.8
21.8
21.9
19.3
19.5
17.9
20.5
22.9
23.0
22.7
31.1
28.0
29.2
28.6
29.2
6 Ministry of Education, 2004.
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Table (3) : Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Activity
Jenin & Tubas
Tulkarm & Qalqilya
Nablus & Salfit
Ramallah & Al-Beirah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem & Jericho
Hebron
West Bank
North Gaza
Gaza
Deir Al-Balah
Khanyounis
Rafah
Gaza Strip
Palestinian Territories
Governorate
Economic activities
Agriculture Industry
Building and
Construction
Services
2003
32.7
25.3
15.8
6.0
1.0
13.8
16.5
14.9
17.5
4.0
18.3
25.6
29.3
17.4
15.7
2004
35.4
24.9
18.6
6.0
1.3
15.9
18.0
16.9
13.6
2.7
13.3
29.2
25.7
13.4
15.9
2003
7.6
11.2
14.3
16.4
12.0
15.9
18.3
14.0
9.8
14.4
7.1
3.8
3.0
9.2
12.5
2004
8.6
10.0
16.0
16.5
12.4
17.3
16.6
14.1
9.3
14.0
6.2
4.3
2.6
9.1
12.7
2003
7.7
7.0
11.9
15.9
19.0
19.7
16.3
14.3
12.8
13.0
9.7
6.2
6.4
10.4
13.1
2004
10.4
7.7
10.7
17.4
13.4
16.4
15.5
13.0
7.6
9.2
5.4
9.7
7.5
8.2
11.7
2003
48.0
43.5
42.0
38.3
32.0
49.4
51.1
43.2
40.1
31.4
35.1
35.6
38.7
37.0
41.3
2004
54.4
42.6
45.3
39.9
27.1
49.6
50.1
44.0
30.5
25.9
24.8
42.5
38.8
30.7
40.3
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Table (4) Poverty Rates by Governorate, till the end of 2003
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Salfit
Nablus
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Hebron
West Bank
North Gaza
Gaza
Deir Al-Balah
Khanyounis
Rafah
Gaza Strip
Total
Governorate Poverty Rate
47.7
58.6
44.9
16.9
53.2
41.5
19.9
17.2
3.6
30.5
38.0
30.9
41.5
35.0
53.6
53.0
50.9
44.7
35.5
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List (E): Palestinians abroad
Table (1) Palestinians abroad (Diaspora): general development indicators (2003)
Population (million)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Number of students Combined first-, second- and third level gross
Average number of students per class
Number of students per teacher in schools
Percentage distribution of the population according to age (%)
       0-14
       65+
Average family size
Headed household by women
Infant mortality per 1000 live births
Child mortality below the age of  5 per1000  births
Average crude births  per 1000
Average crude death  per 1000
Fertility rate
Households by tenure of housing unit (%)
Household connected to electricity
Household connected to water by pipe
Household connected to Sewage
Poverty rate
Indicators Jordan Syria Lebanon Iraq Egypt
2.798
69
41.0
30.2
42.5
3.0
6.2
10.0
24.9
27.4
29
5
4.6
3
98.9
94.4
99.5
23.0
0.436
70
44.3
36.8
36.7
3.9
5.5
9.3
34.0
42.0
28.3
5
3.5
2.3
99.3
79.6
92.8
26.3
0.415
70
40.2
33.8
36.4
4.4
5.1
12.5
38.0
48.5
29.3
7
3.5
5.1
70.0
99.0
10.6
0.11
58
39.7
3.4
127.0
10
5.4
0.062
66
39
22.0
52.0
26.0
6
3.5
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List (F): International Funds Indicators
7
:
Table (1): Commitments by donor countries (1994-2003) Million $
Arab Countries
EU
USA
Japan
International Institutes
European Countries
Other Countries
Total
Donors
Total
Commitments Disbursements Commitments CommitmentsDisbursements Disbursements Commitments
8
Disbursements
1994-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003
312.3
520.2
292.9
298.9
225.5
1107.6
101.5
2858.9
193.8
219.1
285.3
308.3
139.3
810.9
72.6
2029.3
101.5
507.2
396.8
167.5
180.5
858.6
57.2
2269.2
105
235
260.4
132.4
140.7
533.4
57.9
1465.9
5.2
187.3
759.5
37.5
54.5
519.3
16.7
1580
903.4
787.3
482.3
41.3
154.7
669.5
18.9
3057.4
418.9
1214.6
1449.2
504
460.4
2485.6
175.4
6708.3
1203.1
1214.6
1028
482
434.7
2013.8
149.4
6552.5
Total
Commitments Disbursements Commitments CommitmentsDisbursements Disbursements Commitments
9
Disbursements
1994-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003
Table (2): regional Distribution of the International donations (1994-2003) Million $
Infrastructure
Production Sectors
Social Sectors
Building Institutions
Other Sectors
Sector
999.3
270.5
815.2
697
76.9
2858.9
606
137.3
599
604.5
82.5
2029.3
1025.5
348.9
439.1
406.1
49.6
2269.3
550.5
192.5
427.4
241.7
53.8
1465.9
500
143.9
516
333.2
87.1
1580.2
307
98.5
2094.7
346.8
210.2
3057.4
2524.8
763.2
1770.3
1436.2
213.8
6708.3
1463.5
428.3
3121.1
1193
346.5
6552.3
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7 Calculations by the research team based on data
published by    MOP and MOF
8 By mid - 2003
9 By mid - 2003
Total
Commitments Disbursements Commitments CommitmentsDisbursements Disbursements Commitments10 Disbursements
1994-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003
Table (3): Loans from the donor countries (1994-2003) Million $
Arab Countries
EU
European Countries
China
International Institutes
 Total
Loaner
36.9
98.9
55.2
12.5
202.2
405.7
0
0
30.2
1.7
106.6
138.6
9.8
154.6
149.4
1.2
155
469.9
26
86.9
51.3
0.3
113.9
278.4
0
0
28.4
0
43
71.4
486.4
12.6
9.8
0
66.2
575
46.7
253.5
233
13.7
400.2
947
512.4
99.5
91.3
2
286.7
992
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10 By mid - 2003
Reported health status, health behavior and health services
1996 2000 2004
NA
NA
NA
NA
6.1(1994)
NA
NA
4.8(1995)
NA
NA
21.8
39.9
2.7
NA
61.6
45.2
30.7
21.5
3.8
NA
18.5
46.9
3.4
44.0
5.9(1999)
25.5 (1995-1999)
28.7(1995-1999)
4.6
18
28.2
22.1
40.7
3.2
37.4
60.4
51.4
36.7
24.6
5.8
 52.4
List (G): Annual Comparative Indicators
Table (1): Health and Domographic indicators
11
Demographic Indicators
Children less than 5 years old
Children less than 15 years old
Persons 65 years old and over
Women 15-49 years old
Total Fertility Rate
Infant mortality rate
Under five mortality rate
Children ever born alive
Median age at first marriage
Consanguinity (first cousins marriage)
Percentage of individuals 10 years old and over who smoke
Males
Females
Percent of households consuming iodized salt
Percent of individuals with health insurance
Percentage of women (15-49 years old) reporting currently
using any family planning method at the time of the survey
Percentage of women (15-49 years old) reporting currently using
any modern family planning method at the time of the survey
Percentage of women (15-49 years old) reporting currently
using IUD at the time of the survey
Percentage of women (15-49 years old) reporting currently
using Pill at the time of the survey
Women (less than 55 years old) who want no more children
Maternal and child health
Family planning
17.6
45.8
3.0
45.5
5.6(2003)
24.2 (1999-2003)
28.3(1999-2003)
4.5
18
27.4
18.0
33.7
2.0
65.3
76.2
47.9
34.4
23.5
6.2
51.7
Appedix One184
11 NA: Not Available
Main type of delivery
Breastfeeding
94.6
86.8
10.0
22.0
50.4
NA
72.3
6.8
3.1
11.1
96.0
7.4
58.3
11
NA
NA
NA
38.1
66.8
95.6
94.8
5.2
27.5
75.8
44.3
72.1
8.8
2.7
16.4
96.8
12.9
68.8
11.1
16.7
38.1
0.7
50.4
71.4
96.5
96.3
3.1
34.6
75.7
43.6
71.5
12.4
2.4
13.7
95.6
9.8
65.8
9.9
25.4
33.3
2.9
61.8
72.9
Ante natal care and delivery
Percentage of women (less than 55 years old) who reported
receiving ante-natal care with the last two births taking place
during the past three years
Percentage of births taking place in health institutions of the last
two births reported by women during the past three years
Births that took place at home
Percent of women (less than 55 years) with a birth in the past
year and reported receiving tetanus toxoid2
Percent of women (less than 55 years) who received Iron
tablets3
Percent of women (less than 55 years) who received folic acid
Normal delivery
Caesarian
Suction and forceps
Episiotomy
Percent of children who breastfed
Percent of children who were weaned during the first three months
Continued breastfeeding rate (9-12 months)
Mean duration of breastfeeding (months)
Children 0-6 months who were exclusively breastfed
Children 0-6 months who were mixed fed (breast and other milk)
breastfed
Children 0-6 months who exclusively received milk other than
breast milk
Percent of children under one year of age who received vitamin A/D
Percent of children under five years of age whose Immunization
cards were seen
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Percent of children (12-23) months whose cards were seen and receive
Immunized against polio (3rd dose)
Immunized against DPT (3rd dose)
Immunized against measles
Children aged 18-59 months that were fully immunized4
Percentage of children under 5 years who suffered from
Stunting
Wasting
Under weight
95.7
96.4
48.9
NA
7.2
2.8
4.0
96.8
88.5
92.9
69.9
7.5
1.4
2.5
98.1
97.9
95.3
77.8
9.9
2.8
4.9
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5426.5
1722.7
4619.2
4574
1162.2
1507.7
2624.8-
3513.9
73
889.1
92.3
1466.4
8.5
15.7
6.5
69.3
852.8
946
940
24
964
360.3
603.7
4817.4
1460.3
4325.7
4371.8
1326.1
1186.2
2550.3-
3155.5
NA
605.2
NA
1311.2
8.1
14.9
5.1
71.9
619.9
1129
1091
38
758
255.9
325.1
4570.0
1319.3
4169.3
4284.8
1222.9
727.2
2050.1-
2615.1
NA
565
NA
1203.4
9.3
15.3
2.7
72.7
582.1
1126
1096
30
798
205
0
4581.8
1226.1
4143.3
NA
NA
NA
2081.1-
2701.5
NA
620.4
NA
1108.7
NA
NA
NA
NA
378.2
1066
1044
22
1066
207
324
2000 2001 2002 2003
Table (2): General Economic indicators
12
Total GNP (million $)
Per capita GNP $
Total GDP  (million $)
Final consumption (million $)
Governmental consumption (million $)
Total Investment ( Million $)
net accumulation of Export Income ( Million $)
Total Imports ( Million $)
Percentage of Imports of goods & services from Israel
Total Exports ( Million $)
Percentage of Exports of goods & services to Israel (million) $
Adjusted real per capita GDP $
Percentage of share of economic sectors in GDP
       Agriculture
       Industry
       Building and construction
       Services
Commitments by donor countries (million $)
Public expenditures  (million $) 
Current Expenditures (million $) 
Development Expenditures
Public revenues (million $) 
Domestic revenues (million $) 
Clearing revenues (million $)
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12 Source of data indicated by  is the Palestinian Monetary Authority. Source of data indicated
by  is the Ministry of planning. Source of data indicated by  is Ministry of finance.
Donations to finance the current budget (million $) 
Budget deficit + Arrears (million $) 
Public Debt  (million $)
Proportion of people living on less than two dollars per day
Number of closure days ( Days)
Total liabilities  in the banks (million $ ) 
Total banking facilities
Percentage of   over draft from total bankng  facilities
Percentage of loans from total banking  facilities
Total deposite in the banks   (Million $) 
Percentage of deposites to facilities
Total profits (Million $) 
0
(50)
Arrears
391.8
32
62
412.35
1346.25
56.8
38.4
3506.9
38.4
21.9
117+60
Low rate
loans
(371+155)
Arrears
839.7
44
210
372.73
1220
52.7
44.4
3492.55
34.9
(1.87)
578+15
Low rate
loans
(328+425)
Arrears
962.2
60
NA
396.56
957.12
54.4
43.6
3563.37
26.9
(12.37)
535
0.0
989.2
NA
NA
519.9
1072
44.2
44.3
3523.52
30.4
(8.63)
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2000 2001 2002 2003
Banking Data 2000 2001 2002 2003
Table (3): Employment and Unemployment Indicators:
Proportion of the labor force over the age of 15          (%)
Proportion of women in the labor force                        (%)
Proportion of children (10-14) year in the labor force   (%)
Number of workers in Palestine  (thousands)
Number of workers in the local economy
Number of workers in the public sector
Number of workers in Israel and in Israeli Settlements
Average daily wage for workers in the West Bank  ( NIS)
Average daily wage for male workers in the West Bank ( NIS)
Average daily wage for female workers in the West Bank ( NIS)
Average daily wage for workers in Gaza Strip (NIS)
Average daily wage for  male workers in Gaza Strip ( NIS)
Average daily wage for  female workers in Gaza Strip ( NIS)
Average daily wage s for workers in Israel and in
Israeli Settlements  ( NIS)
Average daily wage for male workers in Israel and in
 Israeli Settlements  ( NIS)
Average daily wage for female workers in Israel and in
 Israeli Settlements  ( NIS)
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity:
      Agriculture
     Industry
     Building and construction
     Services
Unemployment rate  (%)
Unemployment rate, ages (15-24) (%)
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41.5
12.7
1.8
597
480
115
117
69.5
72.8
55.5
53.3
53.7
50.7
110.4
110.7
91
13.7
14.3
19.7
52.3
14.1
20
38.7
10.4
0.6
508
438
118
70
69.1
72.4
56.8
54.4
54.8
51.1
106.9
107.2
93
12
14
14.6
59.4
25.5
31.1
38.1
10.4
0.6
486
436
113
50
71.4
74.2
62.1
54.9
54.8
56.3
117.3
117.4
14.8
12.9
10.9
61.4
31.3
42.6
40.4
12.8
1.2
591
533.7
NA
57.3
72.2
75
63.3
53.1
53.1
53.0
125.1
125.7
15.7
12.5
13.1
58.7
25.6
38.4
2000 2001 2002 2003
Reasons for remaining outside the labor force:  (%)
     Old-age / illness
     Housework
     Education or training
     Other reasons
9.5
53.7
26.8
10
9
53.7
26.7
10.6
8.5
52
29
10.5
9.8
50.8
31.2
5.7
12.1
49.0
33.2
5.7
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In order to ensure the accuracy and objectivity of the Human Development Report, and to guarantee the meaningful
involvement of all relevant Palestinian actors — including PA institutions, political groups, civil society organizations,
academic institutions, professional associations, trade unions and grassroots organizations — a diverse set of
research and data collection methods were employed in its preparation.  These methods include:
 Conducting primary research studies, preparing background papers and performing literature
reviews specifically for the purposes of this report. A list of researchers, authors and reviewers
and their contributions follows:
1. Ibrahim Dakkak, The Role of Civil Society Institutions in Society Building and Empowering the Palestinian People.
2. Bassem Ezbidi, The Role of Palestinian National Authority Institutions in Society Building and Empowering the
   Palestinian People.
3. Nasr Abdul-Karim, The Role of International Funding in Society Building and Empowering the Palestinian People.
4. Jamil Hilal, Emancipatory Empowerment of Palestinian Society in the West Bank and Gaza in the Face of
 Fragmentation, Marginalization, and Intensified Segregation.
5. Taysir Muheisen, Empowerment: The Concept and Its Indicators.
6. Nader Said, The Concept of Empowerment and its Implications.
7. Nader Said, Concepts: Empowerment, Political Participation, and Decision-Making from the Perspective of Gender.
8. Nasser Abul-Atta, The Relationship between the Individual and Society.
9. Nasser Al-Rayyes, Palestinian Human Rights in the Context of International Standards and Conventions.
10. Samir Abdullah, The Nature of the Environment Affecting the Palestinian Development Process.
11. Ibrahim Abu Hantash, Economic Indicators.
12. Samir Abu Zuneid, Remarks on the Human Development Report 2003/2004.
13. Tafidah Al-Jarbawi, Gender in Palestinian School Textbooks.
14. Anwar Hamam, Palestinian Camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Role of UNRWA in Empowering
  the Refugees.
15. Muhsen Abu Ramadan, The Development Environment 2002-2004.
16. Fadwa As-Sha’er, The Future of the Relationship between the Ministry of Interior and Civil Society Institutions.
17. Khalil Nakhleh, Review of the Chapter on the Role of International Funding in Society Building and
     Empowering the Palestinian People.
18. Muhammad Al-Samhouri, Review of the Chapter on the Role of International Funding in Society Building and
  Empowering the Palestinian People.
19. Osama Noufel, Reading of the Draft Human Development Report ≠ Palestine.
 Holding a number of meetings with the Ministerial Committee (composed of representatives from 15
ministries and chaired by the Ministry of Planning) and the Technical Advisory Committee (composed
of 31 academics, experts, and technicians) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The meetings began in the
earliest stages of report preparation in order to identify the principal report themes.  Meetings continued
throughout the stages of report development to discuss and review background papers, report chapters
Appendix Two:  Report Methodology
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and to propose modifications. In addition to these meetings, regular meetings were held with the primary
authors of the report chapters in order to discuss and further develop the content and to closely align all
sections of the report under one theme. A list of the most important meetings conducted throughout the
process of report development follows:
1. An advisory meeting was held with the Ministry of Planning and the United Nations Development Programme to
determine the planning strategy for the report launch. Subsequently, a series of brainstorming sessions were
conducted to consider proposals for the report theme.
2. Four Ministerial Committee meetings were held to follow up on the internal processes of report preparation and
    content development.
3. Five Technical Advisory Committee meetings were held to follow up on the internal process of preparing the
    report and its contents.
4. In cooperation with the Ministry of Planning, focus groups were conducted in order to gather data for use in the
    chapter on the PA institutions and their role in empowerment.   These focus groups were conducted in the West
    Bank on 5 July 2004 and in Gaza on 11 July 2004.
 The DSP conducted thorough literature reviews on the primary report topics and on the issues addressed in its
  chapters. In addition, the DSP examined a large body of statistical data, particularly the publications issued by
  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
 In order to highlight the critical importance of Palestinian public opinion, some of the report chapters reference the
results of various public opinion polls. The DSP designed and conducted a number of polls to explore opinions on
report issues and themes. From the beginning of 2003 through the end of 2004, the DSP conducted ten public
opinion polls (Poll No. 10 on 6-10 February through Poll No. 20 on 3 December 2004).
 The DSP undertook numerous field research activities, such as workshops (with political parties and groups,
representatives of civil society organizations, and representatives of professional and trade unions) and focus groups.
In addition, several research questionnaires for governmental institutions and local authorities were designed to
examine the respective roles of PNA institutions, civil society, and international funding agencies. The most
important field research activities undertaken by the DSP for the purposes of the report include:
1. A questionnaire evaluating the local councils, involving six local councils in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Habla
Municipality, Al-Ram Local Council, Jenin Refugee Camp Popular Services Committee, Beit Hanoun
Municipality, Wadi Al-Salqa Municipality, and Rafah Municipality).
2. A questionnaire evaluating the work of PNA ministries, distributed to nine ministries (the Ministry of Social
Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, the
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Youth and Sport, and the
Ministry of Local Government).
3. A workshop with representatives of professional and trade unions in the West Bank.
4. A workshop with representatives of NGOs in the West Bank.
5. A workshop with representatives of NGOs, unions, and political groups in the Gaza Strip.
6. A workshop with representatives of political parties and national groups in the West Bank.
7. A focus group with ministries receiving international assistance, private sector institutions, NGOs, and beneficiaries.
8. A case study: “The Impact of International Assistance in Promoting Community Participation, especially for
Marginalized Groups, such as Women, Youth, and the Unemployed” in Al-Mazra’a Al-Qabliya village.
9. Gathering data on international assistance from primary sources of statistical data including: the Palestinian Central
     Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian Monetary Authority, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and UNRWA.
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